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INTRODUCTION

The distinctions between corporations and unincorporated
associations have blurred. The vast majority of states have enacted
filing requirements for unincorporated associations that typically had
applied only to corporations.' Although somewhat onerous, complying
*

Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. B.A., Yale

College, 1994; J.D., The University of Chicago, 1997. I thank Steven A. Bank, Barbara
Ann Banoff, Joseph M. Dodge, Elena Kagan, Larry E. Ribstein, and Howard M.
Wasserman for their comments and suggestions. And I appreciate the generous
assistance of Courtney S. Brogan and Michelle J. Ramsey. This paper has benefited
from a faculty workshop at The Florida State University College of Law.
1. See REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 105 & cmt. 2 (Robert W. Hillman et
al. eds., 1999) (noting that "Section 105(a) provides for a single, central filing of all
statements, as is the case with corporations, limited partnerships, and limited liability
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with these requirements indirectly provides certain unincorporated
associations with means to attain limited liability while avoiding
double taxation.2 Further, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
created so-called "check-the-box" regulations3 that permit eligible
companies") [hereinafter RUPA]. Although filings are not mandatory under RUPA, id.
at cmt. 1, they are in many states. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED
BUSINESS ENTITIES §§ 11.01, 12.02A, 13.01A (1996) (outlining filing requirements for
limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and limited liability partnerships).
Twenty-two states have adopted RUPA. RUPA, supra, app. B at 463. All fifty states
have legislation governing the formation and operation of limited liability companies.
See generally J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 15.11-15.60 (1994)
(summarizing state laws on limited liability companies) [hereinafter CALLISON &
SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES]. Every state except Louisiana has adopted
both the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), which was approved in 1916 and
wholly revised in 1976, and the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), which was approved
in 1976 and has been amended several times. RUPA, in 6A UNIFORM LAWS
ANNOTATED 2 (Supp. 2001); see also 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
PARTNERSHIP § 11.02(c), at 11:23 (1996) ("While the 1916 ULPA was motivated largely
by underutilization of its predecessors, the 1976 Act was motivated largely by the
overutilization of its predecessor .. ") [hereinafter BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
PARTNERSHIP]. Every state that has adopted the ULPA, except Vermont, also has
adopted the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA). RULPA, in 6A
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, supra, at 1-2.
2. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company,
51 BUS. LAW. 1, 6 (1995) ("LLC [limited liability company] statutes tend to resemble
corporation and limited partnership statutes in terms of the filings and other
All of the LLC statutes provide that
formalities required to form the firm ....
members, like corporate shareholders, are not liable as such for the debts of the LLC.")
[hereinafter Ribstein, Emergence of LLC]. The connection between filing and limited
liability, however, is not apparent. Many of the conventional reasons supporting filing,
such as third-party notice, do not apply to unincorporated limited associations. This is
because most LLC and LLP statutes require a public name identifying their status.
See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the
Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 386 (1992). A possible explanation for the filing
requirement concerns statutory domicile. One commentator has suggested that "it
might be argued that the formality of a filing requirement is necessary in order to be
completely clear about which state's rules will apply in the absence of any such filing."
Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 433, 440 (1995). Professor Macey rejects this argument because
[n]onfiling firms simply would bear the risk that the law being applied in a particular
case might not be the law they would have selected had they filed" while potential
investors could simply contract for a particular jurisdiction's laws to apply. Id.
Although this might make sense for firms, a potential investor's leverage in this
regard seems dubious.
3. The check-the-box regulations provide:
A business entity that is not classified as a corporation ... can elect its
classification for federal tax purposes as provided in this section. An eligible
entity with at least two members can elect to be classified as either an
association (and thus a corporation under § 301.7701-2(b)(2)) or a
partnership, and an eligible entity with a single owner can elect to be
classified as an association or to be disregarded as an entity separate from
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organizing businesses4 to decide whether they will be regarded as a
corporation or a partnership for federal tax purposes. Not
surprisingly, these state and federal benefits have rendered
unincorporated limited associations a viable, if not superior,
alternative to corporations as a way to organize a business.5
its owner.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (2002).
4. The check-the-box regulations concern publicly traded entities. See, e.g., David
A. Weisbach, Line Drawing,Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1627, 1629-30 (1999)("The check-the-box regulations eliminated the four-factor
test [of the Kintner Regulations] and moved the line between partnerships and
corporations to public trading."). The American Law Institute has proposed uniform
tax treatment for all private entities. See GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW,
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 49
(AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Reporter's Study 1999) (Proposal 2-1) ("[A]ll private
business firms shall be treated alike for income-tax purposes, regardless of their
characteristics or form of organization .. ") [hereinafter ALI, TAXATION OF PRIVATE
ENTERPRISES]. The study, however, is not unproblematic. See, e.g., Steven A. Bank,
Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the CorporateIncome Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 447, 465 (2001) (criticizing the American Law Institute's resort to the traditional
entity theory of corporate personality to explain the enactment of a separate corporate
income tax).
5. See, e.g., Walter D. Schwidetzky, Is It Time To Give the S Corporationa Proper
Burial?, 15 VA. TAX REV. 591, 592 (1996). According to Schwidetzky,
S Corporations were once the entity of choice for small businesses, and
sometimes for larger ones as well. However, new partnership-type vehicles,
specifically the limited liability company and the limited liability
partnership, have now come into their own. These new entities are, on the
whole, the preferred choice for the vast majority of private businesses.
Id. But see infra, note 79. According to Donald C. Alexander, the former Commissioner
of the IRS, "'[n]o rational, reasonably well-informed tax professional would
deliberately choose subchapter S status over an LLC [limited liability company] when
there is a choice, and 99 percent of the time there is a choice."' Amy Hamilton, S
Corporations Most Popular Choice, IRS Finds, TAX PRAC. July 17, 2000, at 1, 67; see
also 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.01, at 1 (2000) (stating that "the LLC has become what many
considered to be the preferred choice for many businesses") [hereinafter RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES]; Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs and
Freeze-Outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 497 (1995)
(predicting that "before too long the LLC may largely render the partnership, limited
partnership and closely held corporation obsolete"); Don W. Llewellyn & Anne
O'Connell Umbrecht, No Choice of Entity After Check-the-Box, 52 TAX LAW. 1, 2 (1998)
(crowning the LLC "as the entity of choice for the next millennium"). Partnerships
with limited liability were particularly attractive when states had more stringent
corporate charter requirements. Richard A. Mann & Barry S. Roberts, Unincorporated
Business Associations:An Overview of Their Advantages and Disadvantages,14 TULSA
L.J. 1, 28 (1978) (stating that the "[1]imited partnership enjoyed wide use when
corporate charters were not readily granted"). Such partnerships continue to be a
prominent form of business organization. See id. ("[T]he past twenty-five years have
witnessed a resurgence in the use of limited partnerships .... "); Fallany D. Stover,
The LLC Versus LLP Conundrum:Advice for Businesses Contemplating the Choice, 50
ALA. L. REV. 813, 841 (1999) ("Unsophisticated businesses that either cannot afford the
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The problem is a continued path dependence' on these now
blurred distinctions. The amended state statutes and liberalized tax
regulations have resulted in proposals for consolidated treatment
that range, inter alia, from a universal statute for all business
organizations7 to a unified limited liability entity.' These proposals

transaction costs of completing an elaborate operating agreement or have not even
considered entering into a written agreement will typically be better off choosing the
LLP.").
6. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 603-04
(2001). Broadly defined, path dependence
means that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific and systematic ways
by the historical path leading to it .... At the most basic level, therefore,
path dependence implies that "what happened at an earlier point in time will
affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point
in time."
Id. (quoting William H. Sewell, Jr., Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful
Sociology, in THE HISTORIC TURN IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 262-63 (Terrence J.
McDonald ed., 1996)). According to Richard Posner,
in a number of other respects, the law is in thrall to history, and not merely
as a matter of judicial psychology. This point can be made perspicuous with
the aid of the economists' concept of path dependence, which means that
where you end up may depend on where you start out from, even if, were it
not for having started where you did, a different end point would be better.
Richard A. Posner, Path-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 583 (2000). See generally
W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY
(1994); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641 (1996). But see generally S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, PathDependence,
Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) (challenging the analytical
utility and validity of path dependence). For corporate applications of path dependence
theory, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999)
(using path dependence theory to explain varying methods of corporate governance);
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
IncreasingReturns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996)
(using path dependence theory to suggest possible reasons for the standardization of
corporate contracts).
7. See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge, Universal Business OrganizationLegislation:Will
It Happen? Why and When, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 29, 81-82 (1998) (discussing "hub and
spokes" structure for a universal statute) [hereinafter Keatinge, Universal Business
Organization Legislation]; Larry E. Ribstein, Linking Statutory Forms, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 200-06 (1995) (delineating relative merits and deficiencies in
enacting a universal statute); Symposium, Check-the-Box and Beyond: The Future of
Limited Liability Entities, 52 BUS. LAW. 605, 610-11 (1997) (proposing one statute to
govern all closely held entities) (statement of D. Gordon Smith); see also infra Part
II.A.
8. See, e.g., Robert C. Art, Conversion and Merger of DisparateBusiness Entities,
76 WASH. L. REV. 349, 378 (2001) (endorsing statutory changes permitting business
entities to convert or merge into all possible combinations); Dale A. Oesterle & Wayne
M. Gazur, What's in a Name?: An Argument for a Small Business "Limited Liability
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are largely a response to certain unincorporated limited associations,
such as the limited liability company (LLC) and the limited liability
partnership (LLP), that amalgamate characteristics once exclusively
associated with corporations and partnerships.' But this exclusivity
no longer obtains. 0 That these combined characteristics can co-exist
in relative balance merely points to the disutility in using
increasingly defunct definitions of a corporation or an unincorporated
association." Without resort to these definitions, there is no legal
justification for collapsing their target corporate distinctions.
This article presents such a justification. By critically examining

Entity" Statute (With Three Subsets of Default Rules), 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101,
131 (1997) (proposing a "limited liability entity" with three sets of default rules
designed to account for different types of business organizations) [hereinafter Oesterle
& Gazur, What's in a Name?]; Larry E. Ribstein, The New Choice of Entity for
Entrepreneurs, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 325, 344 (1997) (suggesting limited liability as a
default rule); see also infra Part II.A.
9. See, e.g., Int'l Flavors & Textures, LLC v. Gardner, 966 F. Supp. 552, 553 (W.D.
Mich. 1997) (characterizing the LLC as "designed to achieve the best of all worlds");
Prefatory Note, UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT, in 6A UNIFORM LAWS
ANNOTATED 426 (1995) ("The allure of the limited liability company is its unique
ability to bring together in a single business organization the best features of all other
business forms .... All state limited liability company acts contain provisions for a
[corporate-styled] liability shield and [pass-through] partnership tax status."). One
commentator explains:
In general, the statutes [authorizing the creation of LLPs] share the theme
that a limited liability partnership will limit, or eliminate, joint and several
liability of partners for some, or all, of the partnership's debts or other
obligations. For purposes other than joint and several liability, the statutes
provide that a limited liability partnership remains a general partnership
under the UPA [Uniform Partnership Act] or RUPA.
Author's Comments, RUPA, supra note 1, § 1001, at 348. See generally Symposium,
LLC, LLPs and the Evolving CorporateForm, 66 U. COLO. L REV. 855 (1995).
10. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
11. Similarly tautological are conventional critiques that focus on the incapacity of
the tax classification system to account for the limited liability company. See, e.g.,
Susan Pace Hamill, A Case for Eliminatingthe PartnershipClassificationRegulations,
68 TAx NOTES 335, 352 (1995) ("Although elimination of the classification regulations
undoubtedly will allow some limited partnerships and LLCs ... to enjoy the many
benefits offered by the partnership tax provisions, this adds no new legal
inconsistencies or formalistic distinctions to those that already exist .... ") [hereinafter
Hamill, Eliminating PartnershipClassification];Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability
Company and Subchapter S: Classification Issues Revised, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083,
1141 (1992) ("A comparison of the S corporation and the LLC with respect to ... the
[repealed Kintner] regulations reveals that the two entities are not sufficiently
different to warrant the differences in taxation.... On the whole, the differences
between the two entities do not indicate why one should be considered more 'corporate'
than the other.") [hereinafter Kalinka, LLC and Subchapter S]. By definition, business
organizations such as the limited liability company exhibit certain traditional
characteristics of corporations and unincorporated associations. Predictably,
problematic definitions engender problematic classifications.
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the origins and rationales of certain jurisdictional principles," this
article reveals an inconsistency 3 that can serve as an entry point for
analyzing and potentially reconciling certain existing distinctions
between corporations and unincorporated associations. Resolving this
inconsistency can provide a sound legal basis for harmonizing
corporate distinctions. 4 Such a result is possible without having to
revise our conventional definitions of different types of business
organizations."
Although indistinct in many practical respects, corporations and
limited
unincorporated
associations
continue
to
receive
systematically disparate treatment in other respects. Specifically,
different tests determine the citizenship of corporations and
unincorporated associations for jurisdictional purposes. The test for
corporations is codified in the alienage and diversity jurisdiction
statute, 6 which provides "a corporation shall be deemed to be a
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the
State where it has its principal place of business . . . ."" In contrast,
the test for unincorporated associations exists as a common law rule
that "[alienage and] diversity jurisdiction in a suit by or against the

12. See infra Part III.B.
13. See infra Part III.C.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. In an extremely abstract sense, this method can be, and has been, used in a
diverse range of contexts. For instance, John Rawls has applied the method in an
attempt to harmonize a deeply-entrenched division between consequentialist and
retriblitivist theories of criminal punishment:
The answer, then, to the confusion engendered by the two views of
punishment is quite simple: one distinguishes two offices ... and one
distinguishes their different stations with respect to the system of rules
which make up the law; and then one notes that the different sorts of
considerations which would usually be offered as reasons for what is done
under the cover of these offices can be paired off with the competing
justifications.... One reconciles the two views by the time-honored device of
making them apply to different situations.
JOHN RAWLS, Two Concepts of Rules, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 20, 23-24
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). For the distinction between alienage and diversity
jurisdiction, see infra Part III.A.
17. Id. § 1332(c); see infra Part I.B..1. But see Eisenberg v. Comm. Union
Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (finding that "subdivision [(c)
of
section 1332] is not susceptible of the construction as if it read 'all corporations shall
be deemed citizens of the States by which they have been incorporated and of the
States where they have their principal places of business'"); Charles A. Szypszak,
Jural Entities, Real Parties in Controversy, and Representative Litigants: A Unified
Approach to the Diversity JurisdictionRequirements for Business Organizations, 44
ME. L. REv. 1, 5 (1992) (explaining that "Congress has never explicitly sanctioned the
Supreme Court's treatment of a corporation as a jural entity whose citizenship is the
exclusive measure of diversity").
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[unincorporated] entity depends on the citizenship of 'all the
members,' 'the several persons composing such association,' [or] 'each
of its members.""'8
An undesirable by-product of these asymmetrical tests becomes
manifest when one considers the jurisdictional status of alien
business organizations. A novel way to understand the alienage
jurisdiction statute involves its applicability to two separate classes
of aliens: "domestic aliens," which are citizens or subjects of a foreign
state that permanently reside in the United States, and "foreign
aliens," which are United States citizens legally domiciled in another
country. 9 Unlike their domestic counterparts, foreign aliens do not
constitute "citizens" in a jurisdictional sense-they are deemed
"stateless" and thus cannot sue or be sued in federal courts on the
basis of alienage. 0 Accordingly, a foreign alien who is a member of an
unincorporated association renders that association incapable of
suing or being sued under the alienage jurisdiction statute."'
Statelessness bears material consequences for all unincorporated
business associations. The incapacity to sue or be sued eviscerates
the historical rationales supporting alienage jurisdiction." The

18. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1990) (quoting Chapman v.
Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449,
456 (1900); United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145,
146 (1965)). See infra Part II.B.2.
19. See infra Part III.C.
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 1990). The
Second Circuit there concluded:
If in fact any of [the defendant New York law partnership]'s foreign-residing
United States citizen partners are domiciled abroad, a diversity suit could
not be brought against them individually; in that circumstance, since for
diversity purposes a partnership is deemed to take on the citizenship of each
of its partners, a suit against [the partnership] could not be premised on
diversity.
Id. (citations omitted), remanded on othergrounds, 771 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
22. See generally JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure
Ltd., 536 U.S. 88, 93-96 (2002) (delineating certain Constitutional Convention
rationales for alienage jurisdiction); Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction?
Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over
Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1996) (reviewing the historical
origins of, and modern justifications for, alienage jurisdiction). According to Professor
Johnson,
[h]istory has demonstrated that the political processes in the country are
susceptible to antiforeign sentiment ... which necessitates a forum more
politically insulated than that offered by most states. Though this danger is
not present in every alienage case, state court adjudication of disputes
involving foreign citizens continue to raise the possible adverse foreign policy
and international trade consequences feared by the Framers of the
Constitution.
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standing possibility that local and state courts may harbor prejudice
towards U.S. citizens residing abroad presents the prospect of forum
shopping to unincorporated associations.22 Further, ascertaining
whether an unincorporated association is stateless imposes an
additional or undesirable cost on potential litigants that can override
negotiated contractual choice-of-venue provisions, which potentially
compromises commercial relations. 4 These considerations may affect
whether an unincorporated association elects to have foreign
branches or become registered subjects of foreign laws.
This distinct problem of unincorporated business associations
did not always exist. Courts initially applied the same common law
citizenship
test to both corporations
and unincorporated
associations.25 Under this test, all business organizations assumed
the citizenship of their respective constituent groups: stockholders
for corporations and members for most unincorporated associations.26
The uniform test was highly controversial,27 perhaps ironically,
because it was thought that corporations should be denied access to
federal courts.28
The citizenship test changed as corporations assumed a more
prominent role in the economy.29 Recognizing the "necessities and
Id. at 31.
23. See infra notes 260-64, 341-42, and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 272-75, 343, and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Chapman, 129 U.S. at 682 (determining citizenship of a joint stock
company using the test for corporations first established in Bank of the United States
v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809)).
26. See, e.g., Great S. Fire ProofHotel, 177 U.S. at 456 ("When the question relates
to ... jurisdiction ... as resting on the diverse citizenship of the parties we must look
in the case of a suit by or against a partnership association to the citizenship of the
several persons composing such association."); Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 91 ("The
court feels itself authorized.., on a question of jurisdiction, to look to the character of
the individuals who compose the corporation ... ").
27. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 136-45 (1927) (referencing
virtually annual attempts from 1878 to 1910 to limit or deny corporations access to
federal courts).
28. See, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 452 (1882) ("[T]he corporation
created by the laws of the States bring a large part of their controversies with their
neighbors and fellow citizens into the courts of the United States for adjudication,
instead of resorting to the State courts, which are their national, their lawful, and
their appropriate forum.").
29. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) ("During the 19th
Century... corporations were relatively few and small.... But the 20th Century has
presented a different climate."). See generally GEORGE HERBERTON EVANS, BUSINESS
INCORPORATION

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES

1800-1943

(1948);

TONY

A.

FREYER,

PRODUCERS VERSUS CAPITALISTS (1994); JAMES WILLIARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970);

Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
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conveniences of trade and business" implicated by corporations, the
Supreme Court fashioned a new citizenship test based on the state of
incorporation." This test recognized that corporations possessed
many of the powers belonging to natural persons, and so they should
be treated equally in a jurisdictional sense.3' Congress codified this
test in 1948,"2 and then expanded citizenship for corporations a
decade later to include also their principal place of business. 3 The
amendment was an explicit attempt to regulate the economic
significance of corporations, as broadened bases for citizenship
decreased the likelihood of diversity between litigants. 4 Consistent
with this rationale, Congress paid no attention to whether the
amended citizenship test should extend to unincorporated
associations, which remained a relatively insignificant part of the
economy. 5 As a result, the once-uniform common law test now
applies only to unincorporated associations. The Court has noted that
this separate hold-over test for unincorporated associations "can
validly be characterized as technical, precedent-bound, and
unresponsive to policy considerations raised by the changing realities
of business organization."'6
The reality is that, increasingly, new businesses are electing to
organize as unincorporated associations. For instance, the IRS's most
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987).
30. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327-28 (1853).
31. Id.
32. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 930 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1332 (2000)).
33. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415. As early as 1939, the
Supreme Court had held that foreign corporations, by qualifying to do business in a
state and appointing therein an agent for receiving process, thereby consented to being
sued in diversity suits in that state. See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
308 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1939).
34. S. REP. No. 85-1830, at 3101-02 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099,
3101-02. According to the Senate report,
[T]his fiction of stamping a corporation a citizen of the State of its
incorporation has given rise to the evil whereby a local institution, engaged
in a local business and in many cases locally owned, is enabled to bring its
litigation into the Federal courts simply because it has obtained a corporate
charter from another state.
Id. (citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) (permitting company that had reincorporated in
another state for purposes of accessing federal court to sue on basis of diversity)).
35. See, e.g., R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 336 F.2d
160,164 (4th Cir. 1964) ("By no stretch of the process of interpretation can [28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1391(c) (1958)] be read as applying to an unincorporated association."), affd, 382
U.S. 145 (1965). The 1965 Bouligny decision marked a sixty-one year span since the
Court had last re-examined the jurisdictional status of unincorporated associations in
Thomas v. Board of Trustees Ohio State University, 195 U.S. 207 (1904).
36. Carden, 494 U.S. at 196.
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recent tax filing statistics reveal the number of new limited liability
companies has quadrupled, dwarfing the rate of new S-class
corporations over the same five-year span:37
1995

1996

1997

198

1999

S Corps 38

2,153,119

2,304,416

2,452,254

2,588,088

2,725,775

LLCs

118,559

221,498

349,054

470,657

589,403

(Members) 39

(1,580,900)

(1,654,256)

(1,758,627)

(1,855,348)

(1,936,919)

LLPs

N/A41

11,45842

N/A40

26,287

42,612

(Members) 40

(N/A)

(N/A)

(N/A)

(141,884)

(206,142)

LPs

295,304

311,563

328,210

342,726

354,295

(Members) 43

(10,223,901)

(10,025,630)

(10,167,018)

(9,325,111)

(8,944,693)

37. One commentator has challenged the propriety of comparing the growth rate of
LLCs to S Corporations:
The same pattern of concentration of real estate businesses and service
businesses in all partnerships indicates that what Professor [Susan Pace]
Hamill calls the "meteoric pace" in the growth of LLCs, which has been the
motor driving the increase in the number of all partnerships since 1994,
appears to have been more at the expense of other types of partnerships than
C and especially S Corporations.
John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe:
"Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do," 78 TEX. L. REV. 885, 890 (2000)
(quoting Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1454, 1460-61 (1998) [hereinafter Hamill, Origins]). Professor Lee bases
his challenge on data indicating that, "while the number of LLCs is continuing to grow
at a phenomenal rate, the number of general partnerships has recently declined, and
net growth in the number of limited partnerships has been limited." Id.; see also Larry
E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities,43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 79, 100 (2001) (contending that, "for tax reasons, LLCs are replacing
general partnerships but not corporations"). As with many things, the truth perhaps
lies in the middle. The LLC's ascendance likely has cut into the growth of both general
partnerships and S Corporations.
38. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: SOI BULLETIN, Winter
2001-2002, at 198 [hereinafter IRS, SOI BULLETIN (Winter 2001-2002)]; INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: SOI BULLETIN, Winter 2000-2001, at 198
[hereinafter IRS, SOI BULLETIN (Winter 2000-2001)].
39. IRS, SOI BULLETIN (Winter 2001-2002), supra note 38, at 196. IRS, SOI
BULLETIN (Winter 2000-2001), supra note 38, at 196. See, e.g., 1 RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 5, § 1.01, at 1 (observing that
"LLCs appear to be the fastest growing form of unincorporated organization") (citation
omitted). Exactly why LLCs are so popular is a subject of debate. Some commentators
believe LLCs enjoy a superior federal tax status. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The
Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst for Exposing the Corporate Integration
Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 396 (1996) [hereinafter Hamill, CorporateIntegration].
Professor Hamill also believes that "use of LLCs actually improves the fairness of the
business tax system" by "level[ing] the playing field" between sophisticated small
businesses able to circumvent double-taxation and their unsophisticated peers. Id. at
430. Other commentators believe LLCs provide a safer and simpler way to acquire
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Additionally, these statistics for limited unincorporated
associations are conservative. The IRS has indicated that the
"[n]umber of limited partnerships and of limited liability companies
and associated number of partners are understated because some
businesses failed to answer the question about type of partnership on
their tax returns as originally filed."" Regardless of what the actual
numbers are, limited unincorporated associations now clearly occupy
a significant place in the business organization landscape."
limited liability than the alternative, which is to circumvent the S Corporation rules.
See, e.g., Ribstein, Emergence of LLC, supra note 2, at 3. Professor Ribstein contends
that "closely held business association statutes" reduce the transaction costs of doing
business. See Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and
Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 372-84 (1995).
40. IRS, SOI BULLETIN (Winter 2001-2002), supra note 38, at Schedule B; IRS, SOI
BULLETIN (Winter 2000-2001), supra note 38, at Schedule B. "The key reason for the
popularity of the LLP is that there is no need to change the partnership to a new
entity with the corresponding need to change the existing partnership agreement."
PHILIP P. WHYNOTT, THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY § 2:40, at 2-3 (3d ed. 2000). But
see, e.g., Saul Levmore, Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies, and Taxes: A
Comment on the Survival of OrganizationalForms, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 489, 491 (1992)
(noting that individuals who shift from a partnership form to a limited company could
still enjoy the benefits of limited liability, but "'many of these firms' contractual
creditors will be caught by surprise"); see also BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS $1 2.0113], at 2-7
(7th ed. 2000) ("Decisions to embrace the corporate form of organization should be
carefully considered, since a corporation is like a lobster pot: easy to enter, difficult to
live in, and painful to get out of.") (citations omitted).
41. The IRS began collecting information on the number of LLPs and their
members when Form 1065 first appeared in 1998. E-mail from Judy Lim-Sharpe,
Reference Librarian, Treasury Department Library, to Peter B. Oh, The Florida State
University College of Law (Aug. 29, 2002, 12:50 E.S.T.) (containing information
supplied by Timothy Wheeler, Treasury Department) (on file with author).
42. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §
1.01(e) (1998) (citing INTERNATIONAL ASSOC. OF CORPORATE ADMIN., 1997 ANNUAL
REPORT).
43. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: SOI BULLETIN, Spring
2002, at 295 [hereinafter IRS, SOI BULLETIN (Spring 2002)]; INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME: SOI BULLETIN, Spring 2001, at 285 [hereinafter IRS,
SOI BULLETIN (Spring 2001)].
44. IRS, SOI BULLETIN (Spring 2002), supra note 43, at 334 (Table 11 n.2).
Starting in 1993, the IRS began using a survey question that identifies partnerships
as limited liability companies. Id. "[T]he question identifying partnerships as limited
liability companies was only introduced, starting with 1993. No attempt was made to
identify these companies for the statistics for earlier years." Id.
45. For an informal set of statistics concerning the number of cases involving LLCs
and diversity of citizenship, see Debra R. Cohen, Citizenship of Limited Liability
Companies for Diversity Jurisdiction,6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 435, 437 nn.6-7
(2002) ("In 2002 to date, there have been almost fifty times the number of cases
reported in 1995 in which LLCs are parties.... Of the growing number of cases
involving LLCs that were filed in federal court, 465 expressly mention diversity.").

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:389

This development has not escaped the Supreme Court's
attention. Since 1958, when Congress amended the citizenship test
for corporations, the Court twice has considered the merits of
extending this test to unincorporated associations. Less than a
decade after the 1958 amendments, Justice Fortas acknowledged
that corporations and unincorporated associations were becoming
"indistinguishable ... in terms of the reality of function and
structure."46' But he concluded that "these arguments, however
appealing, are addressed to an inappropriate forum, and that pleas
for extension of ... diversity jurisdiction ... ought to be made to the
Congress and not to the courts."47 The invitation received no
legislative audience and, fifteen years later, the Court took occasion
to revisit the alienage jurisdiction statute's distinction between
corporations and unincorporated associations. Although admitting
that perhaps "considerations of basic fairness and substance over
form require"48 a uniform citizenship test for all business
organizations, a divided Court again balked: "Which [type of
unincorporated associations] is entitled to be considered a 'citizen' for
diversity purposes, and which of their members' citizenship is to be
consulted, are questions more readily resolved by legislative
prescription . . . ."'
The time for such prescription has arrived. Part II of this article
critically examines the landscape of legal distinctions between
corporations and unincorporated associations. Beginning with the
Revenue Act of 1894"° and culminating with the Kintner
Regulations, 1 the IRS consistently has established regulations
predicated on the now orthodox dichotomy between corporations and
partnerships.2 On which side of the dichotomy a particular business
46. Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 149-50; see infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.
47. Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 150-51.
48. Carden, 494 U.S. at 196 (quoting Brief for Respondent). Justice Scalia, writing
for the Carden majority, proceeded to uphold the common law test for unincorporated
associations. Id.; accord MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox 1992) ("Mr. Gambini,
that was an intelligent, lucid argument. Overruled.").
49. Carden,494 U.S. at 197.
50. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (exempting "corporations,
companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or
educational purposes"); cf Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
(striking down Revenue Act of 1894 as unconstitutional), overruled by South Carolina
v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 522-23 n.13 (1988) (ruling that Pollock was superseded by the
Sixteenth Amendment).
51. Former Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960 amended 1996) [hereinafter
Former Treas. Reg.].
52. See, e.g., Armando Gomez, Rationalizing the Taxation of Business Entities, 49
TAX LAW. 285, 286 (1996) ("Throughout the history of the federal income tax, Congress
has chosen to treat corporations and partnerships differently for tax purposes.").
Apparently, "Congress was not unaware that it had established disparate tax regimes
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organization belonged was determined by the extent it possessed
certain attributes. 3 Exhibiting a threshold number of these
attributes warranted federal tax treatment as a corporation, notably
the imposition of double taxation.14 This bright-line formula
unintentionally provided businesses with an organizational blueprint
for avoiding double taxation.55 Recognizing this problem, as well as
the growing prevalence of hybrid forms such as the limited liability
company,56 the IRS implemented a more flexible taxation scheme in
which business organizations could elect how they wished to be taxed
with the aim of disengaging federal taxation of business
organizations from the dichotomy between corporations and
partnerships. 7 Accordingly, commentators have rushed to propose
statutory schemes that attempt to provide uniform treatment to all
business organizations. 8 These schemes, however, are premised on
classifications designed to differentiate corporations from
unincorporated associations.59 Equally significant, these differences
for corporations and partnerships," id. at 288, until as late as "1919, when Treasury
issued Regulation 45," id. at 289 (citing Regs. 45, art. 1503 (1919) (establishing
transferability of interests and centralization of management as basis for tax
classification)). See also J. William Callison, Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and
the Limited Liability Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded, 26 J.
CORP. L. 951, 957-60 (2001) (recounting historical basis of IRS regulations).
53. Former Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701 to -2. The attributes were continuity of life,
centralized management, free transferability of interest, and limited liability. Id.; see
infra Part II.A. 1.
54. Former Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701 to -2.
55. Tax shelters were devised where quasi-corporations assumed the optimal
combination of attributes necessary to retain certain corporate benefits and yet be
eligible for pass-through partnership tax treatment. See, e.g., Committee on
Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, Publicly Traded Limited
Partnership:An Emerging Financial Alternative to the Public Corporation, 39 Bus.
LAW. 709, 723 (John W. Slater, Jr. ed., 1984) ("A publicly traded partnership generally
has centralized management and probably has free transferability of interests .. ");
Steven T. Limberg, Master Limited PartnershipsOffer Significant Benefits, 65 J. TAX'N
84, 84 (1986) ("The MLP [master limited partnership], which operates as a partnership
but has readily tradable units, has dramatically affected oil and gas tax planning.
Because the MLP is an 'inside shelter,' it is becoming increasingly popular for other
business offerings.").
56. See I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297 ("[M]any states recently have revised
their statutes to provide that partnerships and other unincorporated organizations
may possess characteristics that have traditionally been associated with corporations,
thereby narrowing considerably the traditional distinctions between corporations and
partnerships.").
57. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701 (2002).
58. See infra Part II.A.2.
59. See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES, supra note 1, §
10.05(A), at 253 ("[T]he Kintner [Regulations] remain of interest.... [They] help
explain the current shape of business associations .... "). Professor Ribstein prefers to
deemphasize tax considerations in favor of default rules, coherent and flexible
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still endure in certain jurisdictional respects." The residual
distinctions between corporations and certain limited unincorporated
associations evince a gap in how we should approach the task of
collapsing corporate distinctions and fashioning corresponding
statutory and common law schemes.
Part III of this article establishes the relevant jurisdictional
framework for such collapsing by analyzing the historical bases of
alienage jurisdiction. As a preliminary matter, alienage jurisdiction
is distinct from, but often conflated with, its more problematic
relative, diversity jurisdiction.6' Three discrete rationales supporting
alienage jurisdiction can be gleaned from the Framers and modern
foreign
relations from perceived
protecting
commentary:
provincialism by state courts,6 guarding against the threat-whether
actual or apparent-of local prejudice towards foreigners,63 and
furthering international commercial interests.64 These rationales
establish the significant value of providing aliens access to federal

terminology, and efficiency considerations to fill gaps in contractual and statutory
schemes. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L.
407, 450 (1999) (advocating freedom to contract so as to avoid "fac[ing] the Scylla-andCharybdis choice of either accepting a risk of vicarious liability or subjecting
themselves to the inappropriate default rules of a business association statute that is
designed for completely different settings"); infra Part II.A.1.
60. See infra Part II.B.2.
61. Johnson, supra note 22, at 4 ("Careful study, including 'rattling through dusty
attics of the history books ... reveals that alienage jurisdiction differs in salient
respects from ordinary diversity jurisdiction.") (quoting Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 575 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)). For an informative debate about the relative merits
of diversity jurisdiction, see Richard H. Field, Proposals on Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 17 S.C. L. REV. 669, 673 (1965), which delineates and defends the
American Law Institute's proposals to modify diversity jurisdiction. But see John P.
Frank, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-AnOpposing View, 17 S.C. L. REV. 677, 679-80
(1965) ("I am opposed to this proposal to gut the diversity jurisdiction. My objection is
entirely in principle .... There is nothing wrong with this proposal except its
substance."). But see Richard H. Field, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-A Rebuttal, 17
S.C. L. REV. 685, 685 (1965) ("[W]hen you have issues in a case wholly dependent upon
state law ... we feel that a case where the state judges have the last word as to what
is the state law ought to be decided in the state court unless there is some good reason
to have it elsewhere."). Richard Field participated in drafting the American Law
Institute's proposals; Judge John P. Frank was one of the most vigorous supporters of
diversity jurisdiction and chair of the national Committee to Maintain Diversity
Jurisdiction. See, e.g., John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction,16 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 403, 405 (1979) (urging retention because "[d]iversity jurisdiction must be
seen for what it is, a social service of the federal government") [hereinafter Frank,
Case for Diversity]; infra Part III.A.
62. See infra Part III.B.1.
63. See infra Part III.B.2.
64. See infra Part III.B.3.
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courts." Accordingly, Congress conferred federal courts with
jurisdiction over all suits involving aliens, power of a breadth that
arguably conflicted with the express terms of Article III.66 The
legislative "solution" to the conflict consisted of restricting alienage
jurisdiction to suits where aliens were paired with U.S. citizens; this
was accomplished by amalgamating alienage and diversity
jurisdiction to co-habit the same statute. 7 Nevertheless, the primary
criticisms advanced against diversity jurisdiction predominantly do
not apply to alienage jurisdiction. 8 "Statelessness" is a problem
endemic to alienage jurisdiction." Only foreign aliens are susceptible
to the phenomenon of "statelessness," which is magnified when
corporations and unincorporated associations become involved. 0
Part IV of this article proceeds to apply the jurisdictional
framework to the business organization landscape. Statelessness is
not merely an anomalous jurisdictional phenomenon, but also related
to the citizenship test, unjustifiably maintained for unincorporated

65. See infra Part III.B.
66. See infra note 229-30 and accompanying text.
67. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)) (authorizing federal courts to hear controversies between
.citizens of different States" and controversies "between citizens of a State and foreign
states, citizens, or subjects"). Congress revised this statute in 1948. See Act of Jun. 25,
1948, ch. 646, § 1332 62 Stat. 869, 930 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2000)).
68. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 121
("[Although] the case for abolishing diversity jurisdiction is clear ... [t]he federal
government is responsible, and is sometimes required by treaty, to provide aliens
access to justice according to standards recognized in international law.") [hereinafter
Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction].
69. The phenomenon of "statelessness" examined in this article is distinct from the
problem concerning persons without a country. See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic
Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S. 88, 99 (2002) (noting that "some persons,
like resident aliens, may live within a foreign state without being treated under
American law as members of that particular polity") (citing United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 660 (1898)). Some persons are not citizens under their
respective country's law. See generally Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d
1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983) (involving an individual domiciled in New York whose
Soviet citizenship had been revoked upon departure); Blanco v. Pan-American Life Ins.
Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 228 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (involving Cuban refugees domiciled in
Florida who had renounced Cuban citizenship), modified on other grounds, 362 F.2d
167 (5th Cir. 1966); Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. 496, 498-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (involving an individual domiciled in Portugal who had forfeited Soviet
citizenship by illegally leaving country and then had Portuguese citizenship cancelled).
The United Nations has denounced this phenomenon. See U.N. DEP'T OF SOCIAL
AFFAIRS, A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS 11, U.N. Doc. E/1112, U.N. Sales No. 1949.XIV.2
(1949) ("The fact that the stateless person has no nationality places him in an
abnormal and inferior position which reduces his social value and destroys his own
self-confidence.").
70. See infra Part III.C.
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associations. Both problems are based on incorrect and outdated
reasoning, an instantiation of stare decisis gone awry." As Justice
Holmes once remarked,
[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in [a bygone time]. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.72
The solution is to apply a citizenship test based on domicile to
both foreign aliens and unincorporated associations. Implementing
such a test would redress a number of dubious asymmetries. First,
domestic and foreign aliens both would have access to federal court
in compliance with the historical purposes of alienage jurisdiction.73
Second, corporations and unincorporated associations would assume
comparable citizenship status in agreement with their merging
corporate personalty. 4 Equally important, a citizenship test based on
domicile would furnish a legal basis supporting additional uniform
treatment of corporations and unincorporated associations.
Accordingly, Congress should amend the alienage jurisdiction statute
to give citizenship to foreign aliens based on their domicile and to
unincorporated associations based on their principal place of
business. Eliminating these sort of existing asymmetries is a critical
predicate for business scholars and legislators who prospectively seek
uniform statutes or universal entities.
II.

CORPORATIONS: UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS

Although defunct, dichotomies between corporations and
unincorporated associations remain an influential part of the
business organization landscape. This Part examines two such
dichotomies. First, IRS regulations once applied differential tax
treatment to business organizations on the basis of whether they
were a corporation or a partnership. Second, certain statutory and
common law tests accord fictional citizenship status exclusively to

71. See infra Part IV.
72. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897); see
also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *70 (1765-69)
("The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules must be followed,
unless flatly absurd or unjust."); JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 201 (1979)
(noting that two rules "pursuing different and inconsistent social goals ... cannot
coexist"); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1143
n.262 (1996) ("In some instances, inconsistencies that in one era made sense have
grown frivolous with the passage of time and hence should be looked upon, more
precisely, as anachronisms.").
73. See infra Part IV.A.1.
74. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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corporations. Historically, tax regulations have framed our
perspective on different types of business organizations.75 The
overhaul of the IRS regulations in favor of an elective scheme should
have liberated current and prospective approaches to business
organizations. While there is a movement towards unified treatment
of all business organizations, the justifications for such a movement
remain path dependent on the defunct dichotomies. Moreover,
corporations and unincorporated associations continue to receive
disparate treatment for citizenship purposes. This Part contends that
such path dependency and jurisdictional disparity must be resolved
before any corporate distinctions can be collapsed.
A.

Regulatory Distinctions
1.

Kintner Regulations"6

The Kintner Regulations established the modem analytical
framework for distinguishing corporations from unincorporated
associations. These Regulations established a classification system"

75. See, e.g., Keatinge, Universal Business OrganizationLegislation, supra note 7,
at 47 ("Of all the influences on the development of organic statutory regimes, the
federal income tax system has had the greatest effect in the area of unincorporated
business organizations."); see also Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Elective Tax Classificationfor
Qualifying Foreign and Domestic Business Entities Under the Final Check-the-Box
Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 99, 103 (1997) ("Because of the very abbreviated
statutory language in section 7701 [of the Treasury Regulations] as to the tax status of
unincorporated associations, the Treasury Regulations under section 7701 have played
a particularly significant role in classifying business entities for federal income tax
purposes."); J. Mark Meinhardt, Note, Investor Beware: Protection of Minority
Stakeholder Interests in Closely Held Limited-Liability Business Organizations:
Delaware Law and its Adherents, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 288, 297-98 (2001) (suggesting
that the choice of business type is often propelled not by fiduciary protections for
minority interests, but by tax consequences). But see, e.g., Cohen, supra note 45, at 439
n.15 ("Since the adoption of check-the-box, tax considerations are no longer a driving
force in choosing an organizational form.").
76. Former Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11. The impetus and namesake for these
regulations derive from United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 428 (9th Cir. 1954),
where the Ninth Circuit adjudged a state law partnership, with an executive
committee governance structure and continuity of existence akin to a corporation, to
be an "association" for federal tax purposes.
77. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTNERS T 3.06[1], at 3-50 (2d ed. 1990) ("The 1960 Regulations, which track the
Morrissey [v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935)] opinion more closely than the prior
Regulations, describe six corporate characteristics that bear on the classification of an
organization as an association .. "); John J. Sexton & Donald F. Osteen,
Classificationas a Partnershipor as an Association Taxable as a Corporation,24 TUL.
TAX INST. 95, 123-34 (1975) (comparing 1959 proposed regulations to 1960 final
regulations under the rubric of both sets of regulations being a departure from
"association" classification system).
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whereby an organization constituted a corporation 7 -and not a
partnership 79-for federal tax purposes if three of the four following
characteristics were present: continuity of life,80 centralized
management,"' free transferability of interest,82 and limited liability.83
78. A "'corporation' is not limited to the artificial entity usually known as a
corporation, but includes also an association, a trust classed as an association because
of its nature or its activities, a joint-stock company and an insurance company."
Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c). The origin of the corporation can be traced to
classical antiquity. Numa Pompilius introduced the corporation to Rome, and the
Romans introduced the corporation to England by way of invasion. 2 SIR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 469 (St. George Tucker ed., 1969) (1803). In time, the
British established a system of laws that recognized corporations for charitable,
municipal, and private purposes. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 486 (2d ed. 1968).
79. A "partnership" includes, but is not limited to, "a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not a corporation
or a trust or estate within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954." Former
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a). "As a profit-seeking arrangement, [partnership] has a
traceable course from Babylonian sharecropping through classical Greece and Rome to
the far-flung trading enterprises of the Renaissance." 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
PARTNERSHIP, supra note 1, § 1.02(a), at 1:19. The limited partnership originated in
ancient Rome:
Commercial credit began when an individual or a family, by what Latin
Christendom called commenda, commended or entrusted money to a
merchant for a specific voyage or enterprise, and received a share of the
profits. Such a silent or "sleeping" partnership was an ancient Roman device,
probably relearned by the Christian West from the Byzantine East.
WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION, Part IV, 627 (1950) (discussing the revival
of commerce between the Eleventh and Fourteenth centuries). The limited partnership
re-emerged in Seventeenth-century France (Comandite) and Italy (Accomandita) and
first appeared in the United States during France's occupation of Florida and
Louisiana. See SCOTT ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP § 53 (1960); FRANCIS J.
TROUBAT, THE LAW OF COMMANDATARY AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IN THE UNITED
STATES 34 (1853); see also Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. 321 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1850)
(establishing well-regulated and well-established status of limited partnerships by
tracing them to the Middle Ages). The first statutes governing (limited) partnerships
appeared in Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio. See PA. LAWS 271 (1874)
(later codified at 59 PA. STAT. ANN. § 341 et seq. (1964)) (repealed 1989); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 449.301, 449.351 (1877); N.J. STAT. §§ 42:3-1, 42:3-29 (1880); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 783.01 et seq. (1881).
80. Subsection (b) of the Kintner Regulations provides:
An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy,
retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a
dissolution of the organization. On the other hand, if the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will cause a
dissolution of the organization, continuity of life does not exist.
Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1).
81. Subsection (c) of the Kintner Regulations provides:
An organization has centralized management if any person (or any group of
persons which does not include all the members) has continuing exclusive
authority to make the management decisions necessary to the conduct of the
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business for which the organization was formed.... The effective operation
of a business organization composed of many members generally depends
upon the centralization in the hands of a few of exclusive authority to make
management decisions for the organization, and therefore, centralized
management is more likely to be found in such an organization than in a
smaller organization.
Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(1).
82. Subsection (e) of the Kintner Regulations provides:
An organization has the corporate characteristic of free transferability of
interests if each of its members or those members owning substantially all of
the interests in the organization have the power, without the consent of
other members, to substitute for themselves in the same organization a
person who is not a member of the organization. In order for this power of
substitution to exist in the corporate sense, the member must be able,
without the consent of other members, to confer upon his substitute all the
attributes of his interest in the organization.
Id. § 301.7701-2(e)(1).
83. Subsection (d) of the Kintner Regulations provides:
An organization has the corporate characteristic of limited liability if under
local law there is no member who is personally liable for the debts of or
claims against the organization. Personal liability means that a creditor of
an organization may seek personal satisfaction from a member of the
organization to the extent that the assets of such organization are
insufficient to satisfy the creditor's claim.
Id. § 301.7701-2(d)(1). Although not an inherent feature of early corporations, see, e.g.,
Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 576
(1986), limited liability is arguably the most significant vestige of the historical
distinction between corporations and unincorporated associations. See, e.g., Keatinge,
Universal Business Organization Legislation, supra note 7, at 38-39 ("Vicarious
liability was once the characteristic that distinguished corporations from
partnerships.... This... has been modified by the advent of LLCs and LLPs, which
allow some unincorporated associations to have the property of limited liability."); see
also ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1.03(b), at
19-20 (1998) ("Limited liability is available to... LLCs, corporations, and limited
partnerships. Accordingly, the policy issue concerning limited is not whether the
liability should be limited at all, but whether it should be limited specifically in the
LLP form."); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 40 (1991) ("Limited liability is a distinguishing feature
of corporate law-perhaps the distinguishing feature."). For a good survey of the
historical policy justifications supporting limited liability, see Steven C. Bahls,
Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited Liability Companies, 55
MONT. L. REV. 43, 55-58 (1994).
Limited liability offers two distinct advantages. First, limited liability enables
persons to assume risks beyond actual means. Second, limited liability promotes
economic efficiency. Under this argument, limited liability reduces transaction costs
and enhances the operation of securities markets. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra, at
40-59. As a result, the cost of capital is decreased while economic output and public
welfare are increased. See id. This occurs because limited liability: (1) reduces the need
to monitor agents, thereby reducing operational costs; (2) reduces the need to monitor
shareholder ability to assume risks; (3) promotes the free transfer of shares since they
are regulated by the market; (4) creates homogenous commodities that publicize all
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The IRS weighed all four characteristics equally in a "resemblance"
test. 4 Under this test, a business organization must have exhibited
more "noncorporate characteristics" than "corporate characteristics"
tax treatment" accorded to
to receive the pass-through
partnerships.86 By such formulaic means, the Kintner Regulations
introduced a bilateral tax structure for corporations and
partnerships.87
This structure, however, engendered practical problems. The IRS
had designed the Kintner Regulations to complicate the ability of
relevant information; (5) allows efficient diversification of assets; and (6) prevents
excessive risk-aversion by managers. Id. at 41-44. Easterbrook and Fischel, however,
acknowledge limited liability may create a moral hazard risk because managers may
act on knowledge that costs will be imposed on someone else. See id. at 50. This
problem, however, may apply only to involuntary creditors because voluntary creditors
may factor in this risk ex ante before providing credit terms. See id. at 50-53.
Moreover, courts may fashion doctrines to protect victims from this moral hazard. See
id. at 54-55, 60-62. But Barbara Banoff points out that
[n]ot all business people do want limited liability. Although accounting firms
have apparently converted to LLPs en masse, not all law firms have done so.
The reason for that is surely not that they do not know they could. Instead,
staying a full-liability partnership may serve as a signal to the market for
legal services that the partners stand behind the quality of their work. It is,
in effect, a bonding mechanism in a lemons market.
Barbara Ann Banoff, Company Governance under Florida'sLimited Liability Company
Act, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 53, 56 n.14 (2002) (citing Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Opting In
and Out of Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures: Refining the So-Called Coasean
ContractTheory, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 353 (1992)).
84. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 357 (1935) (construing inclusion
of "association" within the definition of a "corporation" as "impl[ying] resemblance; but
it is resemblance and not identity"). The Morrissey Court actually evaluated six salient
characteristics to determine whether a state law trust constituted a corporation for tax
purposes: (1) the presence of associates; (2) the business's purpose; (3) centralized
management; (4) continuity of existence; (5) free transferability of interests; and (6)
limited liability. Id. at 359.
85. See, e.g., BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 40, T 1.07[2] ("Under the prevailing
conduit theory, the character of such items as ordinary income, capital gains and
losses, charitable contributions, tax-exempt interest, and so forth passes through to
the partners.").
86. Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).
87. Commentators heavily criticized this bilateral structure as not being based on
sound tax policy considerations. See, e.g., Milton B. Hyman & Peter M. Hoffman,
Partnershipsand "Associations":A Policy Critique of the Morrissey Regulations, 3 J.
REAL EST. TAX'N 377, 384 (1976) (contending Kintner Regulations reflected "nothing
about the federal tax policies, if any, underlying the tax distinctions between
'associations' and 'partnerships'); William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form,
Limited Liability, and Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward A Coherent Outcome?, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1001, 1010 (1995) ("[Any tax test that seeks to distinguish between
entities based on nontax characteristics, without regard for tax objectives, will be
arbitrary."). As one commentator has stated, the Kintner Regulations represented "the
antithesis of rational tax policy." Daniel S. Goldberg, The Tax Treatment of Limited
Liability Companies:Law in Search of Policy, 50 BuS. LAW. 995, 1006 (1995).
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unincorporated associations seeking to avoid the double taxation88
assessed on corporations. 9 But the disincentives associated with
to avoid
double taxation impelled business organizations
incorporation and instead structure themselves in a strategic, albeit
sometimes inefficient, manner. To evade double taxation, some
businesses organized themselves with centralized management and
free transferability of interests, but no other "corporate
characteristics."' In exploiting the rigid Kintner Regulations,9 such
88. See, e.g., BI1KER & EUSTICE, supra note 40, T 1.07[7] ("Most distributions
from a C corporation to its shareholders are taxed as ordinary income dividends and do
not affect the stock's basis. If the corporation distributes appreciated property, it must
recognize as income the difference between the property's fair market value and its
adjusted basis.").
89. RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES, supra note 1, § 10.05, at 250
("Since the IRS was in [United States v. Kintner] concerned with stopping what it
believed were essentially partnerships from attaining certain tax advantages of
incorporation... the Kintner regulations are weighted in favor of finding that a
business organization is not a corporation."). Shareholders can avoid double taxation
by electing to incorporate under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. See
I.R.C. § 1361 et seq. (2002). S Corporations, however, are subject to significant
organizational restrictions. S Corporations cannot, inter alia, have more than seventyfive shareholders, create more than one class of stock, or own a corporate subsidiary.
Id. § 1361(b)(1)-(2). Additionally, S Corporations are subject to significant operational
restrictions. S Corporation shareholders must allocate income, loss, deduction, and
credit in direct proportion to their interests, id. § 1377; the corporation's debts are not
included in the shareholders' calculation of their deductions, id. § 1366(d); and only
shareholders who control the corporation and take stock can contribute property
without a recognizable gain, id. § 351.
90. See, e.g., MCKEE ET AL., supra note 77, $$ 2.01[1]-[5], at 2-1 to -5 (outlining
various alternative type of business organizations such as the REIT and REMIC).
According to one commentator,
[tlhe 1960 regulations allowed creative tax planners to devise new ways to
use the partnership form to achieve tax benefits. In the 1970s tax planners
developed large syndicated tax shelters as limited partnerships that easily
met the technical requirements for partnership status.... Around 1980,
large, widely held limited partnerships, known as master limited
partnerships, whose interests were traded on the stock exchange,
emerged.... Because the master limited partnerships met the technical
requirements-by lacking continuity of life and limited liability-owners of
these limited partnership interests received all the benefits of publicly
traded corporate stock combined with flow-through taxation under the
partnership provisions.
Hamill, Eliminating Partnership Classification, supra note 11, at 340; see also
Kalinka, LLC and Subchapter S, supra note 11, at 1142-56 (recounting historical
attempts to evade the Kintner Regulations). Two decisions have upheld limited
partnerships functioning as tax shelters despite having greater affinity to
corporations. See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 730 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson
v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976). For more information on publicly traded limited
partnerships, see generally Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business
Organizations, supra note 55; Limberg, supra note 55.
91. The Kintner Regulations were not intended to be applied mechanistically. See,
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business organizations willingly absorbed the costs of dissolving upon
a member's death and the risk of exposing members unnecessarily to
unlimited liability." Moreover, the Kintner Regulations were
complicated to apply and so business groups, particularly less
sophisticated ones, were forced to expend a great deal of resources to
determine their federal tax status. 3 Small groups of individuals
would organize as an unincorporated association under state law,
only to realize that such an association nevertheless constituted a
corporation for federal tax purposes. 4 And the possible permutations
of corporate characteristics rendered selecting an optimal form a
more costly process. 5
Equally problematic were the theoretical inconsistencies the
Kintner Regulations permitted within and between corporate
distinctions. On one level, the Regulations undermined their bilateral

e.g., Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 358 (finding that earlier judicial interpretations of
"association" "are not to be pressed so far as to make mere formal procedure a
controlling test. The provision itself negatives such a construction.").
92. See infra note 90.
93. See, e.g., Rod Garcia, Single-Member LLCs: Basic Entities Raise Complex
Problems, 68 TAX NOTES 142, 142 (1996) (observing that "[t]oo many resources have
been wasted both by the IRS and the private sector in resolving classification issues")
(citing statements by Michael Thomson, Treasury's acting deputy tax legislative
counsel). A variant of this problem concerns the political viability of statutes that
disadvantage less sophisticated entrepreneurs. See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED
BUSINESS ENTITIES, supra note 1, § 10.05(3), at 252 (noting that "even if many noncorporate firms were willing to adopt two or more corporate characteristics [for the
purposes of the Kintner Regulations], legislators would be reluctant to enact statutes
that provide for these features out of concern for misleading less sophisticated firms
and their lawyers as to tax classification").
94. See, e.g., MCKEE ET AL., supra note 77,
3.06[1], at 3-50 to 51 (delineating
attempts to evade Kintner Regulations that met with mixed success); Jeffrey A. Maine,
Linking Limited Liability and Entity Taxation: A Critique of the ALI Reporters' Study
on the Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 223, 235 n.65
(2000) ("Under the Kintner classification test, clients and tax practitioners spent
considerable amounts of time and resources in ensuring desirable tax classification,
despite the fact that partnership classification was usually a foregone conclusion.")
[hereinafter Maine, ALI Critique].
95. See, e.g., ALI, TAXATION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, supra note 4, at 46 ("The
IRS must administer.., the three different [operating-rule] systems. Further, the
planning, compliance, and administration costs are ongoing in that businesses may
have the opportunity to change their choice of rule structure as their business
activities evolve or as other aspects of the law change."); Maine, ALI Critique, supra
note 94, at 235 n.65 ("[T]he Service spent considerable amounts of time and resources
interpreting each factor and issuing rulings to those seeking assurance as to
classification."); Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1629 ("Although taxpayers could achieve
the desired tax results, the costs-the changes in organizational structures needed to
meet the rules and the fees to accountants and lawyers-were significant in the
aggregate.").
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treatment of corporations and partnerships.96 This is because an
unincorporated business organization with more than two corporate
characteristics would qualify for double taxation.97 In essence, actual
partnerships could be corporations for federal tax purposes.98 On
another level, the Regulations revealed a false distinction between
"entities" and "aggregates." Behind the differential treatment of
corporations and partnerships was a much broader, long-standing
opposition between "entities" and "aggregates."99 As applied to the
Kintner Regulations, an unincorporated business organization
qualifying for pass-through taxation constituted a partnership for
This
federal tax purposes and thus an "aggregate."' °
knowledge
characterization, however, conflicted with the established
that partnerships can and do exhibit many defining features of

96. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
97. Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1); see Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501,
501-05 (specifying under what conditions the IRS will determine whether an
association should receive partnership or limited liability tax treatment). But see Rev.
Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361 (establishing that an LLC will be treated as a
partnership unless continuity of life and free transferability of interest are both
exhibited).
98. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Possible Futures for UnincorporatedFirms, 64 U.
CiN. L. REV. 319, 347 (1996) ("In general, the tax rules appear to be 'egg-eater' rules
[I]f
because they focus on underlying features rather than the form of the entity ....
the firm varies the defaults it might be characterized for tax purposes as a corporation
even if it is a 'partnership,' or as a 'partnership' even if it is an LLC.").
99. According to the ALI,
[t]he origin of... separate entity taxation of corporations as opposed to the
conduit taxation of partnerships, can be linked to some extent to a debate
that raged during the last part of the 19th century and the early part of the
20th century ... . At that time, the 'aggregate' versus 'entity' controversy...
applied to both corporations and partnerships. Gradually, the entity theory
prevailed for corporations but not for partnerships.... This theory of
business-organization personality influenced the income-tax rules that
developed for those organizations.
ALI, TAXATION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, supra note 4, at 35-36 (citing Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66
IND. L.J. 53, 57-62 (1990)); see also infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. Under
the aggregate theory, the corporation comprises "a mere collection of men having
collectively certain faculties." Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
61, 87 (1809). In contrast, under the entity theory, the corporation does not "derive aid
from the personal character of its members; nor does it incur any disability from the
[The corporation] is
disabilities of the individuals who compose the society ....
substance: it is the knot of its combination; it is its essence; it is the thing itself." Id. at
75 (quoting the defendant in opposition).
100. See Robert R. Keatinge, Corporations, Unincorporated Organizations, and
Unincorporations:Check the Box and the Balkanization of Business Organizations,1 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 201, 233-34 (1997) (referencing tension between aggregate
and entity theories of characterization) [hereinafter Keatinge, Balkanization of
Business Organizations].
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"entities."0 1 Whether a particular business organization "fit" the
"aggregate" or "entity" theory only begged the question of whether
these theories were conceived adequately.' 2 And on a final level, the
Regulations disrupted the relationship between the corporationpartnership and entity-aggregate dichotomies. An incorporated
business organization-an "entity" in a principled sense-also could
qualify for pass-through taxation and thus constitute a partnership
for federal tax purposes. 0 3 So "entities" could assume the federal tax
identity of a partnership. In this way, the Kintner Regulations
severed the parallel agreement between tax categories and principled
characterizations.
Contrary to conventional belief, these multi-level inconsistencies
are responsible for ensuring the continued significance of the Kintner
Regulations.0 4 Many commentators still utilize the four Kintner
101. See, e.g., ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN
ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.03 (1988) (discussing aggregate-entity distinction and showing
that partnerships, like corporations, are regarded as entities for many purposes).
Moreover, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act has recognized that the distinction
between aggregate and entity theories is of limited utility. Partnerships, for instance,
may seem to have "aggregate" liability for partners, but actually have "entity" capacity
to own and dispose of property. See RUPA, supra note 1, § 201(a) ("A partnership is an
entity distinct from its partners."). Indeed, the Official Comment to section 201 states
that "the explicit statement provided by subsection (a) is deemed appropriate as an
expression of the increased emphasis on the entity theory as the dominant model." Id.
at 69.
102. See RUPA, supra note 1, § 201(a) (contending that partnerships seem to have
aggregate" liability for members, but "entity" capacity to own and dispose of
property). One prominent commentator has noted that
[a]n unincorporated business association is not necessarily best
characterized as either an aggregate or an entity because it combines
aggregate and entity features ....
It follows that it makes no sense to say
that, because a partnership is on balance an "aggregate," it should
necessarily have only "aggregate" features, such as personal liability or
direct taxation of partners.
RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES, supra note 1, § 1.02, at 4.
103. And conversely, an unincorporated business organization-and so an
"aggregate" in a doctrinal sense-could be considered a corporation for federal tax
purposes. Indeed, some commentators have argued that LLCs most closely resemble S
Corporations. See, e.g., Kalinka, LLC and Subchapter S, supra note 11, at 1084
("While an LLC has some partnership characteristics, it more closely resembles the
type of corporation that currently qualifies for taxation under subchapter S of the
Internal Revenue Code ('S corporation')."); see also Jill E. Darrow, Limited Liability
Companies and S Corporations:Deciding Which Is Optimal and Whether To Convert
To LLC Status, 48 TAX LAW. 1 (1994) (drawing comparisons between LLCs and S
Corporations beyond their similar pass-through tax treatment). Indeed, the IRS has
established that an LLC that elects tax treatment as a corporation can elect to become
an S corporation. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-53-045 (Oct. 2, 1998); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9636-007 (May 30, 1996).
104. See, e.g., Keatinge, Balkanizationof Business Organizations,supra note 100, at
217 ("While the modification of the tax rules has made these properties [in the Kintner
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factors when attempting to assess the relative merits of
classifications
for corporations
and unincorporated
limited
associations." 5 Ironically, such comparisons are difficult precisely
because of the Kintner Regulations. The desire to circumvent
classification as a corporation for federal tax purposes directly led to
the emergence of numerous unincorporated limited associations. 106

Regulations] unimportant for purposes of federal tax classification, these properties
continue to be default rules under most partnership and LLC statutes.").
105. See, e.g., Fallany 0. Stover & Susan Pace Hamill, The LLC Versus LLP
Conundrum:Advice for Businesses Contemplating the Choice, 50 ALA. L. REV. 813, 817
(1999) (comparing LLCs versus LLPs based on, inter alia, their respective
management structures and limited liability shields); see also Keatinge, Universal
Business OrganizationLegislation, supra note 7, at 36 (proposing distinction based on
relation of business association to "internal properties," which concern owners,
managers, and agents, and "external properties," which concern third parties).
Keatinge proceeds to list eleven defining characteristics of all business organizations:
(1) entity status; (2) limited or vicarious liability management structure; (3) formation
requirements; (4) dissolution effects; (5) "Requirement of Owners at Formation"; (6)
"Fungibility of Ownership Interests"; (7) "Sharing Relationships"; (8) "Interim
Distribution Decisions"; (9) "Liability for Distributions"; (10) apparent authority; and
(11) "Transferability of ownership interests." Id. at 37-44.
106. See Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 39, at 402 ("If the tax system
provided for corporate integration, the LLC probably would not have been born and
without the critical partnership classification, the LLC had no chance of expanding
throughout the country."). "[B]y bringing the inequities between the incorporated and
unincorporated forms out of the closet, the rise of the LLC form should compel
lawmakers to integrate small closely held businesses as quickly as possible." Id. at
432. According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the LLC "is designed to achieve what
is seemingly a simple concept-to permit persons or entities (members) to join together
in an environment of private ordering to form and operate the enterprise.., with tax
benefits akin to a partnership and limited liability akin to the corporate form." Elf
Atochem N.A., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999). Some commentators,
however, attribute the blurring of corporate distinctions to the emergence and
ascendance of limited liability companies:
With the LLC "gold standard" of pass-through income taxation and limited
liability for all, one might have predicted that other existing forms would
either need to change or become unimportant. The former prediction was
correct.... Rather than jump to a new entity ...why not just add limited
liability by statute to an old favorite? As a result, LLPs and LLLPs were
born.
Oesterle & Gazur, What's in a Name?, supra note 8,at 105.
The origins of the limited liability company trace back to the German business form
known as the Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbH). See Bahls, supra note 83
(citing WILLIAM D. BAGLEY & PHILIP P. WHYNOTT, THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY:
THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE 1.502-.503 (1991); WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMANN & GEORGE
KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES 214, 216-17 (1961)); see also
Hamill, Origins, supra note 37. In its early formulation, the LLC received the same
federal tax treatment applied to corporations. See, e.g., Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of
the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race between the States, But Heading
Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193, 1200 (1995). Only two states, Florida and
Wyoming, initially recognized LLCs. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.401-608.514 (West
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Forms such as the LLC and LLP quickly demonstrated the
inadequacy of the Kintner Regulations' predicate corporate
distinctions."7 So the Kintner Regulations arguably facilitated their
own demise.
2.

Check-the-Box Regulations"'

The IRS finally acknowledged the problems plaguing the Kintner
Regulations in 1995. Observing that "many states recently have
revised their statutes to provide that partnerships and other
unincorporated organizations may possess characteristics that have
traditionally been associated with corporations, thereby narrowing
considerably the traditional distinctions between corporations and
partnerships,"' ° the IRS decided to evaluate the merits of a more
efficient corporate taxation scheme. In 1996, Treasury, working in
conjunction with the IRS, concluded: "The existing regulations for
classifying business organizations as associations.., or as
partnerships... are based on the historical differences under local
law between partnerships and corporations. Treasury and the IRS
believe that those rules have become increasingly formalistic." ' °
1982) (enacted in 1982); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 17-15-101 (Michie 1977) (enacted in 1977).
In 1988, the IRS issued a ruling classifying a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for
federal tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (1988). Then, in 1992 and 1993,
the IRS issued rulings recognizing LLCs as partnerships for federal tax purposes in
Virginia, Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (1993); Colorado, Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B.
229 (Dec. 24, 1992); Delaware, Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233 (1993); Nevada, Rev.
Rul. 93-30, 1993-1 C.B. 231 (1993). As one person critically observed, through the IRS
rulings, "the Federal Government... opened up a candy store." James W. Wetzler,
1992 TAX NOTES TODAY 243-10. By 1994, thirty-eight states had enacted statutes
recognizing and governing limited liability companies. Hamill, Corporate Integration,
supra note 39, at 442-43. The IRS has never provided an official reason for its decision
to change the tax policy for LLCs. Some commentators have speculated the change
resulted from intense lobbying by business interests. See, e.g., William W. Bratton &
Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company:
Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629, 683
(1997) (concluding that "the efficiency case for the LLC runs into a problem because
interest group influence figures prominently in all accounts of the proliferation of LLC
statutes").
107. See, e.g., Thomas E. Fritz, Flowthrough Entities and the Self-Employment Tax:
Is It Time for a Uniform Standard?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 811, 876 (1998) ("As evidenced by
the emergence and subsequent popularity of the hybrid LLC, as well as by the [IRS's]
1996 adoption of final 'check-the-box' regulations, the historic distinctions among
various forms of flowthrough entities are blurring."); Carol R. Goforth, Limiting the
Liability of General Partners in LLPs: An Analysis of Statutory Alternatives, 75 OR. L.
REV. 1139, 1150 (1996) ("Like LLPS, LLCs also blur the distinction between
corporations and partnerships ....
").
108. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3 (2002).
109. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297.
110. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,584
(proposed Dec. 18, 1996) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301, 602); see, e.g., Gomez, supra

20031

COLLAPSING CORPORATE DISTINCTIONS

415

Accordingly, the IRS repealed the Kintner Regulations and instituted
what now are known as "check-the-box" regulations.111
Under these new regulations, federal tax treatment primarily
depends on whether an entity is subject to the rules governing public
trading."' Nearly all publicly traded entities receive treatment as
corporations for federal tax purposes.1 All separate entities, except
trusts and certain other exempt entities, are treated as "business
entities.""4 Two classes of "business entities" always receive
treatment as corporations for federal tax purposes: entities organized
under state corporation laws, and specially-listed entities such as
joint stock companies, insurance companies, federally insured banks,
and state-owned entities."' All remaining "business entities" can
elect whether they want to be treated as a corporation or a

note 52, at 292 ("[T]he [Kintner] regulations drew bright lines, precluding
classification as an association unless the organization had more corporate
characteristics than non-corporate characteristics."); Symposium, supra note 7, at 609
("The so-called 'check-the-box' regulations mark the toppling of the old, formalistic
regime.") (quoting J. William Callison). Arguably, this rationale has been undermined
by Treasury and the IRS through their reliance on state corporate law to determine
how mergers are to be treated for tax purposes. See Steven A. Bank, Taxing Divisive
and Disregarded Mergers, 34 GA. L. REV. 1523, 1583-84 (2000) ("By denying A
reorganization status to the merger of a target corporation into a disregarded
entity ...Treasury is turning [its stated purpose for the check-the-box regulations] on
its head.").
111. There are questions about whether Treasury had the authority to implement
the check-the-box regulations. See Hamill, Eliminating Partnership Classification,
supra note 11, at 337 n.15 ("Arguably, eliminating [the Kintner] regulations by
interpretative regulation, whether by creating a taxpayer election system or requiring
per se partnership treatment, exceeds the Service's authority under IRC section
7805 ....
") (emphasis added). But see Victor E. Fleischer, Note, "IfIt Looks Like a
Duck": Corporate Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective Tax Classification, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 518, 520 (1996) ("Check-the-Box, in tandem with the publicly traded
partnership rules, satisfies administrative law standards as a reasonable
implementation of the congressional mandate to impose the corporate tax on those
entities that resemble corporations.").
112. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Review of Selected Entity
Classification and Partnership Tax Issues (JCS-6-97), Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 9,
1997); see also Richard A. Booth, The Limited Liability Company and the Search for a
Bright Line Between Corporationsand Partnerships,32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 79, 83
(1997) ("There are numerous indications that public trading is in fact the most
important line of demarcation between partnerships and corporations for tax
purposes.") (citing Donna D. Adler, Master Limited Partnerships,40 U. FLA. L. REV.
755, 783-86 (1988)).
113. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a) (2002); see also supra note 4.
114. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a) ("For purposes of this section and § 301.7701-3, a
business entity is any entity recognized for federal tax purposes ... that is not properly
classified as a trust under § 301.7701-4 or otherwise subject to special treatment under
the Internal Revenue Code.").
115. Id. § 3301.7701-2(b).
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partnership for federal tax purposes."6 Despite the seeming simplicity
of this elective scheme, the check-the-box regulations still face some
of the problems that plagued the Kintner Regulations.117
Nonetheless, the check-the-box regulations are widely perceived
to have collapsed the practical distinction between corporations and
unincorporated associations for federal tax purposes,"' and have
become a vehicle for unified treatment of all business organizations.
Some commentators have argued for unification on the sole basis of
limited liability. 9 There also have been proposals for collapsing

116. Id. § 3301.7701-3(c).
117. According to the ALI,
[a]lthough in theory, similarly situated businesses have an equal opportunity
to be treated in the same tax-advantageous manner under current law, the
practical reality is probably to the contrary, due to disparities in the quality
of advice the businesses receive. By permitting such disparate tax choices
without any apparent underlying, conceptual foundation, current law has
simply provided a tax benefit for the well-advised and a trap for the illadvised.
ALI, TAXATION OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, supra note 4, at 45; see also Maine, ALI
Critique,supra note 94, at 240 ("The current law... is inefficient in that the available
choices create unnecessary costs and complexities. Businesses must understand and
compare three complex regimes before choosing one that minimizes overall taxes."); cf.
supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
118. Arguably, a chasm exists between the perceived and actual effect of the checkthe-box regulations on corporate entity characterizations. Eligible businesses may
choose treatment as a corporation or as a partnership for federal tax purposes. In this
way, the check-the-box regulations still perpetuate the orthodox corporationpartnership dichotomy. See supra notes 52 and 87. This is not to say that the
dichotomy is sound. See supra note 86. In any event, perceptions need not be grounded
in fact to have material consequences; whether the oversight by commentators is
deliberate or unintentional, they nevertheless have pushed for unified treatment of
business organizations on the basis of the check-the-box regulations. I thank an
insightful conversation with Alice G. Abreu for this point.
119. See, e.g., Oesterle & Gazur, What's in a Name?, supra note 8, at 141-48
(proposing uniform statutory treatment on basis of limited liability).
Other
commentators disagree:
[A]n extension of the corporate tax using substantive limited liability would
be unwise for at least two reasons. First, it would severely disrupt the
current business climate and would call into question the status of many
partnerships.
Second, the provisions surrounding the structure of the
corporate tax contain many opportunities to mitigate its effect, which
arguably sends a policy signal against any further expansion of the corporate
tax beyond the corporate form.
Hamill, Corporate Integration, supra note 39, at 434. In addition, Jeffrey Maine
argues that
[florcing all non-public entities to use one uniform limited liability business
form is undesirable from a policy perspective, as such form would necessarily
mandate extreme flexibility.... Conversely, maintaining distinctions among
business forms and permitting businesses to choose among a proliferation of
different forms, each serving a different purpose and each with its own
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regulation of corporations and unincorporated associations into one
universal statute,12 where properties common to all business forms

coherent set of default rules, best serves diverse business interests. A
proliferation of statutes offering different operational structures and
established, predictable rules on fiduciary duties and piercing is far better, in
theory, than one generic, flexible business form that would create a
pandemonium free-for-all.
Jeffrey A. Maine, EvaluatingSubchapter S in a "Check-the-Box" World, 51 TAX LAW.
717, 754 (1998) [hereinafter Maine, Evaluating Subchapter S]; see also David M.
Deaton, Comment, Check-the-Box: An Opportunity for States to Take Another Look at
Business Formation, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 1741, 1744 n.20 (1999) (citing arguments by
Mark J. Lowenstein, Osterle, and Gazur stating that the check-the-box regulations
obviate the need for limited liability forms beyond corporations, general partnerships,
and LLCs).
The American Law Institute has recommended uniform federal tax treatment for all
private business entities, but rejected distinguishing firms on the basis of whether
limited liability exists. See ALI, TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, supra
note 4, at 2-1. According to the American Law Institute, the income tax is not a tax on
"benefits conferred" and, in any event, the amount of an entity-level tax could not
properly reflect the value of the limited liability benefit. Id. at 54. Second, linking
entity taxation and limited liability "would simply discourage firms from utilizing an
efficient method of doing business" because limited liability creates efficiency gains by
reducing agency costs and promoting diversification and more liquid investments. Id.
at 55. Third, Congress and the Treasury have consistently refused to adopt such a
rule. Fourth, it would be difficult to implement such a rule given the proliferation of
possible entity forms and financing arrangements. Id. at 55-56; cf. generally Maine,
ALI Critique,supra note 94, at 223.
120. See, e.g., Thomas F. Blackwell, The Revolution Is Here: The Promise of a
Unified Business Entity Code, 24 J. CORP. L. 333, 334 (1999) ("The time has come for
serious (re)consideration of a single unified code that would govern all variations of
businesses entities .. ") (citing Henry J. Haynsworth, The Need for a Unified Small
Business Legal Structure, 33 BUs. LAW. 849 (1978); Robert A. Kessler, With Limited
Liability for All: Why Not a PartnershipCorporation?,36 FORDHAM L. REV. 235 (196768); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business Organization
Law, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1996)) [hereinafter Blackwell, Revolution]; Keatinge,
Universal Business OrganizationLegislation, supra note 7, at 68-69. "Changes in the
tax law and the revision of most organic statutes have afforded those who work with
these statutes the freedom to make the changes in them which facilitate the use of
forms used by business owners. In doing so, many of the statutory distinctions among
forms have disappeared, leaving some statutory forms almost indistinguishable from
others . . . ." Keatinge states that "[d]ue to the growth in alternative and often
indistinguishable forms, the need for an increase in universality of the organic
statutes governing the forms is suggested.").
Keatinge outlines two proposals for a universal statute: (1) the Universal
Contractual Organization ("UNICORN"), whereby a single new business form may
comprise most available business forms; and (2) the "hub-and-spokes" system, where
general rules govern attributes shared by all business forms. Id. at 81. But see
Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management
Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137, 235-45
(1998) (criticizing Keatinge's notion of an "unincorporation"). As early as 1995,
Keatinge, along with George Coleman, in connection with the American Bar
Association's Business Law Section Committee on Taxation and Partnerships and
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would be subject to a superstructure of rules while sub-provisions

would address properties particular to each business form.''
To a significant extent, both types of proposals flow from an
unease directly attributable to the limited liability company.
Whether the check-the-box regulations effected a liberalization of tax
standards that popularized the limited liability company, or vice
versa, 122 numerous states have since amended their statutes

Unincorporated Business Organizations, had presented a draft argument for and
proposed outline form of a UNICORN Act. See The Azle Society, UNiversal
[Contractual]ORgaNizationAct, at http://www.stcl.edu/lnet-llc/commllo.html (Aug. 7,
1995). See generally Thomas Geu & Robert Keatinge, The Proposed Model Inter-Entity
Transactions Act: A Proposal to Rationalize Changes in Forms of Business
Organizations, 37 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 385 (2002).
121. These universal statutes, which feature a hub-and-spoke structure, cater to
two competing interests: "The first is a desire to simplify the statute and minimize
duplication of provisions. The second is a concern that practitioners and other
researchers be able to find all relevant provisions of the law." Thomas F. Blackwell,
Finally Adding Method To Madness: Applying Principles of Object-OrientedAnalysis
and Design To Legislative Drafting, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 255 (19992000). How a universal statute would operate faces rule-based concerns that bear
jurisprudential implications:
In evaluating each characteristic a statute may provide, drafters of a
universal statute must consider whether that characteristic should be a
mandatory or default rule. In an environment of highly flexible organic
statutes, most rules should only apply as a default. There are only three
reasons that a property should be mandatory: (1) public policy requires that
it be mandatory, (2) it should be mandatory as a result of the fact that third
parties will be relying on it, or (3) it should be mandatory as a structural
rule.
Keatinge, Universal Business OrganizationLegislation, supra note 7, at 82. In many
respects these considerations parallel H.L.A. Hart's "description" of how secondary
rules function to supplement primary rules. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
89-91 (1961). Hart delineates three deficiencies in primary rules: (1) their uncertainty
(i.e., lack of an authoritative basis); (2) their static character (i.e., need for adaptive
compliance); and (3) their inefficiency (i.e., problems of enforcement). Id. To remedy
these deficiencies, Hart suggests "supplementing the primary rules of obligation with
secondary rules ... " Id. at 91. For a description of these secondary rules, see id. at 9194. But see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 34-35, 43-46, 70-72 (1986) (advancing a
not unproblematic account of concepts and conceptions from which he formulates a
critique of Hart's notion of secondary rules, also known as "the semantic sting").
122. See, e.g., supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text; see also CALLISON &
SULLIVAN, supra note 1, § 1.5, at 4 (contending shift in federal tax status resulted in
limited liability companies being recognized by numerous states); Maine, Evaluating
Subchapter S, supra note 119, at 718 ("In the wake of check-the-box classification, the
LLC has become even more attractive. Many states amended their LLC statutes in
1997, eliminating the statutory restrictions intended to cope with the old classification
system and giving the LLC the flexibility to look like a corporation."); Dale A. Oesterle,
Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to Restructure the
Internal Affairs of Small Business, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 881 (1995) ("The ongoing
revolution in small business structure is driven by the belief that limited liability
should be available to businesses without a tax penalty."). Keatinge states that:
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governing various business organizations.'23 These amendments
modify a variety of provisions originally designed to comply with the
Kintner Regulations and converge in their preoccupation with
regulating the limited liability company.2 4 Not surprisingly, the
reason behind the convergence is that the limited liability company,
as formulated, is a hybrid of characteristics historically associated
with both corporations and partnerships-the same set of
characteristics that comprise the Kintner Regulations.12' The implicit
belief is that, by addressing limited liability companies, amended
statutes can address all types of business organizations.'26 And this is

[Blecause the tax code favors unincorporated business organizations that
may be treated as partnerships and many business organizers prefer an
organization that has many of the characteristics of a corporation (such as
certificated interests, officers, and other corporate characteristics), the result
is that many organizers are forming LLCs that contractually adopt
characteristics that are corporate in nature.
Keatinge, Universal Business OrganizationLegislation,supra note 7, at 34.
123. See, e.g., Blackwell, Revolution, supra note 120, at 338. ("As might be expected
with the recent expansion of the number of types of entities, and continuing of the
authorizing statutes for various types of business entities,... there has been a
development of a certain amount of overlap between the various statutes. This has
been particularly true in areas such as statutory merger provisions .
.
124. One commentator has observed that
[m]any of the provisions of the newer statutes have been driven by the desire
to attain specific tax results while protecting business owners from vicarious
liability for the obligations of their businesses. For example, current LLC
statutes provide ... that the dissociation of a member results in the
dissolution of the LLC ....
In formulating new business organization
statutes and revising existing statutes, drafters have borrowed provisions
from statutes governing one form of organization and have engrafted them
into statutes governing others. Thus, many LLC statutes contain provisions
borrowed from both traditional corporations and partnerships.
Keatinge, Universal Business OrganizationLegislation, supra note 7, at 48-49; see also
Maine, ALl Critique,supra note 94, at 239 n.80 ("After the introduction of check-thebox entity classification regulations, state-law provisions in business statutes intended
to cope with the Kintner classification regulations became unnecessary ....
For
example, some states eliminated the requirement that an LLC's Articles of
Organization set forth a period of duration.") (citing Gary W. Derrick, Oklahoma
Limited Liability Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships,22 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 643 (1997)); Susan Kalinka, The Louisiana Limited Liability Company Law after
"Check-the-Box," 57 LA. L. REV. 715 (1997)); Oesterle & Gazur, What's in a Name?,
supra note 8, at 104 ("[T]hose amending the various statutory forms are driving all
forms toward each other. The drafters are attempting to allow businesses to register
under whatever title they need for external regulatory advantage and, at the same
time, contract specifically for the internal form of organization they prefer.").
125. Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 et seq.; see also supra notes 76-79.
126. But see, e.g., Keatinge, Universal Business Organization Legislation, supra
note 7, at 81 ("In a hub and spoke regime, all of the alternative approaches to each
property would be identified and separately described in the statute. This would
require the identification of each property that must be addressed in all business
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the same belief implicit in a universal statute or in treatment purely
based on limited liability.127
But the limited liability company's hybridity is an empty
premise that alone cannot justify merging regulation of corporations
and limited unincorporated associations. By definition, the limited
liability company exhibits characteristics that bridge the historical
dichotomy between corporations and partnerships12 -a dichotomy
undermined by the operation and circumvention of the Kintner
Regulations."9 As a hybrid is only as good as its constituent elements,
the limited liability company cannot amalgamate different
organizational attributes viably from a defunct categorical
distinction. More poignantly, the move to collapse statutory
treatment of business organizations cannot be rationalized on the
ground that the limited liability company, as well as other similar
entities, combines elements of corporations and partnerships that are
no longer exclusive. 3 '
The remaining rationales for such a move are no better. These
rationales concern, respectively, a universal statute and a statute
based on limited liability. First, some commentators contend that
states already have begun implementing forms of universal
statutes.' This contention more closely resembles fatalism than any
organizations."). But see, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Form and Function in Business
Paper
Collection,
Electronic
Organizations (2003), available at SSRN
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=378740 (criticizing entity rationalization on the basis
that "[ilt seems clear that there are fundamental differences between forms" and that
"choice of form may affect the culture of a firm, and indeed that choosing the wrong
form or mixing and matching elements may be harmful."). According to Professor
Booth, "[olne of the distinct risks of entity rationalization ... is that businesspeople
will overplan and choose terms that do not work well together.... Mixing and
matching rules from different organizations may be dangerous." Id.
127. But see, e.g., Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon v. Pickett, 11 F. Supp.
2d 449, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (rejecting New York LLP's argument that its
statutorily-afforded limited liability justified treatment as a corporation for diversity
jurisdiction purposes). The Mudge court reasoned that "the standard of liability by
which the actions of members of an LLP are to be measured has little bearing on the
proper characterization of the organization for [jurisdictional] purposes." Id. at 451-52.
128. See Gomez, supra note 52.
129. See supra Part Il.A.1.
130. See supra note 117.
131. According to one proponent of universal statutes,
[r]egardless of whether statutory rules should move in the direction of
universality, it seems clear that statutes will tend to move in that direction.
While law professors and uniform law commissioners may consider these
matters, statutory drafting in this area is being done almost entirely by
practitioners ....Thus, the question is not whether these changes should
occur, but whether the changes described in this article are likely to occur.
Keatinge, Universal Business Organization Legislation, supra note 7, at 68. This
arguably explains the growing preponderance of model acts. See, e.g., UPA, supra note
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sort of justification. Merely citing the current state of affairs provides
no assurance that this is a substantively sound path to take. Indeed,
this argument merely comports with the possibility that these
statutes uncritically perpetuate defunct corporate classifications and
definitions. Second, other commentators believe a statute based on
limited liability would yield the best policy results, as limited liability
historically has been the most prominent aspect of business
organization. 3 ' But these commentators acknowledge, as they must,
that limited liability has been of partial relevance ever since the
Court decided Morrissey v. Commissioner.'33 In any event, this
historical argument does not justify using limited liability now, much
less ignoring all other aspects of business organization.'34 None of
these objections is to say that these proposals are unsound-or even
undesirable. But the proposals clearly lack a concrete legal basis for
changing the existing framework for business organizations.
B.

Statutory and Common Law Gaps
1.

Corporate Citizenship

A statutory test determines the citizenship of corporations for
federal jurisdictional purposes. 3' The historical basis for this test
resides in the well-known trilogy of Supreme Court decisions: Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux;36 Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston
Railroad Co. v. Letson;37 and Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad

1; RUPA, supra note 1. Cf.Oesterle & Gazur, What's in a Name?, supra note 8, at 108
("Our obsession with 'uniform' state statutes may restrict and retard an otherwise
valuable and natural process of statutory evolution, the state against state game of
legal leapfrog."); see also Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws,
Model Laws, and Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 947, 949-53 (1995)
(contending that market processes would yield a better set of statutes than a concerted
effort to create one statute by experts).
132. See, e.g., Maine, ALI Critique, supra note 94, at 227-31 (contending that the
development of limited liability explains the development of entity taxation); see also
supra note 83. These policy claims are by no means certain. See id
133. 296 U.S. 344 (1935); see Maine, ALI Critique, supra note 94, at 232 ("In the
mid-1930s, courts began to formulate tax classification standards that weakened the
role of limited liability in distinguishing between those entities that should be subject
to an entity-level tax and those that should not.... In cases and regulations following
Morrissey, the relevance of limited liability in determining tax status diminished.").
134. See, e.g., Klein & Zolt, supra note 87, at 1008 ("Although the tax issue and the
limited liability issue historically have been intertwined, we find no good reason why
that should be.").
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000) ("[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of
any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal
place of business.").
136. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
137. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
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Co."' This trilogy established a presumption of corporate citizenship
that, according to the Supreme Court, was a "compromise destined to
endure for over a century." 139
The debate over whether to grant citizenship to corporations
initially revolved around the propriety of characterizing them as
either an entity or an aggregate.14 ° In Deveaux, Chief Justice
Marshall established the analytical parameters for this issue with
his now familiar observation: "That invisible, intangible, and
artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is
certainly not a citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or be sued in
[federal] courts ... unless the rights of the members ... can be
exercised in their corporate name."'4 1 According to Marshall, the legal
fiction of corporations having "corporeal qualities," in connection with
the "general purposes and objects of a law"'
implied that
corporations be represented in court by their members 3 and assume

138. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
139. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145,
148 (1965). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the
Corporation,4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95 (1995) (delineating three constitutional theories
of the corporation: (1) the "corporate person," (2) the "contract," and (3) the
"unconstitutional conditions") [hereinafter Ribstein, ConstitutionalConception].
140. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
141. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86. The issue before the Court was whether the
Georgia branch of the Bank of the United States, whose president and officers were all
citizens of Pennsylvania, could commence a trespass action against certain Georgia
citizens on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 63.
142. Id. at 89; see also Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) ("A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law."). As one author has noted,
[u]ntil the last few years of the nineteenth century jurists took for granted
that when they called a corporation a person, they were indulging in a
standard convention, a kind of legal shorthand, that meant nothing more
than treating a group of corporators ... as a unit instead of individually. For
most of the century, personification depended upon two interrelated but
analytically distinguishable propositions: that the corporation was an
artificial entity and that the corporation existed only through the grant of
incorporation from the sovereign .... That the two were almost always used
together in legal arguments .. . reinforced the view that the corporation was
but a legal fiction.
Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1447-48 (1987)."
143. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 91 ("[T]he term citizen ought to be understood,
as it is used in the [C]onstitution .... That is, to describe the real persons who come
into court .. "). The Court held that only the citizenship of the Bank's officers
mattered for the purposes of alienage and diversity jurisdiction. See id. at 92. A
divided majority succinctly summarized the anomaly created by utilizing an entity
theory for jurisdictional purposes: "An alien cannot sue a domestic corporation, unless
in the state courts. Although you permit an obscure alien to sue a citizen in the federal
courts, yet you deny that privilege to a corporation consisting of a great number of
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their citizenship.
Thirty-five years later, the Court in Letson1" repudiated Deveaux
as illegitimately reasoned and unjustifiably perpetuated by stare
decisis.'4 ' Absent an express constitutional prohibition,'4 the Court
believed the citizenship of a corporation was related more sensibly to
where it can expect to be sued, i.e., the charter state, and not where
its members are domiciled.4 7 The belief stemmed from the capacity of
aliens." Id. at 69. To resolve this anomaly, the Court resorted to a test based on "not
what names appear upon the record, but between whom is the controversy; who are
the real litigants." Id. at 68. By assuming the citizenship of their constituent
shareholders, corporations enjoyed only limited access to federal courts on the basis of
alienage or diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Commercial & R.R. Bank of Vicksburg v.
Slocomb, Richards & Co., 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 60 (1840) (denying diversity of citizenship
between Louisiana plaintiffs and a Mississippi corporation with Louisiana members,
based on Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); Breithaupt v. Bank of
Georgia, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 238 (1828); Sullivan v. Fulton Steam Boat Co., 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 450 (1821)).
144. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). The plaintiff, a New York citizen, commenced a
breach of contract action against a South Carolina corporation, of which certain
members were New York citizens. Id. at 497-98.
145. See id. at 556 ("We cannot follow further, and upon our maturest deliberation
we do not think that the cases relied upon for a doctrine contrary to that which this
court will here announce, are sustained by a sound and comprehensive course of
professional reasoning."). The Court noted that: "[Wihenever a case has occurred on
the circuit, involving the application of the case of the Bank and Deveaux, it was
yielded to, because the decision had been made, and not because it was thought to be
right." Id. Interestingly, the Court also acknowledged its concern over widespread
dissatisfaction with the rule in Deveaux, and "[b]y no one was the correctness of [the
rule] more questioned than by the late chief justice [sic] [Marshall] who gave [the
rule]." Id. at 555. Indeed, the Court felt compelled to state:
We remark too, that the cases of Strawbridge and Curtiss and the Bank [of
the United States] and Deveaux have never been satisfactory to the bar, and
that they were not, especially the last, entirely satisfactory to the court that
made them. They have been followed always most reluctantly and with
dissatisfaction.
Id.; see also Charles Warren, Corporationsand Diversity of Citizenship, 19 VA. L. REV.
661, 667 (1933) (noting federal judges' disapproval of Deveaux) [hereinafter Warren,
Corporations].
146. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 552 ("[J]urisdiction is not necessarily excluded ...
unless the word citizen is used in the Constitution and the laws of the United States in
a sense which necessarily excludes a corporation."). The Court has embraced this
principle of expressio unius with Article III on a selective basis. See infra note 230; see
also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 390 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The
Constitution is not to be satisfied with a fiction.").
147. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 553. The Court added:
[T]he question occurs, if the corporation be only suable where its locality
is... and a suit is brought against it by a citizen of another state.... it is
not a suit between citizens of the state where the suit is brought and a
citizen of another state. The fact that the corporators do live in different
states does not aid the solution of the question.
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corporations to contract, sue or be sued, and otherwise act as natural
persons do.'45 These state-conferred privileges led the Court to
conclude that a corporation is "entitled, for the purpose of suing and
being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state."'49
Recognizing difficulties with characterizing corporations as
entities or aggregates, the Court abandoned this paradigm for a new
rationale in Marshall."' The decisions in Deveaux and Letson had
created an unresolved tension between the corporation as an
artificial entity and as a quasi-person with natural legal powers.'

148. Id. at 558; see also Peter A. French, The Corporationas a Moral Person, 16 AM.
PHIL. Q. 207, 207 (1979) (arguing that corporations can have the same "moral
privileges, rights, and duties" accorded to persons). Individuals who wished to
establish corporations had to apply to state legislatures for charters granting
permission to incorporate. See, e.g., Ribstein, Constitutional Conception, supra note
139, at 98 ("As general incorporation became widely accepted, legal commentators and
courts came to view individual contracting parties, rather than the state, as the
creators of the corporate entity."). Professor Ribstein, however, identifies two residual
vestiges of the "corporate person" theory: (1) limited tort liability and (2) the "internal
affairs" doctrine. See id. at 99. See generally Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century
JurisdictionalCompetition in the Grantingof Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
129, 138-63 (1985) (examining development of corporate privileges and identifying
external factors that facilitated adoption of general incorporation laws). The advent of
incorporation has brought a recognition that individual contracting parties, and not
the state, create a corporation:
The states enacted "general corporation laws" to assure equal access to the
corporate form.... Although many still saw a reified corporate entity,
widespread use of the corporate form directed attention away from juridicial
constructs and towards the social reality of the business and the creativity of
the individuals conducting it.
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485-86 (1989). According to one commentator,
[t]he older idea that states were responsible for the creation of corporate
power no longer seemed appropriate [in the early 20th century] .... With
this change in theory came a new willingness to treat corporate activity as
fundamentally private in nature, differing in no important ways from
ordinary individual commercial activities ....
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,1990 DuKE L.J. 201, 213. For a debate on
whether the corporation is a creature of contract or state action, see Symposium,
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) (containing
relevant articles by Frank H. Easterbrook, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Daniel R. Fischel,
Lewis A. Kornhauser, and Fred S. McChesney).
149. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 555. But see Dudley 0. McGovney, A Supreme Court
Fiction: Corporationsin the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 56
HARV. L. REV. 853, 873 (1943) (deriding Letson's holding thusly: "A deemster may
adjudge a mouse to be a cat and in a story for children that make-believe would be
amusing.") (citing Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 555).
150. 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 314. The case concerned a breach of contract action
between a Virginia citizen and a Maryland corporation. Id. at 325.
151. Compare id. at 327 with id. at 327-28 (discussing inherent conflict between
corporate status as a legal fiction and its ability to act as a "person" in other ways).
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Rather than trying to reconcile this duality, the Court took a
pragmatic approach: "The necessities and conveniences of trade and
business require that [corporate members] ... should ...have the
faculty of contracting, suing, and being sued in a ...collective name.
But these important faculties ...cannot be wielded to deprive others
of acknowledged rights."'52 Accordingly, stockholders were held to
have assumed the citizenship of the corporation's charter state.153 In
essence, the Court believed that the prominence of corporations
within the nation's economy justified treating them as citizens for
jurisdictional purposes. 54
This extension of federal jurisdiction to corporations for alienage
or diversity purposes was not uncontroversial. From 1878 to 1910,
Congress almost annually entertained bills limiting or prohibiting
corporations access to federal courts.'5' Among the most ardent
supporters of such bills were corporations, which wished to retain the
perceived advantage of litigating in their respective charter state's
courts."6 As corporations became a ubiquitous element of the
business landscape,"' their public standing changed."8 Particularly
infuriating was the abuse by corporations in their strategic selection
of where to incorporate."'

152. Id. at 327.
153. Id. at 327-28 ("The presumption arising from the habitat of a corporation in the
place of its creation ...[is] conclusive as to the residence or citizenship of those who
use the corporate name and exercise the faculties conferred by it .. ");
see also Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) ("a corporation can have no legal
existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created"). In Doctor v.
Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905), the Supreme Court refused to extend this
presumption to prevent stockholder derivative suits based on diversity jurisdiction.
154. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327-28 (1853).
155. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 27, at 136-45 (citing, for instance,
persistent legislative efforts by Representative Culberson of Texas); see also
McGovney, supra note 149, at 854.
156. See, e.g., Warren, Corporations,supra note 145, at 670 ("[T]he doctrine that a
corporation could be treated as a citizen and hence as suable in Federal Courts was
established against the opposition and protest of the corporation."). According to
Warren, the doctrine was for the "benefit [of] the citizen suing the corporation by
enabling [her] to keep out of the Courts of the State which chartered the corporation."
Id.
157. According to one commentator, during the late nineteenth century,
"[c]orporations became the dominant units of business and commerce.... In 1900
corporations produced approximately 60 percent of the total value of American
manufactured goods and employed well over half of the nation's work force." EDWARD
A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 16 (1992).
158. See generally Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs and the Rise
of Double Taxation, 44 WM & MARY L. REV. 167 (2002) (delineating increasingly
prevalent suspicions of corporations and their retention of earnings).
159. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
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After codifying the citizenship test for corporations established
in Marshall,6 ' Congress proceeded to address their abusive
practices.'61 Citing the need to avoid "the evil whereby a local
institution, engaged in a local business and in many cases locally
owned, is enabled to bring it litigation into the Federal courts simply

Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (permitting diversity suit by company that had
reincorporated in another state specifically for purposes of accessing federal court).
The Senate Report for the 1958 amendments specifically cited Black & White Taxicab.
See supra note 34 and infra note 162.
160. The Act of 1948 incorporated the citizenship test into Title 28, Section 1332 of
the United States Code. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 930 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988)). In 1956, Congress amended the Act of 1948
merely to clarify that Puerto Rico's status as a "State" under section 1332 was not
altered by a reference to the "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" in the Puerto Rican
Constitution of 1952. Act of July 26, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-808, ch. 740, 70 Stat. 658
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000)).
161. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415. The 1958
amendments incorporated recommendations adopted in 1951 by the Judicial
Conference of the United States. See COMMITTEE ON JURISDICTION AND VENUE,
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3114
(1958). They also increased the amount-in-controversy requirement to $10,000. Act of
July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415; see also H.R. REP. No. 82-1987 (1st
Sess. 1951) (proposing to deem corporations a citizen of every state in which they do
business); H.R. REP. No. 88-834 (2d Sess. 1963) (proposing to deem corporations a
citizen of the state of their incorporation and any state in which they are qualified to
do business). Section 1332's constitutionality has been upheld:
It seems clear... that the pre-1958 decisions were not interpretations of the
constitutional term, "citizens," but were rather holdings to the effect that a
corporation would be treated as a citizen for the limited purpose of diversity
jurisdiction. If it be conceded, as it must, that Congress has the power to
define, confer, limit and take away the jurisdiction of the lower Federal
Courts, a fortiori it has the power to change a judge-made rule defining the
status of corporations for jurisdictional purposes.
Eldridge v. Richfield Oil Corp., 247 F. Supp. 407, 410 (S.D. Cal. 1965), affd, 364 F.2d
909 (9th Cir. 1966). However, commentary suggests the Framers never intended
diversity jurisdiction to extend to corporations:
The Constitution makes no reference to a corporation as a jurisdictional
party although the word was known to its framers in substantially its
present-day meaning .... The acts of Congress now in force conferring
original diversity jurisdiction upon the federal district courts ... used for
that purpose the very words of the Constitution and forestalled any charge
that it was conferring any jurisdiction beyond that explicitly provided by the
Constitution.
George Cochran Doub, Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity
Jurisdiction?,44 A.B.A. J. 243, 279 (1958). But see Frederick Green, Corporationsas
Persons, Citizens, and Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 206 (1946) ("If
corporations are not to be allowed to sue and be sued in federal courts as being
themselves citizens of the state or country by virtue of whose laws they exist, the
purposes ... for which federal courts were given jurisdiction in cases of diverse
citizenship will largely be defeated.").
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because it has obtained a corporate charter from another State,"'' 2
'
Congress expanded the citizenship test for corporations in 1958. 63
Whereas citizenship for corporations once was determined by the
state of incorporation,' the citizenship test was expanded to include
also the principal place of business.' 6' This test applies regardless of

162. S. REP. No. 85-1830, at 3101-02 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3099,3101-02; see also Carter v. Clear Fir Sales Co., 284 F. Supp. 386, 387 (D. Or.
1967) ("The obvious purpose of the amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) in 1958 was to
narrow the situations in which a corporation could invoke federal jurisdiction."); Riley
v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 173 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Ill. 1959) ("It was the
intention of Congress in its enactment ... to remedy the evil whereby local
corporations were permitted the free access of the Federal Courts simply because they
were doing local business with a foreign charter."). But see Orie L. Phillips & A.
Sherman Christenson, Should Corporations Be Regarded as Citizens within the
Diversity JurisdictionProvisions?, 48 A.B.A. J. 435, 436 (1962) ("We think ...there is
logical justification for the concept that a corporation has a separate and recognizable
citizenship apart from that of its stockholders. And it is easier to justify the
recognition of its localized citizenship than to suppose that it exists nowhere or
everywhere.").
163. According to one commentator, populists and progressives in Congress
implemented this expansion to assert more control over corporations:
To the extent that they remained suspicious of the power and politics of large
corporations, in fact, they were quite content to keep those corporations in
the federal courts where they and the national judiciary, perceived in the
late 1950s to be relatively liberal, could more effectively police them....
...In 1958 Congress was not concerned with protecting corporations against
the dangers of local prejudice but with keeping in the hands of the national
courts what it regarded as in every realistic sense the basic affairs of the
nation.
PURCELL, supra note 157, at 240-41. An unexpected consequence of the expanded
citizenship test was that corporations thereby acquired a property distinct from a
natural citizen, which was a duality at issue in Deveaux and Letson.
164. See, e.g., Ohio & Miss. R.R. Co. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286, 291 (1861)
("If,as the declaration avers, this corporation was created at all by the laws of Indiana,
it is, for the purposes of jurisdiction, a citizen of Indiana... and it therefore cannot
sue a citizen of Indiana in the Federal courts of that State."). The Court subsequently
extended this principle to foreign corporations:
the legal presumption is ...that a suit by or against a corporation, in its
corporate name, must be presumed to be a suit by or against citizens of the
State which created the corporate body. ...

...Consequently, a corporation of a foreign State is, for purposes of [federal]
jurisdiction ... to be deemed, constructively, a citizen or subject of such
State.
S.S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 118, 120-21 (1882) (internal quotations
omitted).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) ("[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal
place of business ....
").Unresolved questions linger about the citizenship test for
corporations, which has remained unchanged since its enactment in 1958. Specifically,
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the 1958 amendments are silent on the test for alien corporations. Arguably, section
1332 could be construed as referring only to corporations having a principal place of
business in the United States. See, e.g., Willems v. Barclays Bank D.C.O., 263 F. Supp.
774, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (indicating section 1332 not applicable to Delaware
corporation whose principal place of business was in British Guiana). But this does not
seem to be the prevailing view. See, e.g., Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d
1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989) (ruling that a domestically incorporated corporation did
not lose United States citizenship by virtue of its principal place of business being
outside the United States); Steinbock-Sinclair v. Amoco Int'l Oil Co., 401 F. Supp. 19,
24-26 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (permitting Delaware corporation with principal places of
business in London, Bermuda, and Cairo to sue under section 1332). Prior to the 1958
amendments, courts deemed alien corporations to be citizens of the foreign state in
which they were incorporated. See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 112
(1898) ("[A]n alien or a foreign corporation... may be sued by a citizen of a State of
the Union in any district in which valid service can be made upon the defendant.");
Tugman, 106 U.S.(16 Otto) at 121 ("[A] corporation of a foreign state is, for purposes of
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States, to be deemed, constructively, a citizen
or subject of such State."). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 213 (1986) ("For purposes of international law, a corporation
has the nationality of the state under the laws of which the corporation is organized.").
By expanding the potential bases of corporate citizenship, most courts have
understood Congress as having permitted alien corporations with a domestic principal
place of business to avail themselves of federal court. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v.
Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir. 1985) (permitting suit by Liberian
corporation with New Jersey principal place of business); Vareka Invs., N.V. v. Am.
Inv. Props., 724 F.2d 907, 908-10 (11th Cir. 1984) (permitting suit by passive
investment vehicle incorporated in Netherlands Antilles with Ecuador as its principal
place of business); Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629
F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1980) (permitting suit by Swiss corporation with New York
principal place of business). But see Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,
189 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("[S]ubdivision [c of section 1332] is not
susceptible of the construction as if it read 'all corporations shall be deemed citizens of
the States by which they have been incorporated and of the States where they have
their principal places of business."'); Marc Miller, Comment, Diversity Jurisdiction
over Alien Corporations,50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1458, 1470 (1983) (endorsing the Eisenberg
court's approach). However, some courts do not uniformly treat alien corporations as
having dual citizenship, but instead regard such corporations only as a citizen either of
the state of incorporation or principal place of business. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v.
Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1994)
("The distinction between our treatment of individuals and corporations finds its
source in the statute establishing diversity jurisdiction. While the statute creates a
system of dual citizenship for corporations ... it contains no indication that we should
consider the dual citizenship of an individual for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.")
(citation omitted); Trans World Hosp. Supplies, Ltd. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 542 F.
Supp. 869, 878 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) ("Despite its incorporation in a foreign country, if an
alien corporation maintains its principal place of business in a state of the United
States, no compelling reason exists that it should not be deemed a citizen of that
state."); Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Serv., Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (same) (citing S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3101-02 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3114). But see, e.g., Int'l Shipping Co., S.A. Hydra v. Offshore, Inc.,
875 F.2d 388, 392 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[W]e [have] concluded beyond cavil that, in this
circuit, a corporation organized under the laws of a foreign nation remains an alien
corporation under § 1332, even if its principal place of business is in one of the
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whether a domestic or alien166 corporation is involved.'67 Ironically,
section 1332(c) has had the effect of increasing the volume of
corporate litigation in federal courts.'
2.

Unincorporated Membership

Until Letson, the citizenship test for corporations paralleled that
for unincorporated associations. In Chapman v. Barney,6 ' the Court
applied the test first established in Deveaux to determine that a joint
States.") (citing Venezolana, 629 F.2d at 790); Rouhi v. Harza Eng'g Co., 785 F. Supp.
1290, 1294 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("'Like a domestic corporation, an alien corporation may
add an additional place of citizenship for diversity purposes if its principal place of
business is within one of the states of the United States,' but it does not lose its foreign
citizenship.") (quoting Panalpina Welttransport GmBh v. Geosource, Inc., 764 F.2d
352, 354 (5th Cir. 1985)).
166. For instance, in Jerguson v. Blue Dot Investment, 659 F.2d 31, 32 (5th Cir.
1981), a group of Florida citizens commenced a suit under section 1332(c) against a
Panama corporation whose principal place of business was in Florida. In affirming the
district court's dismissal of the suit for lack of diversity, the Fifth Circuit interpreted
the alienage jurisdiction statute as guarding against local bias. Id. at 35. The absence
of any statutory provision precluding diversity between a citizen and a corporation
with a principal place of business of the same state led the court to conclude that
"Congress decided there was no need for federal court protection of a corporation with
its principal place of business in the same state in which its legal adversary is a
citizen, even though it is incorporated elsewhere." Id. Accordingly, the court held that
"a foreign corporation is a citizen for diversity jurisdiction purposes of a state where it
has its principal place of business." Id. See also, e.g., Simon Holdings PLC Group of
Cos. U.K. v. Klenz, 878 F. Supp. 210, 212 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Vareka Invs., 724
F.2d at 909-10); Rouhi, 785 F. Supp. at 1293-95; Carmania Corp., N.V. v. Hambrecht
Terrell Int'l, 758 F. Supp. 896, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Jerguson, 659 F.2d at 3335); Cont'l Motion Pictures v. Allstate Film Co., 590 F. Supp. 67, 71 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(adopting alternative rationale set forth in Eisenberg, 189 F. Supp. at 502).
167. See, e.g., Nike, 20 F.3d at 990 ("We draw no distinction between corporations in
a state of the United States and those incorporated in a foreign country when
determining ...citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. In each instance, the
corporation is deemed a citizen of its place of incorporation and ...its principal place
of business.") (citing Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., 979 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir.
1992); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)); Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 1001, 1006-07 (N.D. Ill. 1973) ("While several other courts have
adopted... the dictum of Eisenberg, we do not agree with that analysis. We hold...
that section 1332(c) applies to foreign corporations whose principal place of business is
located in the United States.").
168. See Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction-InReply to Professor
Yntema, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1931) (observing corporations were parties to
80% of all diversity cases drawn from sample of ten Federal Register volumes)
[hereinafter Frankfurter, Note on Diversity]. During 2001, 49,681 cases were filed on
the basis of diverse citizenship, which is approximately 24.9% of all private cases and
19.1% of all civil cases filed during that time. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S.
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 28, Table C-2 (Dec. 31,
2001). Of these diversity suits, approximately 62.6% involved personal injury or
product liability claims. See id; see also infra note 344.
169. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
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stock company assumes the citizenship of every one of its members.'
Explicitly building on Chapman, the Court in Great South Fire Proof
Hotel Co. v. Jones.7' stated that "[we] do[ ] not hold that either a
voluntary association of persons, or an association into a body politic,
created by law, is a citizen of a State within the meaning of the
Constitution." 7' Rather, the Court held: "When the question relates
to ... jurisdiction ... as resting on the diverse citizenship of the
parties we must look in the case of a suit by or against a partnership
association to the citizenship of the several persons composing such
association."'73
Unlike corporations, the citizenship test for unincorporated
associations remains uncodified. The Court considered and preserved
this disparate status in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v.
R.H. Bouligny, Inc."4 Presented with a defamation suit brought by a
corporation against an unincorporated labor union, the Court
acknowledged significant "dissatisfaction" with Chapman's "artificial
and unreal" distinction between the "'personality' and 'citizenship' of
corporations and that of labor unions and other unincorporated
associations.''. Specifically, courts and commentators had argued

170. Id. at 682 ("The [joint-stock] company may have been organized under the laws
of the State of New York, and may be doing business in that State, and yet all the
members of it may not be citizens of that state.").
171. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
172. Id. at 454. The Court found Chapman "decisive" in this regard and proceeded
to state:
That a limited partnership association ... may be described as a "quasi
corporation," having some of the characteristics of a corporation, or as a "new
artificial person," is not a sufficient reason for regarding it as a corporation
within the jurisdictional rule heretofore adverted to. That rule must not be
extended. We are unwilling to extend it so as to embrace partnership
associations.
Id. at 457.
173. Id. at 456. On two occasions, the Supreme Court has deviated from this
membership citizenship test. In Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 482 (1933),
the Court concluded that a Puerto Rican business association known as a sociedad en
comandita exhibited characteristics most closely approximating a corporation. Among
these characteristics were public filing of certain articles; continuity of life; the ability
to sue, be sued, and transact business; and unlimited liability. Id. at 481. In Navarro
Savings Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 462 (1980), the Court concluded a routine business
trust was neither a corporation or an unincorporated business association. The Court
ignored the trust's strong resemblance to a partnership (i.e., centralized management,
continuity of enterprise, and unlimited duration). "[T]his case involves neither an
[unincorporated] association nor a corporation. [The relevant entity] is an express
trust, and the question is whether its trustees are real parties to this controversy .. "
Id. Utilizing a specific case controlling the jurisdictional status of trusts, the Court
found the trustees to be real parties to the controversy. Id. at 465-66.
174. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
175. Id. at 149 (citing, inter alia, Mason v. Am. Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.
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that
corporations
and
unincorporated
associations
were
"indistinguishable... in terms of the reality of function and
structure."'76 Although possessing "considerable merit," these
arguments nevertheless struck the Court as misdirected: "We are of
the view that these arguments, however appealing, are addressed to
an inappropriate forum, and that pleas for extension of the diversity
jurisdiction to hitherto uncovered broad categories of litigants ought
to be made to the Congress and not to the courts."'77 In particular, the
Court observed Congress's self-perceived need to codify the simple
and reliable rule in Marshall for corporations.'78 By extension, any
similar common law rule for unincorporated associations would
require Congressional approval as well.
Congress, however, has not extended the presumption of
corporate citizenship to unincorporated associations. The reason for
this neglect is not apparent, something that evidently did not trouble
the Bouligny Court.' 9 Indeed, whether Congress intended to exclude
unincorporated associations from the citizenship test codified for
corporations in 1958 is not even clear.'
Meanwhile, the Court continues to find the case for harmonizing

1964); Am. Fed. of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1954); Van Sant v. Am.
Express Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1947); Recent Cases, Federal CourtsJurisdiction-UnincorporatedAssociation Is a Citizen for Purposes of Diversity of
Citizenship Jurisdiction, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1965); Recent Decisions,
Unincorporated Joint Stock Association May Be Deemed a Citizen of the State of Its
Organizationfor Purposes of Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction.Mason v. American
Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964), 53 GEO. L.J. 513 (1965); Recent
Developments, Federal Courts-Jurisdiction:Diversity Jurisdictionand Unincorporated
Associations, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 162 (1965)). The Court proceeded to categorize the
sociedad en comandita in Russell as a sui generis case involving "an exotic creation of
the civil law." Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 151; see also id. at 152 n.10.
176. Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 149-50.
177. Id. at 150-51.
178. Id. at 152.
179. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
180. See Comment, Citizenship of Unincorporated Associations for Diversity
Purposes, 50 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1136 n.16, 1143 (1964) ("The [1958] amendment[s]
w[ere] intended merely to prevent essentially local corporations from invoking
diversity jurisdiction by virtue of foreign incorporation. The problems of
unincorporated associations were not considered."); see also John Kaplan, Suits
Against UnincorporatedAssociations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 53
MICH. L. REV. 945, 959 (1955) ("In fact there has been no legislation on the subject and
no court has actually analyzed the reasons for or against including the unincorporated
association within the diversity jurisdiction [statute]."); Comment, Diversity
Jurisdiction for Unincorporated Associations, 75 YALE L.J. 138, 147 n.50 (1965)
("There is no indication that Congress even considered the status of unincorporated
associations in [the 1958 amendments], and the failure of Congress to enact a rule
governing the citizenship of associations in 1958 is not equivalent to congressional
action denying them citizenship for jurisdictional purposes.").
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the citizenship tests for corporations and unincorporated associations
compelling. In Carden v. Arkoma Associates,"' a limited partnership
organized under Arizona law commenced a diversity suit against
Louisiana citizens over a contract. The citizens moved to dismiss the
case on the basis that one of the limited partners was a Louisiana
citizen. 8' After the Fifth Circuit declined to hear the certified
question, the district court denied the citizens' motion.'83 On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and judgment
in favor of the limited partnership.'84
Justice Scalia, writing for a minimum majority, framed the
precise question as "whether [a limited partnership] may be
considered a 'citizen' of the State under whose laws it was created."''
Briskly analyzing Chapman, Great Southern, and Bouligny, the
Court observed that limited partnerships do not enjoy the citizenship
status accorded to corporations.'86 The Court then entertained
whether to consider only the limited partnership's general partners
on the basis that they are the real parties-in-interest. The Court
dismissed evidence that only the general partners had "exclusive and
complete management and control of the operations of the
partnerships."'87
The Court then addressed Justice O'Connor's dissent, which
contended that a real party-in-interest analysis should be utilized to
determine which partners' citizenship was relevant for diversity
purposes.' The Court found no basis for such analysis in the trilogy
of prior cases and thus concluded: "We adhere to our oft-repeated
rule that diversity jurisdiction in a suit by or against the entity
depends on the citizenship of 'all the members,'. . . 'the several
persons composing such association,'. .. 'each of its members.""8 In

181. 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
182. Id. at 186.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 187.
186. Id. at 189. In making this observation, the Court distinguished both Russell
and Navarro. See supra note 173. The Court noted that Russell involved "an exotic
creation of the civil law." Id. at 190. The Court then noted that Navarro dealt with "the
rule, 'more than 150 years' old, which permits [ ] trustees to sue in their own right,
without regard to the citizenship of the trust beneficiaries." Id. at 191 (quoting
Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 151; Navarro, 446 U.S. at 465-66). The Court found the limited
partnership's arguments based on these cases less than compelling. Carden v. Arkoma
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 192-94 (1990).
187. Carden, 494 U.S. at 192. This management and control was manifested by the
general partners managing assets, controlling the litigation, and bearing the entity's
liabilities. Id.
188. Id. at 198 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 195-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Chapman, 129 U.S. at 682;
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so holding, the Court made a general observation about the test for
all unincorporated associations under the diversity jurisdiction
statute: "Which of [the types of unincorporated associations] is
entitled to be considered a 'citizen' for diversity purposes, and which
of their members' citizenship is to be consulted, are questions more
readily resolved by legislative prescription ...."190 Observing that
Congress had declined in its 1958 amendments to fashion a
citizenship test for unincorporated associations akin to that
established for corporations, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and
held that diversity jurisdiction was lacking. 9' Courts across all
circuits have proceeded to apply the rule affirmed in Carden to the
gamut of unincorporated associations such as LLCs,'92 LLPs,'93 LPs,'
as well as other unincorporated forms such as joint stock
forms,'97
(including multi-tiered
partnerships'96
companies, 9'
GreatSouthern, 177 U.S. at 456; Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 146).
190. Carden, 494 U.S. at 197. One commentator has contended that the Court
elected to perpetuate the membership test for unincorporated associations due to a
certain perception. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 438 ("The Court perceives that
deeming unincorporated organizations to have the citizenship of all of their members,
rather than entity citizenship, reduces the number of actions eligible for diversity
jurisdiction. It is not clear that this perception is accurate.").
191. Carden, 494 U.S. at 197-98.
192. See, e.g., Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998) (LLC
assumes citizenship of all its members); Halleran v. Hoffman, 966 F.2d 45, 48 (st Cir.
1992) ("To hold otherwise would make . ..Carden . .. turn on the sheer fortuity of
state law relating to the name or names under which a limited partnership must sue.
Those partnerships ... adhering to the old common law rule .. .might seek to create
diversity jurisdiction simply by not ... su[ing] in [the] partnership['s] name."); JMTR
Enters., LLC v. Duchin, 42 F. Supp. 2d 87, 93 (D. Mass. 1997) (LLC assumes
citizenship of all of its members); Int'l Flavors & Textures, LLC v. Gardner, 966 F.
Supp. 552, 554-55 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (extending Carden to limited liability companies).
193. See, e.g., Cohen v. Kurtzman, 45 F. Supp. 2d 423, 431 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting two
decisions that "have held a limited liability partnership is a citizen of every state in
which one of its partners resides") (citing Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon v.
Pickett, 11 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick
LLP, 965 F. Supp. 165, 176 (D. Mass. 1997)).
194. See, e.g., Handelsman v. Bedford Vill. Assocs. L.P., 213 F.3d 48, 51-52 (2d Cir.
2000) (treating LLPs and LLCs as partnerships for diversity purposes); Bankston v.
Burch, 27 F.3d 164, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1994) ("We have resisted attempts to carve
exceptions from Carden, even though we acknowledged that the decision effectively
closes the doors of the federal courts to many lawsuits among partners or by partners
against a partnership.") (citing, inter alia, Temple Drilling Co. v. Louisiana Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 946 F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 1991); Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 941
F.2d 302, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1991)); see also Penteco Corp. v. Union Gas Sys., Inc., 929
F.2d 1519, 1523 (10th Cir. 1991) (demanding proof of any general or limited partners
that would preclude diversity); Buckley v. Control Data Corp., 923 F.2d 96, 97 (8th Cir.
1991) (embracing Carden as having "clarified the method for determining the
citizenship of a limited partnership").
195. See, e.g., Mason v. Am. Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 401 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting
that while joint stock companies most resembled corporations, they are incapable of
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unions,' underwriting syndicates,199 religious organizations,2 0 and
Native American tribes2 1 ).
possessing citizenship separate from their members).
196. See, e.g., Village Fair Shopping Ctr. Co. v. Sam Broadhead Trust, 588 F.2d 431,
433 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979); Plechner v. Widener Coll., Inc., 569 F.2d 1250, 1260-61 (3d Cir.
1977); Lewis v. Odell, 503 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting that "for purposes of
diversity a partnership is a citizen of each state of which a general partner is a
citizen"); Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir.
1970) (applying membership rule to attempted diversity with John Doe members of a
partnership); Bomeisler v. M. Jacobson & Sons, 118 F.2d 261, 262 n.1 (1st Cir. 1941)
(business trust). Law firms organized as professional corporations are subject to the
same citizenship test applied to all corporations for alienage and diversity purposes.
See, e.g., Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1986) ("To give the professional
corporation determinative significance for diversity jurisdiction is therefore to attach
an unintended consequence to federal tax legislation, and yet we conclude that a
professional corporation is a corporation within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.");
Saxe, Bacon & Bolan, P.C. v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 710 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1983)
(same).
197. See, e.g., Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 976 F. Supp. 119, 12122 (D.R.I. 1997) ("Carden does not prescribe a distinct level of control that one must
have to be considered for diversity purposes .... The Court flatly rejected a degree-ofcontrol test to determine which partners should be considered for diversity purposes.")
(quoting Carden, 494 U.S. at 195 (quoting Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682
(1889)).
198. See, e.g., Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 150-52.
199. Compare, e.g., Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir.
1998) (citizenship based on that of individual investors and underwriter who acted as
managing agent); with Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Layne,
26 F.3d 39, 43-44 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding citizenship based on the syndicate's
managing underwriter under a real party in interest analysis). Circuits appear split on
whose membership should count for the purposes of the Carden analysis of a Lloyd's
syndicate. See, e.g., Advani Enters., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 140 F.3d 157, 16061 (2d Cir. 1998) (outlining, but declining to endorse, competing approaches).
200. See, e.g., Lawson v. United House of Prayer for all People of the Church on the
Rock of the Apostolic Faith, 252 F. Supp. 52, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (determining religious
organization's citizenship based on whether it was incorporated).
201. All Native Americans (as well as any member of an "aboriginal tribe," 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(2)) born in the United States are statutorily deemed American citizens. See
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924). However, Native American tribes do
not assume the citizenship of any state or constitute a "citizen" or "subject" of a foreign
state (or even a foreign state) for diversity purposes under section 1332(a)(2).
Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997) ("In light of the Indian tribes' status
as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original neutral
rights ... it is doubtful at best whether an Indian tribe could be considered a citizen of
any state.") (internal quotations omitted); Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v.
Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 1974) ("[lIt is clear that an Indian tribe is not a
citizen of any state and cannot sue or be sued in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction."); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 464 F.2d 916,
923 (2d Cir. 1972) (concluding Oneida Nation of New York was neither "a citizen of a
state different from New York" nor "a foreign state"), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S.
661 (1974). But see Tribal Smokeshop, Inc. v. Alabama Coushatta Tribes of Tex., 72 F.
Supp. 2d 717, 718 n.1 (D. Tex. 1999) ("Indian tribes are deemed to be citizens of the
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JURISDICTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The previous Part established the need for a legal basis to
collapse corporate distinctions that have engendered path
dependence and have escaped Congressional attention. This Part
presents a possible entry point to achieving such collapsing: the
anomaly of statelessness. Depriving citizens access to federal court
simply because they reside abroad conflicts with the historical and
modern rationales of alienage jurisdiction. These citizens are aliens
because their foreign domicile implicates established and legitimate
concerns about the sensitivity of state courts towards foreign
relations, xenophobia, and international commerce." 2 This Part first
clarifies the differences between alienage jurisdiction and its more
troubled relative, diversity. After examining these differences, this
Part proposes a novel set of categories for aliens that evinces the
inconsistent premises underlying statelessness. Establishing this
inconsistency provides a structured framework and a substantive
context for analyzing unjustified disparities between business
organizations.
A.

Alienage Jurisdiction:Diversity Jurisdiction

Although bearing common historical roots, diversity and
alienage jurisdiction rest on distinct rationales.0 3 Historically," 4

state in which they are located for purposes of jurisdiction.") (citing Schwanz v. White
Lightning, 502 F.2d 67, 70 (8th Cir. 1974); Superior Oil Co. v. Merritt, 619 F. Supp.
526, 531 (D. Utah 1985)). Accordingly, Native American tribes constitute "stateless
entities." See, e.g., Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous.
Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) ("An Indian tribe ... is not considered to be a
citizen of any state. Consequently, a tribe is analogous to a stateless person for
jurisdictional purposes.") (citations omitted). Arguably, these Native American tribes
could be viewed as unincorporated associations that assume the citizenship of their
constituent members.
202. Admittedly, this view is contestable. See infra Part III.C. Clouding the issue is
the fact that Congress lumped alienage and diversity jurisdiction into one statute with
the 1948 amendments. See infra note 232. The real issue is methodological: which set
of historical and modern rationales should determine the characterization of
statelessness? U.S. citizens residing abroad are more susceptible to problems
stemming from their foreign domicile more so than their domestic citizenship, such as
xenophobia. This suggests the problem of statelessness more properly lies in the
domain of alienage than diversity. On a more pragmatic level, the merits of alienage
jurisdiction are less controversial than its counterpart. See infra notes 217-19 and
accompanying text.
203. See generally Johnson, supra note 22, at 56 (noting the distinct rationals
underlying alienage and diversity jurisdiction). Although different, these rationales do
share certain principled similarities. In particular, both alienage and diversity
jurisdiction are premised on citizens from different jurisdictions being able to avail
themselves of federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To an extent, select dynamics
of this diverse citizenship scheme remain constant regardless of whether an alien is
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diversity jurisdiction purports to addresses the threat of state
legislatures retaliating against unpopular state court decisions;2 °5 the
convenience of federal courts deciding types of cases beyond the
jurisdiction of state courts, such as interpleader;2 5° the possibility of
local courts discriminating against out-of-state litigants;2 7 and the
improvement to substantive law resulting from concurrent
jurisdiction.2"8
In contrast,
alienage jurisdiction
addresses
involved. Both aliens and domestic citizens from a different state, for instance, are
subject to essentially the same concerns when facing the prospect of anti-foreign
prejudice in a non-federal forum. See infra Part III.A.2. Because diversity cases greatly
outnumber alienage cases, this Section occasionally utilizes cases involving diversity
jurisdiction to illustrate points about alienage jurisdiction.
204. Some commentators have suggested that the only rationales supporting
diversity jurisdiction are historical. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer,
Defining the Role of Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 82 ("[I]f diversity
jurisdiction had never existed in the past, Congress almost certainly would not create
it today; the continuing viability of this jurisdiction rests to a considerable degree on
its historical pedigree."); see also Stone Grissom, Diversity Jurisdiction:An Open
Dialogue in Dual Sovereignty, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 372, 376-78 (2001) (tracing origins
of diversity jurisdiction to classical antiquity).
205. See, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 354 (1855) ("[Diversity
jurisdiction] is to make people think and feel ... that their relations to each other were
protected by the strictest justice, administrated in courts independent of all local
control.").
206. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS §§ 2371-76, at 386-410 (1969) [hereinafter ALI,
STUDY]. According to the ALI,"[w]here the action was brought in a state court and the
defendant cannot bring about in that court the effective joinder of parties necessary for
a just adjudication as to him, it is appropriate that he be permitted to remove the case
to a federal court authorized to issue far-reaching process." Id. § 2372(a), at 394. But
see David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 29-32 (1968) (criticizing the ALI's treatment of interpleader); Charles A.
Wright, RestructuringFederal Jurisdiction:The American Law Institute Proposals,26
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185 (1969) (evaluating various ALI proposals critically).
207. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) ("Diversity
jurisdiction Js founded on assurances to non-resident litigants of courts free from
susceptibility to potential local bias."); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74
(1938) ("Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent
apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the State.").
208. See John P. Frank, For MaintainingDiversity Jurisdiction,73 YALE L.J. 7, 11
(1963) ("We need the substantial bulk, the regular exposure to concurrent jurisdiction,
to get the best effect of the interaction [between federal and state courts]."). There are
significant problems with this argument, however. First, concurrent jurisdiction is
unnecessary, and perhaps ineffective, in light of the Erie Doctrine:
The leadership idea ...hearkens back to the frustrated ideals of Swift
v. Tyson [41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)]; we would be foolish to forget state
courts' unwillingness to follow federal court leads under that regime.
Whether state courts eventually do adhere to federal court's Erieanticipations of what state law is poses a question of empirical fact
which has been inadequately researched.
J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
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international interests such as the importance of preserving foreign
relations; °9 the necessity of guarding against xenophobic sentiments,
whether actual or perceived;21 and the value of facilitating trade.2 "
This analytical distinction between diversity and alienage
jurisdiction is manifest in their respective standing with courts,
Congress, and commentators. Whether diversity jurisdiction
continues to be necessary has been the subject of extended, intense
debate.212 Justice Jackson once proclaimed that "the greatest
WAYNE L. REV. 317 (1967). Second, this argument diminishes the incentives for states
to reform their courts. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 60
(1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[I]s it sound public policy to withdraw from the
incentives and energies for reforming state tribunals ... the interests of influential
groups who through diversity litigation are now enabled to avoid state courts?").
Finally, there is the problem of federal congestion. See Gibson v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 352 U.S. 874, 874-75 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("These diversity
litigations place, it is becoming increasingly recognized, an undue burden upon the
federal courts in their ability to dispose expeditiously of other litigation which can be
properly brought only in federal courts."); Robert J. Sheran & Barbara Isaacman, State
Cases Belong in State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 50 (1978) (criticizing the
argument of concurrent improvement because "the entire movement to eliminate
diversity is based on the existence of too many other types of cases in federal court").
209. See infra Part III.B.1.
210. See infra Part III.B.2.
211. See infra Part III.B.3. Arguably, this rationale may support diversity
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally
Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 86-90 (1997).
212. Some commentators support completely abolishing diversity jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Howard C. Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction:An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 51
IND. L.J. 347, 349 (1976) ("[T]here are compelling reasons to advocate the elimination
of diversity jurisdiction-given the nature of the federal system and the dramatic
increase in the workload of federal courts."); Currie, supra note 206, at 6 ("I cannot
view either the retention or the abolition of diversity jurisdiction with appreciable
choler. But... I am tempted to say that the impossibility of drafting sensible and
workable limits for diversity is reason enough to abandon the jurisdiction."). According
to Field,
[w]hat was right in 1789 to meet the problems then besetting the
country is not necessarily right today when new problems have replaced
old ones .... To rest access to the federal court solely on the accident
that the citizenship happens to be diverse and the constitutional
requirement therefore satisfied seems to us unprincipled and to produce
whimsical results.
Richard H. Field, Diversity of Citizenship: A Response to Judge Wright, 13 WAYNE L.
REV. 489, 492 (1967).; see also Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 68, at 121
("[T]he case for abolishing diversity jurisdiction is clear."); Carl McGowan, Federal
Jurisdiction:Legislative and JudicialChange, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 517, 533 (1978)
("It is difficult to understand why federal courts should be required to hear cases solely
because the litigants are of diverse citizenship, thereby drawing their energies away
from the formulation of federal law to the ascertainment and application of state
law."); Roger J. Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptions
for Relief, 51 ALB. L. REV. 151, 158 (1987) ("[T]otal elimination of diversity jurisdiction
is the best prescription for the relief of the tensions it causes.... Diversity causes
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contribution that Congress could make to the orderly administration
of justice in the United States would be to abolish the jurisdiction of
the federal courts which is based solely on the ground that the
litigants are citizens of different states." 13 Indeed, Justice
Frankfurter was a vigorous, life-long advocate of abolishing diversity
jurisdiction. 14 Throughout the years, numerous academic and judicial

more trouble than it is worth."); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity
Jurisdiction:Positive Side Effects and Potential for FurtherReforms, 92 HARV. L. REV.
963, 981-84 (1979) (urging abolition).
Some commentators support diversity jurisdiction, but only for severely limited
purposes. See, e.g., George W. Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction,28 ILL.
L. REV. 356, 378 (1933) (endorsing diversity only when local prejudice can be shown);
Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction:Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts,
48 BROOK. L. REV. 197, 221-27 (1982) (proposing to modify diversity jurisdiction by,
inter alia, denying access to in-state plaintiffs, restricting access to only truly foreign
corporations, and implementing a rule of minimal diversity); David L. Shapiro, Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 319 (1977)
(proposing "Congress enact a 'local option' plan, under which each federal district
would have limited freedom to retain, curtail, or virtually eliminate diversity
jurisdiction within its borders"); Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 239-40 (1948)
(endorsing limiting diversity to "situations where it is in fact responsive to ['state
inadequacy']"). Professor Larry Kramer has suggested the debate can be viewed as
between prominent critics and the private bar. Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, supra
note 68, at 98 (noting Robert Kastenmeier's list of diversity critics, including Louis
Brandeis, Warren Burger, Felix Frankfurter, Henry Friendly, Robert Jackson, Roscoe
Pound, Earl Warren, and Charles Alan Wright, is counter-weighed primarily by "state
and national bar associations and the American Trial Lawyers Association") (citing
Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice:
A Legislative Perspective, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 301, 313 (1979); John P. Frank,
Diversity Jurisdiction:Let's Keep It, 3 ADELPHIA L.J. 75, 76-78 (1984)).
213. ROBERT JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 37 (1955); see also CHARLES W. ELLIOT, MOORFIELD STOREY, LOUIS
BRANDEIS, ADOLPH J. RODENBACK & ROSCOE POUND, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON
EFFICIENCY IN THE ADMINISTRATION ON JUSTICE 28 (1914) ("In those parts of the
country in which resort to the federal courts in case of diversity of citizenship is
common the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts on the ground of diverse
citizenship often causes much delay, expense, and uncertainty.").
214. See Gibson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 352 U.S. 874, 875 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("Very often -litigants in the position of the plaintiff bring a suit involving
merely local law in a federal court because for one reason or another they expect a
more favorable outcome than if the suit were tried in the local courts."); Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (seeking
an end to "the mounting mischief inflicted on the federal judicial system by the
unjustifiable continuance of diversity jurisdiction."); Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 651 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("An Act for the
elimination of diversity jurisdiction could fairly be called an Act for the relief of the
federal courts."); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 514 (1928) [hereinafter Frankfurter,
Distribution] ("The constitutional grant of judicial power has never implied a duty by
Congress to employ it.... [P]ractical justifications explain the past judiciary acts ....
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committees have examined the prospect of eliminating or severely
curtailing diversity jurisdiction.215 Congress even has entertained
proposals to repeal the entire diversity statute.216
This controversy, however, largely has left alienage jurisdiction
unscathed. For instance, a Congressional committee has stated that
alienage jurisdiction is outside "minimum federal jurisdiction." 17
Indeed, even the commentators most vigorously opposed to diversity
jurisdiction have supported retaining alienage jurisdiction.218 This can
be explained by the fact that federal courts continue to play an
The present jurisdiction cannot rely on tradition."); Frankfurter, Note on Diversity,
supra note 168, at 1097 ("I have been one of those who have urged legislator to remove
some obvious abuses of diversity jurisdiction, on grounds of policy and to relieve the
dockets of the federal courts.").
215. See, e.g., H.R. 2404, 97th Cong. (1981) (proposing to abolish diversity
jurisdiction); S. 679, 96th Cong. (1979) (proposing to modify diversity jurisdiction);
H.R. 2516, 85th Cong. (1957) (proposing to limit diversity to individual citizens only);
S. 939, 72d Cong. (1932) (proposing to limit jurisdiction of United States district
courts); H.R. 11508, 72d Cong. (1932) (same); S. 4357, 71st Cong. (1930) (same); S.
3151, 70th Cong. (1928) (same). See also ALI, STUDY, supra note 206, §§ 1301-07
(urging retention); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 38 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS REPORT]
(recommending Congress limit diversity jurisdiction "to complex multi-state litigation,
interpleader, and suits involving aliens"). But see Report of the New York County
Lawyers' Association Committee on the Federal Courts on the Recommendation of the
Federal Courts Study Committee to Abolish Diversity Jurisdiction,158 F.R.D. 185, 204
(1995) ("[Tlhe virtual elimination of diversity jurisdiction is not the right solution to
the overcrowding problem presently facing the federal courts ... ").
216. See H.R. 130, 96th Cong. (1979) (proposing to abolish diversity jurisdiction);
H.R. 2202, 96th Cong. (1979) (same); H.R. 9622, 95th Cong. (1978) (same); H.R. 761,
95th Cong. (1977) (same).
217. FEDERAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 215, at 38.
218. See, e.g., Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction,supra note 68, at 121 (noting that "the
staunchest opponents of diversity" would support preserving diversity jurisdiction
under limited circumstances, including alienage). Professor Kramer proceeds to
endorse the ALI's position that
[i]t is important in the relations of this country with other nations that any
possible appearance of injustice or tenable ground for resentment be avoided.
This objective can best be achieved by giving the foreigner the assurance
that he can have his case tried in a court with the best procedures the
federal government can supply and with the dignity and prestige of the
United States behind it.
Id. (quoting ALI, STUDY, supra note 206, at 108). While acknowledging that "[s]ome of
the arguments for diversity jurisdiction have merit, and in a world of unlimited
resources, a case could be made for keeping these cases in the federal courts,"
Professor Kramer believes that, "in this world it is clear that the federal system can no
longer afford the luxury of diversity jurisdiction." Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction,
supra note 68, at 121. Although less opposed to diversity jurisdiction than Professor
Kramer, Richard Posner acknowledges that "[a]lthough the suggested ground for
diversity jurisdiction is of limited reach, it is also independent of the degree to which a
state's residents are xenophobic." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
AND REFORM 176 (1985).
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integral role in maintaining international relations.29
B.

HistoricalRationalesfor Alienage Jurisdiction...

The distinct nature of alienage jurisdiction appears most clearly
in its historical rationales. Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests
in Congress the power to create federal courts and to confer them
jurisdiction to hear cases." 1 Within this constitutionally mandated
range are, inter alia, controversies between "Citizens of different
States ... and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects."222 The scope of Congress's power to
curtail federal court jurisdiction under Article III is highly
controversial.22
219. See, e.g., Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda (New York) Ltd., 229 F.3d 187, 193 (2d
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Alienage jurisdiction was established
by our Constitution and early statutes to strengthen our relations ... with foreign
nations. The importance of these goals has only increased with time as both
international relations and global trade have become more complex and our nation has
assumed a central role in both."); see also Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction,supra note
68, at 121-22 (citing State Department's position that "'the availability of civil
jurisdiction in federal courts under a single nationwide system of rules tends to
provide a useful reassurance to foreign governments and their citizens') (quoting
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction-1982: Hearings on H.R. 6691 Before the
Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties,and the Administration of Justice of the House of
Representatives Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 336 (1982) (letter from State
Department, dated Aug. 9, 1982)).
220. The origins of alienage jurisdiction actually hail to classical antiquity. See, e.g.,
Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction,the Rise of Legal Positivism,
and Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 83 (1993) (citing special
tribunals created by the ancient Greeks and Romans to deal with disputes involving
aliens as evidence of alien jurisdiction's classical origins). The modern formulation of
alienage jurisdiction can be traced to medieval English practice, where trials de
medietate linguae (i.e., "trials of the half-tongue") involved "'one party [who] was an
alien whose native language was not English' before a jury equally divided between
citizens and non-citizens. Johnson, supra note 22, at 8-9 (quoting James C. Oldham,
The Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 167 n.157 (1983); and citing,
inter alia, Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by
Jury "De Medietate Linguae": A History and A Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV.
777, 783-96 (1994)).
221. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
222. Id. at art. III, § 2. The subject matter of federal courts pertains to "'all cases
arising under the national laws and to such other questions as may involve the
national peace and harmony."' MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 119 (1913). According to Farrand, "[t]here was no difference of
opinion as to the jurisdiction of the national courts" with regards to subject matter. Id.
223. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-FederalistView of Article III: Separatingthe
Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 242-46 (1985); Akhil Reed
Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499,
1535 (1990); Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdictionof the Federal
Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1030-31 (1982); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of
Federal Court Jurisdiction:A Guided Quest for the Original Understandingof Article
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Through the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress conferred federal
courts with express jurisdiction over cases involving aliens.
Specifically, federal courts acquired jurisdiction to hear "all suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity, where.. . an alien is a
party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is
brought, and a citizen of another State."22 ' Congress enacted this
provision expressly "to afford a tribunal in which a foreigner or
citizen of another State might have the law administered free from
the local prejudices or passions which might prevail in a State Court
against foreigners or non-citizens."225 According to one commentator,
alienage jurisdiction was "the single most important grant 226
of
national court jurisdiction embodied in the [Judiciary] Act."

III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 758 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362, 1372-73 (1953); Daniel J. Metzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1569, 1610 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense
in the Interpretationof Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633, 1636-37 (1990). The debate
concerning limits imposed and powers conferred by Article III on the judiciary is not
entertained here.
224. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (partially codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1332) (2000). This form of alienage jurisdiction is distinct from that
conferred by the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq. (2000), and the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 et seq. (2000). These Acts draw
upon federal question jurisdiction. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 437 n.5 (1989) (observing section 1330 confers federal question
jurisdiction on district courts in general terms); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405
U.S. 538, 549-50 n.17 (1972) (citing the Torture Victim Protection Act as a "particular
statute[ ] grant[ing] jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy, in
virtually all areas that otherwise would fall under the general federal-question
statute").
225. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49, 83 (1923) [hereinafter Warren, New Light]. But see WILFRED J. RITZ,
REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS,
CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 165-79 (1990) (critically
examining the accuracy of Warren's article).
226. Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
547, 548 (1989) [hereinafter Holt, Alienage Origins]. But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Article III's Case/ Controversy Distinctionand the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 508-09 n.296 (1994) ('Recent scholarship ... suggests that
[the Judiciary Act of 1789] did in fact confer [plenary federal question] jurisdiction.
Moreover ... the Act placed pecuniary limits on diversity and alienage controversies,
but not on federal question 'Cases,' thereby suggesting the less importance of the
former.") (citations omitted). Four of the five proposals for a national judiciary
submitted at the Constitutional Convention provided for federal jurisdiction over suits
involving aliens. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 432 (Max
Farrand 1937 rev. ed., 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND, RECORDS]); Wythe Holt, "To
Establish Justice": Politics, the JudiciaryAct of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal
Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1460-61 (citing 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra, at 22, 242,
292; see also HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 141 (1973)

(noting that without alienage and diversity jurisdiction, "the circuit courts created by
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Notably, Congress perceived the need for alienage jurisdiction before
federal question jurisdiction. 27
Almost a century later,22 Congress amended the Judiciary Act of
1789 to redress its facial inconsistencies with Article III. The conflict
concerned whether the Judiciary Act granted federal jurisdiction over
all cases involving aliens, irrespective of whether they complied with
Article III's mandate that aliens be paired with citizens. 9 This
question arose from a series of Supreme Court decisions limiting the
power of federal courts to hear disputes involving aliens. 3 ° These
decisions prompted Congress to amend the Judiciary Act by
consolidating its treatment of diversity and alienage jurisdiction.'
Specifically, Congress authorized federal courts to hear
"controvers[ies] between citizens of different States or...
the First Judiciary Act would have had very little to do").
227. See generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question"in the District Courts, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953). The first attempt to confer federal question jurisdiction
was the unsuccessful "Midnight Judges" Act enacted by the Federalists in 1801. See
Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92. The Act was repealed in 1802. See Act of
Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 132. For a fuller account of the "Midnight Judges" Act, see
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 27, at 21-28. But see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 727 (Johnny H. Killian ed. 1987) ("Almost
from the beginning, the [Constitutional] Convention demonstrated an intent to create
'federal question' jurisdiction in the federal courts with regard to federal laws ...
[hereinafter CONSTITUTION].
228. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137 § 1 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000)). Through this Act, Congress codified federal question jurisdiction.
229. See, e.g., Warren, New Light, supra note 225, at 79 ("[B]y leaving the clause [in
the Judiciary Act of 1789] as it stood, [Congress] rendered that portion of the Section,
if literally interpreted, unconstitutional; and the Supreme Court, in order to hold it
valid, was obliged ... to read into it a limitation which it did not actually contain.")
(citing JOHN CARTER ROSE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AS
LIMITED BY THE CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE OF THE PARTIES 23 (1899)).
230. See, e.g., Jackson v. Twentyman, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 136, 136 (1829) ("[T]he 11th
section of the [Judiciary Act of 1789] must be construed in connection with, and in
conformity to, the [C]onstitution of the United States. That, by the latter, the judicial
power was not extended to private suits, in which an alien is a party, unless a citizen
be the adverse party."); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 303 (1809)
(holding that the judiciary does not give jurisdiction to the court when all the parties
are aliens because this idea goes "beyond the limits of the [C]onstitution"); Montalet v.
Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46, 47 (1807) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over party
who was "an alien, and subject of France"); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12,
13-14 (1800) ("Neither the [C]onstitution, nor the act of [C]ongress, regard, on [the]
point [of alienage jurisdiction], the subject of the suit, but the parties. A description of
the parties is therefore indispensable to the exercise of jurisdiction."); Turner v. Bank
of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 7 (1799).
231. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.,
536 U.S. 88, 96 (2002) ("The language of the [Judiciary Act of 1789] was amended in
1875 to track Article III by replacing the word 'aliens' with 'citizens, or subjects,' ...
the phrase that remains today.") (citation omitted).
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controversiies] between citizens of a State and foreign states,
'
citizens, or subjects." 32
The Framers' intent behind including alienage jurisdiction in
Article III is not exactly clear. The documented debates at the
Constitutional Convention concerning the need for diversity
jurisdiction are limited in number and tepid at best.233 And the
debates at the First Congress concerning the Judiciary Act of 1789
are only slightly better. 3 4 Notwithstanding these evidentiary caveats,
three primary rationales operate to support alienage jurisdiction.
First, federal courts should decide cases that implicate foreign

232. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1994)). In 1948, this fusion of diversity and alienage jurisdiction assumed the codified
form that exists today. The Judicial Code of 1948 conferred federal courts with
jurisdiction over cases between "citizens of different States and in which citizens or
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62
Stat. 930 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988)). According to one
commentator, these amendments "lumped diversity and alienage jurisdiction together
under the title 'Diversity of Citizenship."' 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.71[4.-3], at 728 (3d ed. 1993). These "lumped" forms of
jurisdiction are now codified in section 1332(a), which provides original jurisdiction to
district courts over civil actions involving:
(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects
of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state ... as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In 1976, Congress again amended section 1332 through the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976). This Act provided a
comprehensive jurisdictional basis for actions against foreign states. Accordingly,
Congress deleted references to "foreign states," which were previously in paragraphs
(2) and (3) of section 1332, and added paragraph (4), which conferred subject matter
jurisdiction over actions initiated by foreign states. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-583, § 3, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994 &
Supp. 1999)).
233. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION, supra note 227, at 774 ("The records of the Federal
Convention are silent with regard to the reasons the Framers included in the judiciary
article jurisdiction in the federal courts of controversies between citizens of different
States .. ")(citation omitted); Henry J. Friendly, The Historical Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 484 (1928) ("Nor are the records of the Convention
fruitful to a student of the diversity clause."); Holt, Alienage Origins, supra note 226,
at 550 ("[T]he extensive debates over the provisions to be made for strengthening the
national legislature and for inventing the new national executive occupied almost all of
the time of the 1787 Convention. Very little indeed was said about the new judiciary.").
234. See, e.g., William R. Casto, The First Congress's Understandingof Its Authority
over the Federal Court's Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1101, 1107 (1985) ("Because all
debates in the first Senate were secret, there is some difficulty in piecing together a
complete history of the [Judiciary] [A]ct."); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of
Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures from the
Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1528 n.36 (1986) ("The debates over the
Judiciary Act are preserved only in a sketchy, incomplete fashion.").
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relations.235 Second, federal courts seem better suited to guard
against prejudice towards out-of-state litigants.2 36 And third, federal
courts can better represent and foster international commercial
interests.237 Each of these rationales has a basis in the Constitutional
Convention and First Congress.
1.

Foreign Relations

The legislative history of the Supremacy Clause evinces a
concern about whether state courts would enforce previously ratified
treaties. At the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin
specifically moved to amend congressional veto power over state laws
to include those state laws that conflicted with foreign treaties.238
Through a motion by James Madison, the Supremacy Clause
eventually was amended "to obviate all doubt concerning the force of
'
treaties preexisting."39
Some delegates feared that state courts would
not be sufficiently sensitive to the importance of treaties between the
United States and other countries.24 ° This prospective threat to
international interests, therefore, was not insignificant.
To further guard against this threat, the participants in the
Constitutional Convention largely agreed on the need for a national
judicial system to hear cases involving aliens. Both Alexander
Hamilton, a strong proponent of alienage jurisdiction, and Oliver
Ellsworth, the principal architect of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
endorsed the idea of federal courts presiding over international
disputes. Hamilton asserted that "matters of general concern in the
last resort" were the province of federal courts and so they were more
properly suited to allay fears that "the national treaties will be liable
to be infringed, the national faith to be violated, and the public

235. See infra Part III.B.1.
236. See infra Part III.B.2.
237. See infra Part III.B.3.
238.

NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES

MADISON 44 (1966) ("the words 'or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the
Union,' being added after the words 'contravening &c. the articles of the Union,' on
motion of Dr. Franklin") [hereinafter NOTES].
239. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 532 (1881).
240. See, e.g., JPMorgan,536 U.S. at 96 ("[A]lienage jurisdiction was necessary to
'avoid controversies with foreign powers' so that a single State's courts would not 'drag
the whole community into war."') (quoting 3 ELLIOT, supra note 239, at 534); Wilson v.
Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Certainly, the
exercise of American judicial authority over the citizens of a British Dependent
Territory implicates this country's relationship with the United Kingdom-precisely
the raison d'etre for applying alienage jurisdiction.").
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tranquility to be disturbed."'" And Ellsworth contended that the
general jurisdiction of federal courts rendered them ideally
accountable to foreign nations who might perceive injustice from an
adverse judgment by a state court.24 Whether or not such a
perception was justified, the delegates clearly believed minimizing
the risk of offending foreign nations made federal alienage
jurisdiction worthwhile.242
Jurisdiction over aliens, therefore, was viewed as an extension of
the federal courts' role in matters of international consequence.
Implicit in this rationale was the delegates' belief that the federal
courts were qualitatively superior to their state counterparts. One
commentator has concluded that "[a]ll the evidence from the
241. 1 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 305-06 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 2d ed.
1903); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). Hamilton further argued the matter in The Federalist,charging that:
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct
of its members .... [I]t will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have
cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are
concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the public faith
than to the security of the public tranquility.
Id.
242. Warren, New Light, supra note 225, at 60 (quoting Letter of Oliver Ellsworth
to Judge Richard Law, dated Apr. 30, 1789); see also NOTES, supra note 238, at 568
(Oliver Ellsworth) ("The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for
the conduct of its members.... [Ilt is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all
those in which they are concerned to the national tribunals."). In a letter to Charles
Tillinghast, Timothy Pickering noted that
there is a particular & very cogent reason for securing to foreigners a
trial . . . in a federal court. With respect to foreigners, all of the states form
but one nation. This nation is responsible for the conduct of all its members
towards foreign nations, their citizens & subjects; and therefore ought to
possess the power of doing justice to the latter. Without this party, a single
state, or one of its citizens, might embroil the whole union in a foreign war.
Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles Tillinghast, dated Dec. 24, 1787, in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 204 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976) (James Wilson) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see also Hugh
Williamson, Remarks on the New Plan of Government, in THE STATE GAZETTE OF
NORTH CAROLINA, 1788, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 399-400 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (making similar arguments for
alienage jurisdiction).
243. See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
The Deveaux Court, for instance, observed:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation ... it is not less true
that the [C]onstitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject,
or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of
suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of
controversies between aliens and a citizen.
Id. Consistent with this premise, foreign citizenship is determined by the foreign
country's law. See note 277 and accompanying text.
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Convention supports the notion that a national court system was
thought necessary on all sides because state courts, or at least many
state courts, were not doing their jobs."" Indeed, James Madison
bluntly stated that "[c]onfidence can [not] be put in the State
Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests." 42
The delegates attributed this mistrust not only to the distinct
provinces of each judicial strata,246 but also to a perceived domination
of courts by partial state legislatures and unqualified state judges
that engendered an uneven quality of justice." 7
A modem form of these arguments charges state courts with
creating undue external costs. Under this view, state courts typically
have no incentive in most contract cases to discriminate between
residents and aliens because they are economically dependent upon
each other. 8 In contrast, state courts may have an incentive to
discriminate in certain criminal and tort cases involving a resident
victim by imposing costs on aliens."9 This is because state courts
presumably are less concerned with national and international
interests, and so are less inclined to protect them.2 Accordingly,

244. Holt, Alienage Origins, supra note 226, at 549.
245. 2 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 226, at 27.
246. For instance, Edmund Randolph contended that "the courts of the States can
not be trusted with the administration of the National laws. The objects of jurisdiction
are such as will often place the General & local policy at variance." Id. at 46.
247. For example, Joseph Story observed that
the prevalency of a local or sectional spirit might be found to disqualify the
State tribunals for a suitable discharge of national judicial functions; and the
very modes of appointment of some of the State judges might render them
improper channels of the judicial authority of the Union. State judges ...
would, or at least might, be too little independent to be relied upon for an
inflexible execution of the national laws.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1589, 408 (5th ed. 1891).
248. POSNER, supra note 218, at 176. Posner believes the contracting parties can
account for the risk of discrimination within the agreement. Id. (citing Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960)). But this simply means
the parties in such contract cases would bear the cost of drafting, negotiating, and
enforcing a discrimination clause. If Posner is correct that state courts have no
incentive to discriminate in these types of cases, then a contractual provision for the
risk of discrimination may not be economically justifiable. Clearly, the unresolved
variables in this calculus are the probability of discrimination and the cost of its
consequences.
249. Id. ("On this view the rationale for diversity jurisdiction is similar to that for
using the commerce clause of Article I of the Constitution to prevent the states from
establishing tariff-like obstacles to interstate commerce."). Posner does admit,
however, that these externalities may be limited since state judges may not consider
the welfare of either residents or non-residents, thus diminishing the need for federal
diversity jurisdiction. Id.
250. Id. at 175. According to Posner,
[s]ince state judges can be expected to be less independent of state political
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there may be some justification for entrusting federal courts with a
limited group of cases involving aliens.
2.

Anti-Foreign Prejudice

Much of the relevant debates at the Constitutional Convention
and the First Congress concerned the superior protection federal
courts could provide to aliens from perceived prejudice in state
courts. Some delegates may have deemphasized their concern about
the partiality of local courts in recognition that the support of states
was necessary to ratify the Constitution.251 James Madison, for
instance, civilly expressed his concerns in the form of a hypothetical
about how "a strong prejudice may arise in some states, against the
citizens of others, who may have claims against them .... A citizen of
another state might not chance to get justice in state court, and at all
'
events he might think himself injured."52
Not surprisingly, Hamilton
was less diplomatic: "It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that
the judiciary authority of the union ought to extend. . to all those in
which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and
unbiased.""52 Regardless of their style, both Hamilton and Madison
articulated a need to stem anti-foreign prejudice. Courts quickly
came to regard this need as the primary rationale for alienage
jurisdiction. 54
forces than federal judges when both are residents of a state adversely
affected by federal regulation, a state court may be an unsympathetic
tribunal in a case where a federal right has been created in order to correct
an interstate externality.
Id.
251. Johnson, supra note 22, at 12 (contending that any downplaying of the actual
bias of states courts towards local residents "should not be surprising if one views The
Federalist as designed to promote ratification of the Constitution by the various
states").
252. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 239, at 486.
253. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 241, at 402-03 (Alexander Hamilton).
254. In his Dred Scott dissent, Justice Curtis argued:
[The] purpose [of U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1] was, to extend the judicial
power to those controversies into which local feelings or interests might so
enter as to disturb the course of justice, or give rise to suspicions that they
had done so, and thus possibly give occasion to jealousy or ill will between
different States, or a particular State and a foreign nation.
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 580 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1882) ("[T]he very object of giving to the national
courts jurisdiction... in controversies between citizens of different States was to
institute independent tribunals which ...would be unaffected by local prejudices and
sectional views .. ").Similarly, the Court subsequently noted:
The foundation of the right of citizens of different States to sue each other in
the courts of the United States is not an unworthy jealousy of the
impartiality of the state tribunals ....It is to make the people think and feel,
though residing in different States of the Union, that their relations to each
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The validity of this rationale, however, was not unopposed or
unproblematic. For instance, George Mason regarded Hamilton's and
Madison's mistrust of state courts to be unfounded and "ridiculous.""
Indeed, one prominent commentator has suggested that
[t]he very form in which the argument [concerning alienage and
diversity jurisdiction] is stated throws doubts on the sincerity of
those propounding it. Madison does not point out any specific
examples of prejudice, does not allege that any exist; Marshall
even gives the innuendo that none do [sic] exist." 6
Moreover, little, if any, evidence of prejudice apparently was
available during the Convention debates.5 7 Given the delegates'
concern about protecting foreign relations, these evidentiary gaps
presumably apply more towards inter-state biases rather than
xenophobia. 9
In any event, the controversy persists over whether such
prejudice exists. Modem concern over protecting foreign litigants
appears as part of an effort to curtail the broader phenomenon of
forum-shopping.265 Although the evidence is largely anecdotal,261 one

other were protected by the strictest justice, administered in courts
independent of all local control or connection with the subject-matter of the
controversies between the parties to a suit.
Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 354 (1855).
255. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 239, at 486 (George Mason). See also id. ("Their [proposed
form of federal] jurisdiction extends to controversies between citizens of different
states. Can we not trust our state courts with the decision of these?").
256. Friendly, supra note 233, at 493; id. ("Only if we could find that the state
judges had been notoriously unfair to foreigners, would we be in a position to place
much faith in the genuineness of the classical theory. It is, of course, impossible to
obtain accurate information on this subject.").
257. John Frank has contended that
it is very true that there was very little concrete evidence of hostility in
specific lawsuits. The evidence does show that in 1787 bias in interstate
lawsuits was more an anticipated than an existing evil.... [T]he problem
was not an acute one in 1787 for reasons going to the nature of the domestic
economy of the colonies and states. There was too little significant interstate
business litigation to give room for serious actual abrasion.
John P. Frank, HistoricalBases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 24 (1948) [hereinafter Frank, HistoricalBases]. But see Hessel E. Yntema &
George H. Jaffin, PreliminaryAnalysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction,79 U. PA. L. REV.
869, 876 (1931) ("Even for the period covered, it is not demonstrated that the diversity
clause was an anomaly or local prejudice inconsequential.").
258. See supra Part III.B.1.
259. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 206, at 5 (stating that "[m]y hunch is that it is too
early to say that xenophobia has disappeared from the American scene," and thus it
remains a possible rationale supporting alienage jurisdiction).
260. See Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction,supra note 68, at 107 ("Forum shopping is
regarded as an undesirable form of strategic behavior in every other context because it
encourages wasteful investment of resources by both parties and courts.") (citing
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study has found that a majority of defense attorneys shop forums
based on a belief that out-of-state litigants suffer from some sort of
bias.262 Indeed, even the American Law Institute has suggested that
courts do not administer section 1332 uniformly across regions.263
This suggestion is at least consistent with one prominent survey of
the federal judiciary.26 '

William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9-10
(1963)).
261. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 492-94 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The risk of prejudice was especially grave here.... As the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has recognized, the temptation to transfer
wealth from out-of-state corporate defendants to in-state plaintiffs can be quite
strong.") (citing Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 906 (W. Va. Ct. App.
1991)); see also Victor E. Flango, Litigant Choice Between State and Federal Courts, 46
S.C. L. REV. 961 (1995) (reporting a not insignificant number of attorneys considered,
inter alia, prejudice against out-of-staters and the comparative quality of judges, in
selecting a forum). According to Flango,
[o]f the various reasons attorneys give for choosing one forum over the other,
three stood out: quality of judges, client characteristics, and convenience....
The fact that resident status is still important to 60% of the attorneys and
corporate status is important to 35% of the attorneys shows that fear of bias
is an important consideration in forum selection to some lawyers. The
percentages also show that of the two, out-of-state residence is of greater
importance than corporate status.
Victor E. Flango, Attorneys' Perspectives on Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 25
AKRON L. REV. 41, 105 (1991).
262. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases under
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction,41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 409 (1992) (finding
that "50.7% of the responding defense attorneys said that bias against out-of-state
litigants was present in their cases."); see also Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks,
Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 93, 98 (1980) (reporting "almost half (47 percent) of the attorneys citing local
bias [as the reason for selecting federal court] characterized it as 'important' or 'very
important' to the forum decision"). But see Wasson v. Northrup Worldwide Aircraft
Servs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 400, 401 (W.D. Tex. 1978) ("[T]he need to insure a 'neutral'
forum for resolving disputes between citizens of different states [ ] loses much of its
force as our society grows ever more mobile.").
263. ALI, STUDY, supra note 206, at 187-96.
264. Shapiro, supra note 212, at 335-36. Among the questions Shapiro's study posed
to federal and circuit court judges was whether they favored curtailment or
elimination of diversity jurisdiction:
With the exception of the Eighth Circuit, the circuits in which a majority of
district judges favored abolition are located in the Northeast (First, Second,
and Third) and Far West (Ninth)-those areas with the heaviest
concentration of population and the greatest number of large metropolitan
centers. In contrast, the circuits in which the percentage of judges favoring
abolition was below 50% were those in the South and Midwest (Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh).
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International Commercial Interests

Although not an explicit concern at the Convention, the desire to
utilize the judiciary for fostering commerce was present. Prior to the
Convention, commercial relationships were limited and relatively
unsophisticated. As one commentator has stated so simply: "The
typical case was still A v. B for a cow."268 But the Framers presciently
anticipated that the Constitution, and specifically federal courts,
could facilitate the nascent commercial revolution by preempting
some of the associated judicial problems that would arise.266 As that

commentator has noted, "[in studying the Constitution it should
never be forgotten that its first object [is] to promote commerce. 67
Some delegates also viewed federal courts as superior vehicles
for protecting national and international commercial interests. For
instance, Madison observed "that foreigners cannot get justice done
them in these [state] courts, and this has prevented many wealthy
gentlemen from trading with us."26 James Wilson contended that an
added benefit of a "just and impartial tribunal" was its furthering of
the "important object [of] extend[ing] our manufactures and our
commerce." 269 According to Wilson, the apparent or actual neutrality
of federal courts would supply commercial actors with a secure
system for enforcing contracts.27 ° Further, some historians have
suggested that the federal courts provided a shield to businesses
from anti-commercial biases extant in colonial state legislatures.27 1
265. Frank, HistoricalBases, supra note 257, at 26.
266. Id. at 27.
267. Id. at 27 n.126.
268. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 239, at 583 (statement of James Madison).
269. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 242, at 519.
270. Id. ("Is it not an important object to extend our manufactures and our
commerce? This cannot be done unless a proper security is provided for the regular
discharge of contracts. This security cannot be obtained unless we give the power of
deciding upon those contracts to the general government."); see also JPMorgan, 536
U.S. at 93-94. The Court there explained that the development of alienage jurisdiction
was due in part to efforts by state courts to impede foreign investment:
Both during and after the Revolution, state courts were notoriously frosty to
British creditors trying to collect debts from American citizens, and state
legislatures went so far as to hobble British debt collection by statute,
despite the specific provision of the 1783 Treaty of Paris that creditors in the
courts of either country would "meet with lawful impediment"' to debt
collection.
Id. at 94 (quoting THE DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN His BRITANNIC
MAJESTY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great
Britain, Art. IV, 8 Stat. 80, reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1818, 151, 154 (Hunter Miller, ed. 1931)).
271. For instance, Edward Cowin has described the treaties thusly:
By their provincial policies with respect to commerce the state legislatures
had already seriously impaired legitimate interests of this [creditor] class,
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A perhaps unintended result of these rationales was that
alienage and diversity jurisdiction established federal courts as
courts of business and commerce. 72 According to Chief Justice Taft:
"No single element-and I want to emphasize this. . .- no single
element in our governmental system has done so much to secure
capital for the legitimate development of enterprises ... as the
existence of federal courts ... with a jurisdiction to hear diverse
citizenship cases." 72 With a reputation for impartiality and
reliability, federal courts served to stabilize commercial relationships
between diverse parties.274 Even commentators otherwise critical of
jurisdiction premised on diverse citizenship recognize its significant
past and present economic value.275

and they now proceeded to attack what under the standing law were its
unchallengeable rights .... [S]tatutes suspending all actions upon debts
were enacted, payment of debts in kind was authorized, and even payment in
land.
Edward S. Cowin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory between the Declaration of
Independence and the Meeting of the PhiladelphiaConvention, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 511,
519 (1925).; see also Frankfurter, Distribution, supra note 214, at 520 ("The real fear
was of state legislatures, not of state courts. Such distrust as there was of local courts
derived ... [from] their general inadequacy for the interests of the business
community."); James W. Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction:Past,
Present, and Future, 43 TEx. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1964) ("Several commentators have
maintained that the constitutional framers were not interested in assuaging the
apprehension of commercial investors. Whether or not fully anticipated by the
Founders, this fostering of investment in the emergent nation was one of the most
salutary effects ascribed to diversity jurisdiction.").
272. See, e.g., JPMorgan, 536 U.S. at 95 (stating that "[t]his penchant of the state
courts to disrupt international relations and discourage foreign investment led directly
to the alienage jurisdiction provided by Article III of the Constitution"); Johnson,
supra note 22, at 20 (stating that "[a] desire to ensure, and increase, the flow of capital
from Britain and other nations into the United States, with its fledgling economy,"
clearly influenced the Framers in their creation of alienage jurisdiction). For a general
discussion of how judicial refinements affected commercial interests, see MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 140-59 (1977).
Notably, Horwitz observes that, at the turn of the nineteenth century "[1law [wals no
longer merely an agency for resolving disputes; it [wa]s an active, dynamic means of
social control and change. Under such conditions, there must be one undisputed and
authoritative source of rules for regulating commercial life." Id. at 155.
273. William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reform in Administration of Justice
in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 604 (1922).
274. See, e.g., William L. Marbury, Why Should We Limit Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction?,46 A.B.A. J. 379, 380 (1960). Marbury notes:
[I]t is generally agreed that the institutions of the Federal Government
reflected to a marked degree the need of the commercial community for a
stabilizing agency in the chaotic situation which was paralyzing commerce in
the states supposedly united under the Articles of Confederation, and
subjecting the infant nation to economic suffocation.
Id.
275. While arguably "the framers of Article III... wanted to reduce interstate
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Statelessness

Section 1332(a) can be understood novelly as establishing two
categories of aliens. The first category, domestic aliens, comprises
"citizens or subjects of a foreign state" that permanently reside in the
United States. 7 ' The second category, foreign aliens, comprises U.S.
citizens who are legally domiciled277 in a foreign state. Although
seemingly symmetrical, these categories receive distinct judicial
treatment that is manifest in the citizenship test for alienage
jurisdiction. Specifically, in common parlance, foreign aliens are
"stateless" for the purposes of alienage jurisdiction.278 The
phenomenon of "statelessness" has been heavily criticized. As one
commentator has stated: "I]t does appear anomalous that ... United
States citizens who are not domiciliaries of the same state as their
adversary, nor of any other state, may not avail themselves of the
protection and benefits of the federal courts, at least on the basis of
'
[alienage] jurisdiction." 79
Courts have construed section 1332 strictly as permitting federal
courts to hear only cases involving certain statutory pairings. For
instance, the Third Circuit bluntly has stated: "We think that section
hostility," Posner, for instance, believes that
today, when increased education, better transportation and communications,
and greater interstate mobility have lessened the parochialism that the
framers worried about, it is significant that there is a rationale untouched by
concern with parochialism for retaining at least a part, though probably a
very small part, of the diversity jurisdiction.
POSNER, supra note 218, at 176-77.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (stating that for purposes of section 1332, "an alien
admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the
State in which such alien is domiciled").
277. See, e.g., Note, Evidentiary Factorsin the Determinationof Domicile, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 1232 (1948).
278. See, e.g., Smith v. Carter, 545 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1977) (explaining that
"an American citizen living abroad is precluded from invoking the [alienage]
jurisdiction of the federal courts while foreign citizens having no connection with the
United States may do so."); Van der Schelling v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 213
F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. Pa.) (concluding that the Framers never intended the term
"aliens" in Article III of the U.S. Constitution to include foreign aliens), affd, 324 F.2d
956 (3d Cir. 1963) (per curiam). See generally John P. Petzold, Note, FederalDiversity
Suits by American Citizens Domiciled Abroad, 19 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 78 (1962)
(analyzing various diversity suits and statutory treatment of American citizens
domiciled abroad).
279. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 0.74(4), at 708.4
(2d ed. 1948); see also Wasson v. Northrup Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 443 F.
Supp. 400, 404 (W.D. Tex. 1978) ("An individual should not be penalized for leading a
mobile life style; however, the plain truth is that, under certain circumstances, a
particular life style may serve to foreclose an individual's access to federal courts.");
Currie, supra note 206, at 9-10 (suggesting foreign aliens should be treated as foreign
nationals).
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[1332](a)(2) 'citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof. . .' means what it says."28 ° One form of this81 strict
construction appears in the requirement of complete diversity.
Section 1332(a)(2) provides that domestic aliens can sue or be
sued in a federal court on the basis of alienage jurisdiction if and only
if they are paired with a United States citizen.2" 2 The determination

280. Pemberton v. Colonna, 290 F.2d 220, 221 (3d Cir. 1961). Plaintiff there never
raised with the Court of Appeals the issue of whether her Mexican domicile rendered
her a "subject" of that foreign state. Id; see also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) ("Not only does the language of the Act of 1887 evidence the
Congressional purposes to restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts on removal, but the
policy of successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one
calling for the strict construction of such legislation."); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,
270 (1934) ("The policy of the statute [28 U.S.C. § 1332] calls for its strict
construction."); CHARLES WRIGHT, WRIGHT ON FEDERAL COURTS 154-55 (5th ed. 1994)
(concluding Congress's power to confer federal jurisdiction over cases between resident
aliens domiciled in different states is "extremely doubtful").
281. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (finding
that joinder of an alien plaintiff and an alien defendant defeats complete diversity);
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) ("[E]ach distinct interest
should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be sued, in
the federal courts. That is, that were the interest is joint, each of the persons
concerned in that interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those
courts.").
Another example of this strict construction is that a litigant cannot waive the
defense that diversity does not exist. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) ("subsequent history clearly demonstrates a congressional
mandate that diversity jurisdiction is not to be available when any plaintiff is a citizen
of the same State as any defendant"); Thomas v. Bd. of Trs., 195 U.S. 207, 211 (1906).
The Thomas Court further explained:
It is... well established that when jurisdiction depends on diverse
citizenship the absence of sufficient averments or of facts in the record
showing such required diversity of citizenship is fatal and cannot be
overlooked by the court, even if the parties fail to call attention to the defect,
or consent that it may be waived.
Id. But see Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1996) (insinuating defendant had
been "'playing fast and loose with the judicial machinery' and using the federal courts'
limited subject matter jurisdiction in bad faith" by asserting a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction truantly) (quoting 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 0.74[1] n.29 (2d. ed. 1996), and noting efforts to remedy this tactic have
been "repudiated by intervening Supreme Court decisions") (citing Am. Fire Cas. Co. v.
Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16-18 (1951); City of Brady, Texas v. Finklea, 400 F.2d 352, 357-58
(5th Cir. 1968); Di Frischia v. NewYork Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141, 141-44 (3d Cir.
1960); Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. Co., 22 F.R.D. 252, 252-55 (W.D. Pa. 1958)).
But see Wojan v. General Motors Corp., 851 F.2d 969, 976 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that
a court retains jurisdiction to punish defendant for falsely admitting existence of
diversity); Note, Second Bites at the JurisdictionalApple: A Proposal for Preventing
False Assertions of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1417, 1438-43 (1990)
(proposing use of estoppel doctrine to stem belated challenges to existence of diversity).
282. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2); see, e.g., Singh v. Daimler-Benz, AG, 800 F. Supp. 260,
262 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("The clear language of § 1332 establishes that when an alien
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of whether an alien is a "citizen" or "subject" of a foreign state turns
on such foreign state's law. 88 The determination of state citizenship
turns on whether the party is a citizen of the United States and
whether there is a state of legal domicile. 84
Unlike their domestic counterparts, foreign aliens cannot be the
subject of a suit under section 1332(a) because they cannot assume
the citizenship of any state. 85 For instance, in Sadat v. Mertes,"'5 an

receives permanent status the alien is no longer an alien for diversity purposes but is
instead a citizen of the state in which he or she resides."). Section 1332 specifies three
other pairings eligible for federal jurisdiction: (1) citizens of different States; (3)
citizens of different States with citizens or subjects of a foreign state as additional
parties; and (4) a foreign state, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(1), (3)-(4).
283. See, e.g., JPMorgan,536 U.S. at 104-05 (noting that a foreign state is entitled
to define who its citizens or subjects are); see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U.S. 649, 690 (1898) ("'Every independent State has as one of the incidents of its
sovereignty the right of municipal legislation and jurisdiction over all persons within
its territory, and may therefore change their nationality by naturalization."') (quoting
with approval statement of Secretary of State Fish).
284. See, e.g., Sun Printing & Publ'g. Ass'n v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377, 383 (1904);
Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1915); Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694, 702
(1891) ("[I]t is essential that, in cases where jurisdiction depends upon the citizenship
of the parties, such citizenship, or the facts which in legal intendment constitute it,
should be distinctively and positively averred in the pleadings."); Brown v. Keene, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 110, 114 (1834) ("A citizen of the United States may become a citizen of
that State in which he has a fixed and permanent domicile; but the petition does not
aver that the plaintiff is a citizen of the United States."). This determination is
governed by federal common law. See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 102.34[3][a] (3d ed. 1997).
285. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Malaxa, 241 F.2d 129, 129 (2d Cir. 1957) (fmding that
defendant was a stateless alien and, thus was "not a citizen or subject of a foreign
state within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(2)"); Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst.,
80 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("'A suit by or against United States citizens
domiciled abroad may not be premised on diversity.'") (quoting Cresswell v. Sullivan &
Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1990)); Bissell v. Breakers-By-The-Sea, 7 F. Supp.
2d 60, 62 (D. Me. 1998) (explaining that "American citizens who actually reside in a
foreign country do not qualify for diversity jurisdiction"); Lemos v. Pateras, 5 F. Supp.
2d 164, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, one is a citizen of a
Because plaintiff is not a United States domiciliary,
state where one is domiciled ....
she is a citizen of no state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction."); Nat'l Enter., Inc. v.
Smith, 892 F. Supp. 948, 950 (E.D. Mich. 1995) ("For a person to fit within [the]
definition [of a 'citizen' under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)] that person must be a citizen of
the United States and domiciled within a state.") (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v.
Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989)), rev'd on different grounds, 114 F.3d 561
(6th Cir. 1997); Carl v. Galuska, 785 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("A U.S.
citizen residing abroad is not a citizen of any state and therefore cannot maintain a
suit in federal court where jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship.");
Bausch v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 1201, 1208-09 (D. Md. 1989)
("American citizens without citizenship in a particular state cannot be parties in a
diversity action."); Simmons v. Rosenberg, 572 F. Supp. 823, 825 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(rejecting as insufficient an averment that plaintiff "was an American citizen and a
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individual alleging to be a U.S. citizen residing in Egypt commenced
a negligence suit in federal district court against individuals and
insurance companies from Connecticut and Wisconsin.287 The district
court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on
the basis that the plaintiff was not a "citizen of a State" under section
1332(a)(1).288 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit observed "settled
precedent establishling] that a citizen of the United States who is not
also a citizen of one [state] of the United States may not maintain
suit under [28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)].' 9 The basis for this rule is that,
for alienage and diversity purposes, state citizenship is essentially
synonymous with domicile. 9 ' According to the court, "[t]o establish a

'citizen of a state other than the state of New York' when she was domiciled in Italy);
De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, N.V., 570 F. Supp. 613, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(imputing father's stateless status to child for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); Mohr
v. Allen, 407 F. Supp. 483, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("A nonresident United States citizen
does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements set out for a diversity action in ... 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)."); Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Gootrad, 397 F. Supp. 1054, 1055
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (citing 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3621 (1975)); Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 580, 589 (M.D. Fla. 1973)
("[B]y the simple expedient of absenting one's self from the United States, an
American citizen may succeed in avoiding federal diversity jurisdiction."); Fahrner v.
Gentzsch, 355 F. Supp. 349, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("Since [plaintiff] was not a United
States citizen at the time suit was filed, he could not have had domicile for diversity
purposes in any particular state of the United States."); Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 914 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (referencing successful
statelessness defense asserted by Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor); Clapp v.
Stearns & Co., 229 F. Supp. 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (rejecting an averment of foreign
residence as nonequivalent to an averment of citizenship); McClanahan v. Galloway,
127 F. Supp. 929, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (denying defendant's averment of diversity
jurisdiction when they were domiciled in Columbia for thirty years); Alla v. Kornfeld,
84 F. Supp. 823, 824-25 (N.D. Ill. 1949) ("There is a recognized distinction between
citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a particular State, and a person
may be the former without being the latter ....
If a person establishes domicile in a
foreign country, he loses his State citizenship but not necessarily his [U.S.]
citizenship."); Bishop v. Averill, 76 F. 386, 387 (D. Wash. 1896) ("The defendants ... by
removal from Montana, lost their citizenship in that state, and they have become
residents of a foreign country, but they have not acquired the rights nor assumed the
obligations of a new citizenship.").
286. 464 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Wis. 1979), aff'd, 615 F.2d 1176, 1176-89 (7th Cir. 1980).
287. Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1178.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1180 (citing cases); see also Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir.
1996) ("An American national, living abroad, cannot sue or be sued in federal court
under [alienage] jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, unless that party is a citizen, i.e.,
domiciled, in a particular state of the United States.") (citing 1 MOORE, supra note 281,
§ 0.74[4]). The Sadat court acknowledged this rule is not without question. Id. at n.4
(citing cases).
290. See, e.g., Rodrignez-Diaz v. Sierra-Martinez, 853 F.2d 1027, 1029 (1st Cir.
1988) (noting that "state citizenship and domicile are equivalents" for diversity
purposes); 15 MOORE, supra note 284, § 102.34[1]. On various occasions, the Supreme
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domicile of choice a.person generally must be physically present at
the location and intend to make that place his home for the time at
least."29' Because the plaintiff was not physically present in the
United States and could not demonstrate an intent to be domiciled
there, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the action's dismissal. 92
Courts also have established that foreign aliens do not qualify as
a "citizen" or "subject" of a foreign state.293 For instance, in Van der
Schelling v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc.,294 a U.S. citizen legally
domiciled in Mexico commenced a libel suit against a Delaware
corporation. 9' In opposition to a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
contended she qualified as a "subject" of a foreign state under section
1332(a)(2). 9' The Eastern District of Pennsylvania defmed a "subject"
of a foreign state by examining the history behind Article III and the

Court also has confirmed that "citizen" and "subject" are to be regarded equivalently in
other contexts. See, e.g., Inglis v. Trs. of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 155
(1830) ("The rule commonly laid down in the books is, that every person who is born
within the ligeance of a sovereign, is a subject; and, e converso, that every person born
without such allegiance, is an alien."); The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 227, 246 (1817)
(interpreting Spanish Treaty of 1795 and concluding "in the language of the law of
nations ...
a person domiciled in a country, and enjoying the protection of its
sovereign, is deemed a subject of that country").
291. Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1180 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 15, 16, 18 (1971)).
292. Id. at 1182 ("Because the plaintiff, an American citizen, was domiciled abroad
in 1976 [when the action was commenced], he was not a citizen of a state within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)."). The Sadat court proceeded to evaluate the
plaintiffs citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) and concluded that plaintiff
constituted a "citizen" or "subject" under a foreign state despite having claimed dual
citizenship. Id. at 1186 (stating that "the plaintiff was domiciled abroad when he
initiated this action and therefore was not a citizen of any state").
293. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Malaxa, 241 F.2d 129, 129 (2d Cir. 1957) ("a stateless
person ... is not a citizen or subject of a foreign state within the meaning of 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(2)") (citing Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubenstein, 133 F. Supp. 496,
496-502 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)); Paglin v. Saztec Int'l, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (W.D.
Mo. 1993) (per curiam) ("A United States naturalized citizen who does not reside in the
United States and who does not claim domicile in any particular state, is not a 'citizen
of a state' for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.") (citing Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1180); Dadzie v.
Leslie, 550 F. Supp. 77, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Haggerty v. Pratt Inst., 372 F. Supp. 760,
761-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[P]laintiff, having lost his state citizenship by acquiring a
foreign domicile but not foreign citizenship, has lost his right to sue on diversity
grounds under § 1332(a)(1) in addition to his failure to acquire § 1332(a)(2) rights.");
Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 F. 165, 170 (W.D. Mo. 1912) ("A fixed or permanent
residence or domicile in a state is essential to the character of citizenship that will
bring the cases within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.") (quoting Prentiss v.
Brennan, 19 F. Cas. 1278, 1278 (N.D.N.Y. 1851)).
294. 213 F. Supp. 756, 756-63 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 324 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1963) (per
curiam).
295. Id. at 756-57.
296. Id. at 756.
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Judiciary Act of 1789.297 The court inferred from Hamilton's
arguments in The Federalist and James Wilson's debates in the
Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention that the Framers intended
"'citizen' and 'subject' to mean the same thing."9 According to the
court, this was because the Framers "were undoubtedly keenly aware
of the fact that they had lately been subjects and that in other lands
men still remained subjects of a sovereign and not citizens of a
state."299 Apparently, that awareness led the Framers to regard
"aliens," but not U.S. citizens residing abroad, as foreign subjects.
Support for this reasoning came in the form of a textualist
reading of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Under this reading, there
seemed to be "no reason to suppose that the first Congress
deliberately failed to exercise a power given by the Constitution." °
The court then applied its reasoning in syllogistic fashion: If "citizen"
and "subject" are interchangeable within Article III, and if "subject"
is equivalent to "alien," then an alien must be a foreign citizen, and
"the Constitution did not cover American citizens domiciled abroad,
for these are not aliens"301
The rule established in Van der Schelling endures. For instance,
in Smith v. Carter, 302 the Fifth Circuit reconsidered the rule in Van
der Schelling. The Smith defendant removed a claim filed in state
court to federal court under the alienage jurisdiction statute. 3° In
dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the

297. Id. at 757-62.
298. Id. at 758-59 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 241, at 588-89
(Alexander Hamilton)); 3 ELLIOT, supra note 239, at 492-93 (James Wilson)); see also
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 663-64 ("The term 'citizen,' as understood in our law, is
precisely analogous to the term subject in the common law. .. .") (quoting State v.
Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 114, 121 (1838)). But see, e.g., Wildes v. Parker,
29 F. Cas. 1224, 1225 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 17,652) (finding United States citizen
domiciled in England to be "by the general principles of law ... now treated, for all
commercial purposes, as an alien merchant of Great Britain").
299. Van der Schelling, 213 F. Supp. at 761.
300. Id. at 759.
301. Id. at 759-60 (citing 2 AM. JUR., Aliens § 2 (2d ed., 1962); Hammerstein, 200 F.
at 165; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460 (1912); JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAw 51 (Oliver W. Holmes ed., 12th ed. 1873)). But see Currie, supra
note 206, at 9-10 (suggesting that foreign aliens be treated as foreign nationals).
302. Smith v. Carter, 545 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1977). The case concerns a replevin
action in a Mississippi state court brought by a United States citizen permanently
residing in Canada. Id. at 910.
303. Id. In removal cases, proper diversity must exist both at the time the state
court action was commenced and such action was removed. See, e.g., Las Vistas Villas,
S.A.v. Petersen, 778 F. Supp. 1202, 1203 (M.D. Fla. 1991), affd, 13 F.3d 409 (11th Cir.
1994); Kanzelberger v. Kanzelberger, 782 F.2d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)); Maple Island Farm, Inc. v.
Bitterling, 196 F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir. 1952)).
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district court cited the "long-standing rule" in Van der Schelling "'
On appeal, the Toronto resident contended that he was a "foreign
subject" of Canada in light of certain historical differences between
the terms "citizen" and "subject," and that Van der Schelling had
created an "anomaly" whereby "an American citizen living abroad is
precluded from invoking the [alienage] jurisdiction of the federal
courts, while foreign citizens having no connection with the United
States may do so.""'5 Notably, the Fifth Circuit did not disagree with
these arguments, in fact conceding "the anomaly of the existing rule
under Van der Schelling."°6 While acknowledging that "these terms
undoubtedly have been used.., with different shades of meaning
over the years," the court maintained that "the basic underpinnings
of Van der Schelling and its progeny are sound"" 7 and concluded that
"Congress is the appropriate body to make such a change."'
The phenomenon of statelessness is not merely an anomaly
limited to a few individuals. Under the rule originally established in
0 an unincorporated association assumes the citizenship
Chapman,"'
of its constituent members. 10 Accordingly, foreign aliens who are
members of an unincorporated association render it stateless for
alienage purposes. As a result, the entire association becomes
incapable of suing or being sued under the alienage jurisdiction
statute.' Two trends indicate how widespread this deprivation of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction stands to be. First, the nature of

304. Smith, 545 F.2d at 911 (citing Van der Schelling, 213 F. Supp. at 756).
305. Id. at 912.
306. Id.
307. Id. (citing Mohr, 407 F. Supp. at 487; Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Gootrad, 397
F. Supp. 1054, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Haggerty v. Pratt Inst., 372 F. Supp. 760, 761
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Fahrner v. Gentzsch, 355 F. Supp. 349, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Rayfield
& Co. v. Watson Seafood & Poultry Co., 268 F. Supp. 97, 103 (E.D.N.C. 1967);
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(dictum)).
308. Id. (citing 1 MOORE, supra note 279, 9 0.74(4), at 708.4).
309. 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
310. See supra Part II.B.II.
311. See, e.g., Creswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 1990). In
Creswell, the Second Circuit explained that
[i]f in fact any of S & C's foreign-residing United States citizen partners are
domiciled abroad, a diversity suit could not be brought against them
individually; in that circumstance, since for diversity purposes a partnership
is deemed to take on the citizenship of each of its partners ...a suit against
S & C could not be premised on diversity.
Id. Venture Fund (Int'l) N.V. v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550, 556
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("The defendant in question... has been living in France for nine
years though he is still an American citizen. He is 'stateless,'... and, since diversity
must be shown for all members of the partnership, this defeats the jurisdiction.").
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modern commerce has become increasingly international, 1 ' which
prospectively translates into an increase in the number of U.S.
citizens living and working abroad. Second, the number of
unincorporated associations is burgeoning,
which suggests their
expanded role in the economy. The combined effect of these two
factors is that unincorporated associations are now more likely than
ever to have stateless members. Moreover, such members are even
more attractive for unincorporated associations that wish to
immunize themselves from alienage jurisdiction.3"4 Accordingly, the
problem of statelessness is not only real, but potentially ubiquitous.
IV. COLLAPSING DISTINCTIONS
The preceding Parts have established the asymmetrical
jurisdictional status accorded to alien business organizations.
Implicit within this analysis is a disbelief in strictly adhering to the
doctrine of stare decisis where substantive gaps exist." 5 As a

312. See supra note 219.
313. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
314. A debatable premise of this argument concerns the motives for not wanting to
be in federal court. State courts, however, can offer procedural and substantive
advantages to a federal court. For instance, some view the federal admissibility test for
scientific evidence established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), as more stringent than the test established in Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which many states continue to use. According to the Co-Chair of
the ABA Section Committee on Products Liability,
Daubert may be driving more plaintiffs to state court. "The most populous
states in the country, with the exception of Ohio and Texas, are still
following Frye, not Daubert .... In those jurisdictions, plaintiffs have an
added incentive to file suit in state court, whereas defense lawyers would
prefer to be in federal court, where the judge, under Daubert, serves as a
gatekeeper."
Katerina M. Eftimoff, The Decade after Daubert Proves Tough on Expert Witnesses,
LITIG. NEWS, July 2002, at 1 (quoting an interview with John B. Ibster). For a
comparative assessment of these two tests, see, e.g., Peter B. Oh, The Proper Test for
Assessing the Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert Evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437 (1997) (recommending federal courts reinstate
the Frye test). Additionally, one should not underestimate the value of dismissing a
case from federal court to protract litigation.
315. See generally SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE
ALTERATION OF PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992 (1995); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi;
trans., 1989); INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997); ROSCOE POUND, LAW FINDING
THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND REASON: THREE LECTURES (1960). See also STARE DECISIS
AND THE DOCTRINE OF LEGAL PRECEDENT: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (Jill Mubarak &
Robert Rich eds., 1995). The flip-side to this disbelief is doctrinal consistency, which is
akin to the notion of "horizontal" (or "temporal") consistency. See Ronald Dworkin, The
Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14, 22-23 (1977); Hirsch, supra note 72,
at 1139 (describing "temporal" inconsistency as occasions when "a legal system...
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preliminary matter, statutory and common law gaps are present as
between the citizenship tests applied to corporations and
unincorporated associations for alienage purposes. 16 Specifically,
Congress fashioned a separate citizenship test for corporations," 7 but
neglected to consider whether unincorporated associations could
engage in similar abuses. 8 Secondarily, this distinct treatment
engenders a prospective doctrinal gap between the jurisdictional test
and the proposed uniform treatment for business entities. Advocates
of uniform treatment give little, if any, shrift to eradicating
distinctions between entities that exist outside of business formation,
operation, and dissolution,319 much less the disconnect between the
premises underlying the current law and the proposed future regime.
Beyond the intrinsic value of closing these substantive gaps,
there are compelling policy reasons to conform our jurisdictional
treatment for business entities with entity rationalization statutes.
Simply by employing stateless members, unincorporated associations
can control when and where they wish to deprive themselves or
adverse litigants of access to federal courts, the same sort of
undesirable forum shopping that prompted Congress to amend the
citizenship test for corporations.2 Further, at the time Congress
enacted its amendments to section 1332, unincorporated associations
were of a relatively limited number that perhaps justifiably did not

oscillate[s] between alternative formulations of the same legal rule"); see also Joseph
William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,
8 (1984) (asserting that the law should "'edify,' that is, it should help.., readers, or
society as a whole, break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes"). This is not to
be confused with the notion of "vertical" (or "structural") consistency. DWORKIN, supra
note 121, at 164-224, 227; Hirsch, supra note 72, at 1058, 1139 (describing "structural"
consistency as the "symmetry ... of doctrinal treatment between structurally
analogous (or 'parallel') legal issues").
316. See supra Part II.B. Some characterize this as a "doctrinal wall." See Cohen,
supra note 45, at 438 & n.12 ("The doctrinal wall refers to the position established in
Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889)."). Professor Cohen believes that
"reliance on precedent is not a persuasive rationale when the results are 'inconsistent
with the goals of diversity jurisdiction ...and by the Court's own admission defly] the
realities of today's business world."' Cohen, supra note 45, at 438 (quoting Robert J.
Tribeck, Cracking the Doctrinal Wall of Chapman v. Barney: A New Diversity Test for
Limited Partnershipsand Limited Liability Companies, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 89, 113
(1995)). As Part III establishes, the case for reversing this "doctrinal wall" through
alienage jurisdiction is more compelling because its rationales are more established
and because it engenders the problem of statelessness. See supra Parts III.A, III.C.
317. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 930 (1948) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (2000)).
318. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 10, 11, 128-34, and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 34 (noting section 1332 was a congressional reaction to the
scenario presented in Black & White Taxicab).
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merit legislative attention.2 1 But the current statistics on certain
limited unincorporated associations now suggest otherwise.32 2 The
prevalence of these associations render them eligible for the same
rationale that resulted in an amended citizenship test for
corporations. Moreover, the growing popularity and globalization of
certain unincorporated associations merely magnify the frequency
and scope of potential abuse posed by statelessness.32 3 Accordingly,
the practical differences between alien corporations
and
unincorporated associations are more glaring than ever.
This Part proposes a way to eliminate these sort of corporate
distinctions in a lock-step manner. First, Congress and the courts
should accord jurisdictional citizenship to foreign aliens based on
their domicile. In alienage, domicile analysis determines an
individual's citizenship.324 But courts recognize only a limited
conception of citizenship that is exclusively concerned with domestic
statehood.322 This conception of citizenship is far narrower than the
true scope of domicile analysis, and rests on an interpretation of
legislative history that is as unduly strict as it is detached from the
historical and modern rationales for alienage jurisdiction. 26 By
harmonizing the scope of domicile and citizenship for alienage
purposes, the problem of statelessness can be eliminated. Second, a
logical corollary to this solution would be to utilize the closest
corporate analogue of domicile, the principal place of business, to
determine
the jurisdictional
citizenship
of unincorporated
associations.327 This effectively would collapse the unjustifiably
distinct jurisdictional tests applied to these associations and to
corporations. Moreover, basing citizenship on domicile would create
doctrinal consistency between the citizenship tests applied to
business organizations and to aliens. Perhaps more significantly,
harmonizing these jurisdictional asymmetries would provide a
substantive basis for collapsing residual corporate distinctions. This

321. There is no clear indication why Congress failed to extend its amendment of
section 1332 to unincorporated associations. See, e.g., Comment, Diversity Jurisdiction
for UnincorporatedAssociations, supra note 180. at 147 n.50 (noting this failure "is not
equivalent to congressional action denying [unincorporated associations] citizenship
for jurisdictional purposes").
322. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
323. See Keatinge, Balkanization of Business Organizations,supra note 100, at 23435 ("[T]he number of LLCs increased by 94.3% in 1995 ....This dramatic growth is
confirmed by earlier statistics from the United States Treasury Department: according
to federal tax information, the number of LLCs filing partnership tax returns
increased by 176% between 1993 and 1994 ...").
324. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part III.C.
326. See supra Part III.B.
327. See infra note 369.
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Part contends obtaining this basis could supply courts and
legislatures with a framework for evaluating and implementing
entity rationalization.
A.

JurisdictionalCollapsing
1.

Resolving Statelessness

The anomaly of statelessness can be resolved by matching the
scopes of domicile and jurisdictional citizenship. Domicile functions
to associate a person with a particular place for a particular purpose.
According to Justice Holmes, "domicile is the technically pre-eminent
headquarters that every person is compelled to have in order that
certain rights and duties that have been attached to it by the law
'
may be determined."328
Indeed, this is the notion of domicile courts
use to determine the citizenship of individuals either from or
permanently residing in the United States.329 In such circumstances,
domicile equates with citizenship.3" The logic of this equation is that
jurisdictional citizenship should reflect the state benefits and
privileges an individual receives in due course through her
permanent residence. 1
Yet courts do not extend this logic to foreign aliens. By virtue of
their permanent residence abroad, foreign aliens fulfill the basic
prerequisites for domicile. They receive benefits and privileges

328. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914) (Holmes, J.) (emphasis
added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11(2) (1971) ("Every
person has a domicil [sic] at all times and, at least for the same purpose, no person has
more than one domicil at a time.").
329. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text. The notion of domicile utilized
for alienage purposes is imported from established choice-of-law principles. See, e.g.,
Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1120 (6th Cir. 1973) ("considerations on which federal
courts rely in determining domicile often derive from state choice-of-law rules that
have been developed in such diverse contexts as probate jurisdiction, taxation of
incomes or intangibles, or divorce law"). The Third Circuit, however, has ruled that
[t]he problem of what law to apply is surely a different problem from that of
whether a litigant should have access to federal court, and it does not
conduce to clarity of analysis to suppose that the same answers will suffice
for different questions ....
[T]he legal conclusion of domicile in diversity
cases is at best a substitute for the constitutional requirement of state
citizenship.
Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972).
330. See supra note 290.
331. The Restatement defines domicile as "a place... to which the rules of Conflict
of Laws sometimes accord determinative significance because of the person's
identification with that place." RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONFLICT OF LAWS), supra
note 328, § 11(1); see also Christopher T. Corson, Reform of Domicile Law for
Application to Transients, Temporary Residents and Multi-Based Persons, 16 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 327 (1981).
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comparable to those received by domestic aliens and United States
citizens. 2 The apparent reason why courts do not recognize this fact
is that they subscribe to a conception of jurisdictional citizenship
unjustifiably restricted to domestic states. 3 Put differently, only
such states can confer the benefits and privileges necessary to justify
imputing an intent to reside permanently in a jurisdiction. Beyond
its clearly counterfactual nature, this reasoning does not cohere with
the prevailing case law. According to Van der Schelling and its
progeny, foreign aliens are to be regarded as foreign citizens; 334 only
because the Constitution does not provide for the exercise of federal
alienage jurisdiction over foreign citizens are they stateless.3
But the rule in Van der Schelling rests on flawed premises and
so cannot support this dualistic approach to domestic and foreign
aliens. That court's reasoning mistakenly equates the powers
conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 with the limits established
under Article III.336 A simple counterfactual to this equation is that
the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not provide for federal question
jurisdiction, whose constitutionality is unquestioned. 7 More
relevantly, Van der Schelling interprets the Judiciary Act of 1789 in
the unconstitutional, literal fashion that prompted the 1875
amendments concerning alienage jurisdiction. 38 These amendments
established that aliens are not to be deemed synonymous with
"citizens" or "subjects" of a foreign state because aliens otherwise
would not need to be paired with citizens for alienage purposes. 9 So
the problem in Van der Schelling is not simply a statutory one in
section 1332, but is also a matter of misinterpreting the Judiciary
Act of 1789."' 0 Deferring to Congress to correct this misinterpretation
332. See, e.g., Van der Schelling, 213 F. Supp. at 756-57. As discussed above, the
court determined a foreign alien residing in Mexico was neither a "citizen" nor a
'subject" of that foreign state under section 1332. See supra notes 294-301 and
accompanying text. But Mexico had accorded the foreign alien the distinct legal status
of an "inmigrado," which provided certain entitlements. See Van der Schelling, 213 F.
Supp. at 757.
333. See supra notes 284-91 and accompanying text.
334. See Van der Schelling, 213 F. Supp. at 756; Smith v. Carter, 545 F.2d 909 (5th
Cir. 1977); Mohr v. Allen, 407 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Kaufman v. Gootrad, 397
F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rayfield v. Watson Seafood & Poultry Co. 268 F. Supp.
97 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
335. See supra notes 297, 301, and accompanying text.
336. Compare supra notes 228-32 with supra notes 297-301.
337. See supra note 227.
338. See supra Part III.C.
339. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
340. In any event, Van der Schelling's concern with breaching the limits of Article
III is unfounded. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531
(1967) ("Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction,
founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.") (citation
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seems, at best, a flimsy justification for perpetuating an ill-conceived
distinction among groups of aliens.
One need only examine the rationales for alienage jurisdiction to
find a compelling affirmative justification for extending this
treatment to foreign aliens. Whether the threat is actual or
perceived, foreign aliens are among the group most likely to suffer at
the hands of a partial state court. By virtue of their foreign
residency, these aliens are likely to have minimal economic ties to
any particular domestic state, and certainly weaker ties than their
domestic litigant counterparts. 41 These considerations only make the
prospect of forum shopping more attractive and potentially more
meaningful.342 And the problem is a self-feeding one, as foreign aliens
cognizant of the possibilities afforded by forum shopping may avoid
transacting in unfavorable jurisdictions or insist on negotiating
critical choice-of-law and choice-of-venue clauses.343 The collective
result is unnecessary costs borne by both parties, costs that have
increased as international commerce continues to grow and the pool
of foreign aliens expands." Accordingly, acknowledging the capacity
of foreign aliens to have a domicile and thus jurisdictional citizenship
comports with the objectives of alienage.
2.

Resolving Corporate Citizenship

Although extending domicile-based citizenship to foreign aliens
would eliminate the problem of stateless individuals, as well as
stateless business entities, doctrinal consistency can be gained by
extending an analogue of this citizenship test to certain
unincorporated associations. Certainly, the original basis for
applying the current disparate citizenship tests to unincorporated
associations and corporations is no longer viable. Unincorporated
associations presently assume a role in the economy roughly
commensurate to that which corporations assumed when the Court
issued Marshall v.Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.34 By extension,
omitted).
341. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
343. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO.
L.J. 883 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice and International Regulatory
Competition, 90 GEO. L.J. 971 (2002); Erin Ann O'Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and
the PerennialConflict of Laws, 90 GEO. L.J. 941 (2002); Paul B. Stephan, The Political
Economy of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 957 (2002).
344. Arguably, the inability of stateless persons to access federal courts is consistent
with the notion that federal courts are better suited than their state counterparts to
serve (inter)national interests. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13B FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 3611 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter WRIGHT ET AL., 13B
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE].
345. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 334 (1853); see supra notes 150-54 and accompanying
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Congress and the courts should recognize "[t]he necessities and
conveniences of trade and business" now require that unincorporated
associations should be accorded jurisdictional citizenship. 46 The
Court and numerous commentators already have recognized that
these associations are no less qualified for entity status than
corporations. 47 Indeed, the advent of elective tax regulations has
ensured that certain limited unincorporated associations will
continue to be attractive, and arguably superior, substitutes for
incorporation. 8'
Additionally, the citizenship test for unincorporated associations
is susceptible to abuse akin to what originally concerned Congress
about corporations. 49 The potential for abuse is manifest in the
choice of members.3 A larger geographic base for membership will
result in a diminished capacity to establish diversity as there is a
greater probability of opposing sides being citizens of the same
state. 5' This diminished capacity may seem inconsequential to a
firm's decision concerning who to designate as members or where to
establish offices. But the matter of where a firm can expect to sue or
be sued is not insignificant. 53 Indeed, one need only look to the case

text.
346. Marshall, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 327; see notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 46, 48, and 101.
348. See supra note 5.
349. See supra notes 34, 159, and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 45, at 439 n.15 ("In deciding among the options
that provide limited liability, the organizers will examine factors like start-up costs
and annual fees, flexibility in other characteristics like management, and acceptance
by investors of the different forms."). Arguably, though, choice of members will be
considered in conjunction with tax considerations. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
351. See, e.g., Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 204, at 83 ("[O]nly diversity
jurisdiction has been constricted-by Congress' [inter alia]... expanding corporate
citizenship .... ").
352. See, e.g., World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
("[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood
that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.") (citation omitted). The Court also has stated:
Th[e] [due process] clause does not contemplate that a state may make
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate
defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. But to the
extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state.
The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the
state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit
brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (citations omitted).
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responsible for the 1958 Amendments to see the lengths that
business organizations will go to attain jurisdictional advantages253
Under the current citizenship test, an unincorporated association
need only have one stateless member to be completely deprived of or
immune from federal court actions premised on diversity.354
Accordingly, the circumstances that led to the codification of the
citizenship test for corporations equally apply to unincorporated
associations, a fact repeatedly noted by the Supreme Court and
commentators alike. 5 The matter is undoubtedly ripe for
resolution."'
So the true task is determining not whether, but simply which,
uniform citizenship test should apply to all business organizations. 57
Arguably, there are strong reasons for returning to the membership

353. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). See also supra notes 34 and 159.
354. See supra Part III.C.
355. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
356. Moreover, "Congress presumably has the constitutional power to close these
'loopholes' in the jurisdictional statue. This is precisely what it did in the case of
citizens of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the territories who also were
treated as 'stateless' for jurisdictional purposes prior to the enactment of the definition
of 'state' now found in Section 1332(d) of Title 28." WRIGHT ET AL., 13B FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 344, § 3621.
357. One commentator has advanced a case for instituting a new uniform test, one
based on "direct interest in the litigation:"
When the real party to a controversy is a business organization, the
citizenship assessment should focus on who has a direct interest in the
litigation. If the organization as a distinct legal entity has the direct interest,
it should be treated as an entity for determining citizenship; if the owners
have the direct interest, the persons composing analysis is appropriate for
determining citizenship.
Cohen, supra note 45, at 472. The primary problems with this test also, to a lesser
extent, apply to the possibilities entertained here. See infra notes 369-74 and
accompanying text. Indeed, Professor Cohen recognizes and asserts these problems,
which revolve around transaction costs, as reasons not to endorse a simple amendment
to section 1332. See infra notes 386 and 393. These problems would seem to be even
more exacerbated for the wholesale change of section 1332 that Professor Cohen
envisions. See infra note 393.
In any event, the focus here is on eliciting a legal basis for uniform treatment that
would justify and comport with statutes concerning the formation, operation, and
dissolution of business organizations. Professor Cohen's proposal is partially premised
on the fact that section 1332 "does not reflect the business realities of today's spectrum
of business organizations, which includes hybrid organizations that are substantially
similar to corporations." Cohen, supra note 45, at 472. As established here, though,
hybridity is predicated on utilizing increasingly defunct distinctions that are
jeopardized by prospective universal statutes. See supra Part II.A.2. Accordingly, any
proposal based on hybridity commits the error of path dependence and runs the risk of
becoming antiquated by, as well as doctrinally inconsistent with, universal statutes.
See id.; supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
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test based on the citizenship of the constituent members that existed
prior to Letson.356 As a matter of policy, imputing business
organizations with their members' citizenship likely would decrease
the number of diversity suits and thus alleviate the workload of
federal courts. Presently, diversity suits account for approximately
19 percent of the total federal civil docket. 59 Although the effect of a
membership rule would be difficult to project,"' any diminishing
likely would be significant and desirable. As a matter of principle,
minimizing jurisdiction between diverse parties seems justified
because its underlying rationales no longer apply. The voluminous
criticism of diversity jurisdiction is largely predicated on a
recognition that federal courts are not qualitatively superior,36 ' more
impartial,362 or functionally equivalent to a social service.363 Therefore,
358. I thank Barbara Banoff for presenting a set of reasons to me. Her defense
certainly would be more convincing than what appears here.
359. According to one commentator,
[i]n the twelve-month period ending March 31, 1999, plaintiffs commenced
249,245 civil cases in the United States District Courts, 47,772 of which were
based on diversity jurisdiction (roughly 19 percent of all civil suits).
Comparatively, in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1990, plaintiffs
commenced 217,879 civil cases in the U.S. District Courts, 57,183 of which
were based on diversity jurisdiction (roughly 26 percent of all civil suits).
Although the overall number of diversity cases has decreased, many still feel
that the load is overly burdensome ....
Heather N. Hormel, Comment, Domicile for the Dead: Diversity Jurisdiction in
Wrongful Death Actions, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 519 (2001) (internal citations
omitted); see also supra note 135.
360. See, e.g., Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 68, at 100. Professor
Kramer has argued that
[t]o gauge the full impact of diversity cases on the federal courts, we must
adjust these raw caseload figures for the difficulty of diversity cases relative
to other components of the courts' dockets. With respect to the district courts,
two measures suggest that diversity cases are more demanding than the
average case. First, diversity cases are overrepresented among trials, which
place the greatest demand on the time and energy of federal judges....
Second, diversity cases are more difficult than average according to a "time
and motion" study of federal district judges conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center in 1979.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
361. See supra Part III.B.1.
362. See supra Part III.B.2.
363. For arguments that diversity jurisdiction operates like a federal highway
program, see Frank, Case for Diversity, supra note 61, at 406; Marbury, supra note
274, at 379. But see, e.g., FRIENDLY, supra note 226, at 146-47; ANTHONY PARTRIDGE,
THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 30-31
(1988) (outlining the basis for the determination that such a change would decrease
diversity jurisdiction cases by forty-five percent); Charles W. Joiner, Corporationsas
Citizens of Every State Where They Do Business: A Needed Change in Diversity
Jurisdiction, 70 JUDICATURE 291 (1987); Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 212,
at 314 n.60 (observing how attorneys with contingent fee arrangements and
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there is no concrete legal justification for maintaining a system of
federal jurisdiction between diverse parties.
These arguments, however, proceed from a mistaken premise.
The problem of statelessness concerns alienage, not diversity,
jurisdiction. 34 The interests implicated by U.S. citizens domiciled
abroad are international in nature. Such citizens face the prospect of
xenophobic prejudice in local courts by virtue of their receiving
benefits and privileges attendant to their foreign residence.365
Further, these citizens contribute, however indirectly, to the
economies of foreign countries and are subject to their laws; in this
way, the jurisdictional status of foreign aliens and unincorporated
associations impacts interests that are international in nature and
scope. 66 Accordingly, these interests properly lie within the domain of
alienage jurisdiction, whose legitimacy and utility are unquestioned
by those who otherwise advocate curtailing or eliminating diversity
jurisdiction. 67 So a citizenship test based on membership might
relieve federal dockets by complicating the ability of parties to
establish diversity, but this benefit is outweighed by the established
necessity of protecting international commerce and relations.
Further, the net benefits of a membership-based citizenship test
are debatable. Although such a test certainly would decrease the
number of alienage suits, these are far less common than their
diversity counterparts. 66 At the same time, there are hidden costs to
administering this sort of test. Ascertaining the citizenship of all
members of an unincorporated association is a cumbersome and
potentially expensive proposition, not to mention that the prospect of
applying a domicile test to each and every member is simply not
inviting. And for cases involving especially large, multi-national
unincorporated association, the costs of such investigation would not
be insignificant.
A better case can be made for essentially applying a partial
analogue of the citizenship test for corporations to unincorporated
associations, their principal place of business.6 9 Determining an

corporations disproportionately benefit from diversity jurisdiction); Kramer, Diversity
Jurisdiction, supra note 68, at 127 (observing that "diversity jurisdiction gives
multistate corporations an unfair advantage" and reducing diversity suits by
corporations would decrease diversity suits by 45%).
364. See supra Part III.A.
365. See supra Part III.B.2.
366. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.2.
367. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 168, 359, and accompanying text.
369. This article does not endorse a jurisdictional test based on an analogue of a
corporation's state of incorporation. Arguably, the jurisdiction in which a limited
unincorporated association registers resembles that in which a corporation
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unincorporated association's principal place of business is not
necessarily an uncomplicated matter. 7 But most states require
virtually all types of unincorporated associations to file formal
statements containing such information. 7' At the same time, a
principal place of business test would still impede a prospective
litigant's ability to be diverse; while the decrease in alienage suits
under such a test would be less than under a membership test, there
would still be a relative decrease. 72 As a result, a test based on an
unincorporated association's principal place of business still would
comport with the original reasons why Congress amended section
1332 for corporations.373 Equally important, extending the citizenship
test for corporations to unincorporated associations would parallel
the proper test for foreign and domestic aliens. 74 Not surprisingly,
various courts375 and commentators376 have endorsed expanding the
incorporates. Indeed, many statutes governing the formation of limited unincorporated
associations require some form of registration. See generally CALLISON & SULLIVAN,
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES supra note 1. Further, registration appears linked to
statutory domicile. See supra note 2.
There are two primary problems with including state of registration into a
citizenship test for limited unincorporated associations. First, these associations can
register in multiple states, see id., and likely do wherever they have employees, facts
that make the state of registration effectively operate in the same manner as
membership when determining citizenship, see supra Part II.B.2. As a result, a
citizenship test based on the state of registration would engender asymmetrical results
similar to what membership already presents. Second, domicile concerns the primary
location of a "person." See supra note 331. An unincorporated association may have
only tangential contacts with all the states with which it may register. In contrast,
where a firm incorporates reflects more substantial contacts between it and that state.
So determining citizenship based, in part, on the state of registration does not comport
with the primary purpose of a domicile-based test. Interestingly, the Uniform

Commercial Code recently revised its definition of "chief executive office" for the
purposes of a debtor's location. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307, cmt. 2, at 704
(West 2002). The definition no longer states that "chief executive office" "does not
mean the place of incorporation." Compare id. with id. § 9-103, cmt. 5(c), at 1192.
370. See, e.g., Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 68, at 127 ("A standard
like 'doing business' is not easily verifiable and poses significant risks of wasting
judicial resources if the parties do not learn of a state in which both do business until
late in the litigation."). Courts have applied five basic types of tests for determining
the principal place of business. See John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law,
1989 DuKE L.J. 1, 53 ("Incredible difficulties have been encountered by the courts in
localizing th[e] single principal place of business and at least five difficult and
contradictory tests have been used-nerve-center, center-of-operations, place-of-acting
or physical assets, maximum-public-visibility, and totality-of- corporate-activity
tests.") (citing cases).
371. See supra note 2.
372. See supra notes 162-63.
373. See supra note 161.
374. See supra Part III.C.
375. See, e.g., Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 965 F. Supp. 165, 176 (D.
Mass. 1997) (calling for legislative help to expand citizenship test for unincorporated

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:389

citizenship test for corporations to unincorporated associations.
B.

Corporate Collapsing

By consolidating the citizenship test for both corporations and
unincorporated associations, a legal basis for collapsing other similar
distinctions can emerge. As early as 1923, commentators such as
Professor Charles Warren realized that: "The result [of a uniform
test based on an organization's principal place of business and state
of incorporation or registration377] is that these two forms of business
enterprise [i.e., corporations and unincorporated associations] would
be treated substantially alike."378 Jurisdictional collapsing can obtain
substantively similar treatment for all limited business organizations
because the notion of domicile implicitly presents and potentially
resolves questions about corporate personalty."' A citizenship test
based on domicile is possible because limited unincorporated
associations are now regulated and structured like corporations in
many respects. 8 Most relevantly, these associations must file
publicly available information that reveals the primary locus of their
operations. 8' These requirements are necessary because corporate
forms such as the limited liability company and the limited liability
partnership are no longer instruments for individual or local
enterprises, but are increasingly multi-national in composition and
operation. As a result, such limited unincorporated associations now
enjoy the fictitious status of an entity once reserved for
corporations. 82 Instituting a citizenship test based on domicile,
therefore, would establish a foundation of commensurability between
unincorporated associations and corporations on a practical and a

associations); Carlos v. Adamany, No. 95 C 50264, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5764, at *9
n.4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 1996) (LLC citizenship should be in state of principal place of
business).
376. See, e.g., ALI, STUDY, supra note 206, at 10 (proposing unincorporated
associations assume the citizenship of their principal place of business for diversity
purposes). See generally John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute's
Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 880-84 (1998)
(summarizing issues concerning diversity of citizenship).
377. See supra note 369.
378. Warren, New Light, supra note 225, at 208.
379. See Kozyris, supra note 370, at 53. See also generally Larry Kramer, Interest
Analysis and the Presumptionof Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301 (1989).
380. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Indeed, this is the very premise that
supports entity rationalization.
381. See generally RULPA, in 6A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, supra note 1; RUPA,
supra note 1; BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP, supra note 1; CALLISON &
SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 1; RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED
BUSINESS ENTITIES, supra note 1.
382. See supra Part II.B.1.
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conceptual level.
Multiple benefits accrue from this foundation. Most immediately,
a consolidated citizenship test for all limited business organizations
would provide the legal basis necessary to justify uniformly based or
universally applicable statutes. Such a test would eliminate residual
distinctions between corporations and unincorporated associations
based on the dichotomies between corporation and partnership
classifications as well as aggregate and entity theories. 83 In this way,
path dependence on these dichotomies can be mitigated because a
new consolidated basis, one premised on domicile, would be
available. 84 One obvious source for this basis is that a uniform
citizenship test actually would be the first instance of a universal
business organization statute. Additionally, to the extent domicile
implicates and collapses other dichotomies, a consolidated citizenship
test could be used to frame and guide similar, but more
comprehensive, efforts such as a statute based on limited liability or
with hubs-and-spokes.383
The primary objection to reconciling the inconsistent
jurisdictional treatment between domestic and foreign aliens, as well
as between corporations and unincorporated associations, concerns
the inherent costs within any change of a legal regime. 8 These
transition costs are of three primary varieties: the expense of
familiarizing oneself with the new rules;387 the difficulties of
adjusting to rules with uncertain meaning or effect;388 and the

383. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 7-8 and Part II.A.2.
386. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 45, at 474 ("A revised [alienage and diversity]
statute would be the ideal solution providing immediate clarity on the issue [of how
the citizenship of LLCs should be determined]. However, revising statutes is time
consuming and expensive.") (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95
(1977); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Modernization of CorporateLaw: An Essay for Bill
Cary, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187 (1982)). Professor Cohen believes that interest group
dynamics would incur transaction costs that would impede the implementation of any
consolidated statutory treatment. See id.at 474 n.226 ("A legislature will not revise a
statute unless the potential gain outweighs the transaction costs.").
387. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 817
(2002) ("Firms and individuals must determine what laws are relevant to their
activities; they must assess the scope and effect of the applicable ones; and they must
master the complexities of the more detailed or technical provisions."). See generally
DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1986).
388. Van Alstine, supra note 387, at 822-23 ("No body of law.., can plausibly
address all matters within its scope, or anticipate all future developments in a given
field of human activity.... The resulting normative gaps, both open and hidden,
almost unavoidably leave a greater degree of 'open texture' in new legal texts than in
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89
adjustments by third parties to comply with the new rules."
Although a new legal regime may be superior, these various
transition costs may militate against change. 9 ° Indeed, this is the
chief rationale behind the doctrine of stare decisis, 9 ' which largely
may explain why the jurisdictional inconsistencies examined here
endure."' Perhaps understandably, the Supreme Court and Congress
have neglected the anomaly of statelessness and maintained the
procrustean citizenship test for unincorporated associations because
the economics favor inertia.
Many of these objections, however, do not apply to the
consolidated citizenship test proposed here. The primary reason is
that consolidation minimizes transition costs. The existence of a
codified citizenship test for corporations provides an established
framework that can easily assimilate a domicile-based citizenship
9
Additionally, the familiarity
test for unincorporated associations."

established ones.") (citation omitted). Professor Van Alstine differentiates uncertainty
costs from learning costs on the basis that the latter concern determining the content
and scope of rules whereas the former concern resolving disputes over meaning and
effect. Id. He further distinguishes between negative and positive uncertainty costs:
"Negative uncertainty costs ... reflect the loss of the accumulated experience with a
legal regime over time. Positive costs, on the other hand, reflect the uncertainty
created by doubts over the precise meaning of, and simple lack of familiarity with, a
new body of law." Id. at 823; see also id. at 824-28 (negative costs); id. at 829-35
(positive costs).
389. Id. at 837 ("When... the state decides to change the law, transition costs will
arise from the effect on the private conventions established within the framework of
the old legal order."). Professor Van Alstine identifies two types of adjustment costs:
"interpartytransition costs," which "arise from the need to review and adjust internal
forms and practices in response to a change in the law"; and "interparty practices,"
which are "costs that flow from the impact on contractual and other conventions
developed between private parties to regulate their interaction." Id.
390. Id. at 793-94 (noting the force of network effects and opportunity costs that
explain why parties continue to use the inefficient layout of existing keyboards); see
also S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1990) (challenging the historical accuracy of Paul David's explanation for typewriter
keys). Another example, albeit more contentious, concerns Delaware's continuing
appeal as a state of incorporation and as a forum for bankruptcy filings. See, e.g., G.
Marcus Cole, "Delaware is Not a State": An Empirical Analysis of Jurisdictional
Competition in Bankruptcy, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845 (2002) (bankruptcy filings); Roberta
Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709
(1987) (incorporation).
391. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial
Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422 (1988); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic
Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989); Thomas R. Lee, Stare
Decisis in Economic Perspective:An Economic Analysis of the Supreme Court's Doctrine
of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643 (2000). See also supra note 6.
392. See, e.g., supra note 93.
393. But see supra note 386 (delineating Professor Cohen's arguments against a
legislative solution). Professor Cohen instead favors a judicial solution. Cohen, supra
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with the test for corporations easily can extend to the test for
unincorporated associations. Beyond the fact that disputes over the
meaning of the alienage statute and the corporate citizenship tests
are rare, the consolidated test effectively can piggy-back on to the
mature decisional law that exists for corporations. In essence,
harmonizing
jurisdictional
treatment
of corporations
and
unincorporated associations would take advantage of the network
effects applying to the test established in section 1332.
And any admittedly unavoidable transition costs further
associated with this proposal clearly would be outweighed by the
prospective benefits of treating all business organizations alike for
alienage purposes. First, a citizenship test based on a limited
unincorporated association's principal place of business would afford
certainty.39 ' No longer would litigants be able to file suits under the
alienage suit based on mere good faith guesses as to the citizenship
of a limited unincorporated association. 5' Determining citizenship

note 45, at 475 ("In the interim, the judiciary should act. The Supreme Court is not
bound by the current framework.... Precedent is not cast in stone."). This bridge
solution is compatible with the amended statutory test proposed here. See id. at 476
("Under the revised interpretation, the citizenship of many unincorporated entities
would remain the same."). The problem is that neither the Court's composition nor the
merger of unincorporated association features have changed substantially since the
decision in Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 185 (1990). Indeed, the Carden
Court refused to extend the test to limited partnerships even after acknowledging that
substantial changes had occurred since the Bouligny decision, when the Court last
explicitly addressed the question of citizenship tests for unincorporated associations.
See id. at 197; United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S.
145, 145 (1965). Moreover, the Court's repeated, explicit deference to a legislative
solution means that Professor Cohen's judicial proposal may only fall upon closed ears.
See Carden, 494 U.S. at 197 ("Which [type of unincorporated association] is entitled to
be considered a 'citizen' for diversity purposes ... [is a] question[ I more readily
resolved by legislative prescription ....
");Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 150 ("[T]hese
arguments, however, appealing, are addressed to an inappropriate forum... [they
instead] ought to be made to the Congress and not to the courts.").
In contrast, the phenomenon of statelessness in connection with the push towards
universal treatment of all limited business organizations provides a more compelling
and ripe case for change. Further, incurring any and all transaction costs at one time
with a legislative solution might be a more optimal strategy. The parties best situated
to absorb such transaction costs would seem to be those most in favor of universal or
uniform business statutes. Moreover, on a substantive level, the hybridity of the
limited liability company does not seem to provide a sound legal basis that could
justify consolidated treatment of business organizations. See supra Part II.A.2.
394. See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction,101 HARv. L. REV.
610, 676-80 (1988) (contending use of general jurisdiction based on corporation's "home
base," e.g., principal place of business, can provide certainty).
395. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. For an interesting permutation of this problem involving
John Doe litigants, see Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil
Procedure To Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L,REV. 883 (1996); and Howard
M. Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants: A Study in § 1983
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now would be a mechanical exercise, entailing an examination of the
association's state filings. Because these filings are publicly
accessible, potential litigants have constructive notice of whether
they can establish the requisite diversity to support an alienage
suit. 96 Second, the test proposed here would be administratively
efficient. With regards to potential litigants, they would not have to
examine the membership of an unincorporated association and
determine an individual's domicile based on the existing multi-factor
test. 97 Instead, the association's principal place of business would
establish domicile and be ascertainable in one step. With regards to
courts, they would not have to adjudicate domicile disputes to
determine the ultimate citizenship of an unincorporated association.
Indeed, the simplicity of this determination almost would make any
related disputes appear frivolous. In sum, the path could not be any
easier or smoother for this type of jurisdictional, and ultimately,
corporate, collapsing.
V.

CONCLUSION

The citizenship test still applied to unincorporated associations
is a classic illustration of how the doctrine of stare decisis can
perpetuate outmoded rules. Contrary to conventional belief, the
check-the-box regulations have not transformed our understanding of
the business organization landscape. Courts and commentators
continue to conceptualize corporations as possessing characteristics
distinct from those of various unincorporated associations. This path
dependence has resulted in the preservation and active perpetuation
of disparate statutory and common corporate laws even though their
justificatory bases no longer exist. As a result, unincorporated
associations such as the limited liability company and the limited
liability partnership continue to be subject to unjustified rules that
can be used to immunize themselves from or shop forums through
the alienage jurisdiction statute.
By identifying and challenging the historical rationales for such
antiquated rules, this article has presented an entry point for

Procedure, 25 CARDOzO L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
396. See, e.g., Art, supra note 8, at 398 ("The legal fiction-or, more charitably, legal
principle-of constructive notice admittedly can surprise morally innocent but
unsophisticated parties, who are not aware of or proficient with the public filing
system, but this is accepted as a necessary element of a workable commercial
system.").
397. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454 (1973) ("In general, the domicile of
an individual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation. It is the
place to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. This general
statement, however, is difficult of application. Each individual case must be decided on
its own particular facts.").
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initiating a methodologically sound collapse of corporate distinctions.
The anomaly of statelessness violates many of the established and
accepted rationales for alienage jurisdiction. Vitiating these
rationales not only restores access properly to foreign aliens, but also
naturally comports with amending the citizenship for unincorporated
associations. By including these associations within section 1332, we
can acquire a uniform basis to allow the pursuit of entity
rationalization, if so inclined.

